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In this thesis, I will argue that there are various considerations which drove 
Leibniz to the adoption of simplicity as a fundamental criterion for substantiality. 
‘Simplicity’ seems to be a deceivingly obvious term, but on closer inspection it turns out 
to be nonetheless in need of further explanation. Leibniz’s definition as that which is 
‘without parts’ does not lead us to an understanding unless it is clearly set out what 
‘being a part’ entails and whether simplicity goes beyond indivisibility. The 
reconstruction of such considerations will be of help in carving out a more determinate 
content of this notion as it features in Leibniz’s metaphysical system, and will explain 
how it came to be assigned a core function in his philosophy. Various undertakings 
throughout his lifetime about activity, unity, indivisibility and impredicability finally 
culminate in the notion of simplicity. 
Within this overall development, several different areas of science and 
philosophy have taken influence on Leibniz’s considerations. There is, obviously, an 
overreaching metaphysical strand, which tries to account for a notion of substance that is 
in accordance with the requirements from other, more specific strands. Some demands 
derive from Leibniz’s reflections on physics, most importantly the notion of force, and 
from logical considerations concerning the concept of substance. Equally important are 
theological considerations concerning the simplicity of God, and thus the hierarchy of 
monads and their similarity with God. Part of the answer as to what to regard and not 
to regard as partless, i.e. simple, can also be found in Leibniz’s mathematical writings. First 
and foremost it is mereology that occupies itself with the notions of parts and wholes 
and will thus give clues as to how to understand the terms explicitly involved in the 
definition of ‘simplicity’. But Leibniz also frequently feels the need to resort to 
mathematics and the notions of ‘point’ and ‘function’ in order to illuminate the notion 
of a simple substance. Bringing all these strands together will finally give a clearer 






I am deeply indebted to my supervisors, Maria Rosa Antognazza, who has 
carefully read and commented on many drafts of this thesis and without whose input 
and the occasionally required motivational words, this thesis would probably have never 
been finished. The equally careful reading of this thesis combined with his profound 
knowledge of all things early modern (and otherwise) made my second supervisor, 
Jasper Reid, an indispensible contributor to the thoughts presented in it.  
I would not be writing a thesis at all without the tremendous support of my 
family, especially my parents, who have encouraged me to pursue in my life whatever 
makes me happy. I hope they are satisfied with this thesis as the outcome of their 
encouragement and with who I have become. My sister Elisabeth has always been a 
tower of strength in my life and supplied me continuously with a place to on the 
occasional breaks I needed from Leibniz. My grandmother passed away during the 
process of writing this thesis. All I can hope for is that she would have been proud, had 
she seen this. 
The pursuit a PhD would be a far lonelier endeavour without the presence of 
caring fellow students. The Philosophy Department at King’s College is particular well-
stocked with such individuals. I want to thank in particular for their tremendous 
support, for keeping me supplied with coffee, sweets and kind words throughout these 
years, and for being in general absolutely wonderful human beings: Michael Campbell, 
Mike Coxhead, Paul Doody, Alexander Douglas, Owen Englefield, Giulia Felappi, Alex 
Franklin, John Heron, Chris Machut, Clare Moriarty, Peter Ridley, Paola Romero, Saloni 
de Souza, Peter Sutton, Caspar Wilson, Jennifer Wright, and John Wright. I am certain 
that I have forgotten to name a lot of people who have made essential contributions to 
my time at King’s being such a wonderful time. Thank you all! 
In order to pursue a PhD at King’s, I have left behind a wonderful department 
in Graz, which provided me throughout my stay in London with a welcoming place to 
go back to once in a while and the opportunity to try out my ideas. I am deeply indebted 
to my former (most wonderful) chef, Udo Thiel, and his fantastic team, particularly Inge 
Röllig. Without them, as well as Harald Berger and Werner Sauer – who first introduced 
6	  	  
me to the marvels of the philosophy of Leibniz – I might not have even thought about 
writing a thesis in this area at all.  
I have also left behind great friends, who have supported me, often from long 
range: Andreas Berghold, Ulrike Freitag, Michael Matzer, Michaela Miesenböck, Tanja 
Peball, and Eva Pessl. I will hopefully see you all again soon, after having neglected you 
all in the last stages of this thesis. 
It might sometimes go by unnoticed how tremendously important not only the 
academic staff and fellow students are in writing a PhD, but also all other parts of a 
department. I have had the opportunity to teach a number of wonderful and brilliant 
undergraduates from whose views and objections I have learned a lot. I wish all of them 
the best in their future endeavours. Equally important, though in a different way, has 
been the administrative staff in the Department. Without them and their competent 
handling of a variety of issues, probably everything would break down. 
I have benefitted from having available a wide range of excellent literature 
written on Leibniz, among them Shane Duarte, who has kindly provided me with a 
manuscript of his forthcoming paper on ‘Leibniz and Prime Matter’. 
My gratitude goes to the Arts and Humanities Research Council who funded 







A Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt und Berlin: Akademie‐Verlag, 1923–). 
Referenced by series, volume and page.  
AG Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). 
C Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, ed. Louis 
Couturat (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903). 
DS Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, 2 vols., ed. G. E. 
Guhrauer (Berlin: Veit, 1838– 40). Referenced by volume and page. 
G Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Die philosophischen Schriften, 7 vols., ed. C. I. 
Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90). Referenced by volume and page.  
GM Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, 7 vols., ed. C. I. 
Gerhardt (Berlin: A. Asher, and Halle: H.W. Schmidt, 1849–63; Reprint, 
Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971). Referenced by volume and page. 
Gr Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Textes inédits d’après des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque 
provincale d’Hanovre, ed. Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1948). 
L Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd edition, ed. and 
trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969). 
LA Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Leibniz–Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and trans. 
H. T. Mason (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967). 
LDB  Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Leibniz–Des Bosses Correspondence, ed. and trans. 
Brandon Look and Donald Rutherford (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007). 
8	  	  
LDV Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Leibniz–De Volder Correspondence, ed. and trans. 
Paul Lodge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
NE Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. 
Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). 
RA  Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the 
Continuum Problem, 1672–1686, ed. and trans. Richard Arthur (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 
SL Leibniz, Gottfried Willhelm. The Shorter Leibniz Texts. A Collection of New 
Translations, ed. and trans. Lloyd Strickland (London: Continuum, 2006). 
WF Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Leibniz's ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary 
Texts, ed. and trans. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Oxford 






1 The Monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance 
that enters into composites – simple, that is, without parts. 
2 And there must be simple substances, since there are composites; for the 
composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate, of simples.1 
 
When thinking about Leibniz’s notion of a ‘simple substance’, a wide variety of 
problems and worries come immediately to mind: How can something simple have a 
multitude of perceptions? How can many simple substances make up an extended, 
spatial thing? But what one might not immediately be led to ask oneself is a crucial 
question and a prerequisite for answering all further questions: What does it mean to be 
simple? ‘Simplicity’ seems to be an obvious term, but it turns on closer inspection out to 
be nonetheless one that is in need of further explanation. Its definition as that which is 
‘without parts’ does not lead us much closer to an understanding unless it is clearly set 
out what ‘being a part’ entails. One might be tempted to immediately identify ‘simplicity’ 
with ‘indivisibility’2, but that seems a rather strong assumption, since though what is 
simple seems by necessity to be indivisible, this relation does not seem to hold vice versa.3 
The name itself that Leibniz uses in order to refer to simple substances might provide a 
clue: ‘monad’ derives from the Greek monas, i.e. a unit or what is one. But this does not 
mean that the notion of ‘atoms’, i.e. that which is indivisible, does not play a major part 
in his description of simple substances as well: “There are only atoms of substance, that is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Monadology’ (1714), G VI 607/AG 213. 
2 As seems to be done, e.g., by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., “Leibniz on the Simplicity of Substance,” Rice 
University Studies 63.4 (1977).  
3 This might not have been made explicit in the classical or early modern atomistic accounts, but it seems 
to be a consequence of the structure of atoms. As Bayle points out, “for every extension, no matter how 
small it may be, has a right and a left side, an upper and a lower side” (Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical 
Dictionary. Selections, transl., with an introduction and notes by Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1965), 360, i.e. ‘Zeno’, Note G). This seems even clearer in the case of Gassendi’s atoms, which 
are not perfectly round, but have also hooks that allow them to interlock. But not only in classical theories 
of atomism does the reverse relation from indivisibles to simplicity not hold, it does neither for the young 
Leibniz, whose early attempts to account for the continuum at some point entail the claim that 
infinitesimals “and are characterized as lacking extension, but nonetheless containing parts having no 
distance from one another, what he calls “indistant” parts.” (Richard T. W. Arthur, “Actual Infinitesimals 
in Leibniz’s Early Thought,” in The Philosophy of the Young Leibniz, ed. Mark Kulstad et al. (Suttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2009), 12 [= Studia Leibnitiana Sonderhefte, Band 35.])  
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real unities absolutely destitute of parts […]”4 There obviously is a strong connection 
between simplicity, unity, and indivisibility, but what it amounts to requires further 
investigation. Since Leibniz had employed the notions of unity and indivisibility for 
years in order to describe substances, the question arises why he felt compelled to 
introduce the further notion of ‘simplicity’ in 1695 and what he thought it might add to 
his philosophy. I will argue in the following that there is a development in his thinking 
that finally leads Leibniz to embrace the idea of simplicity as the crucial feature of 
substance that can be employed to capture or explain further essential features. 
 Any account of Leibniz’s development seemingly needs to determine whether 
there are significant changes in his philosophy and various metaphysically different 
systems throughout the years5 or if we can talk about a more or less continuous 
development of one system6. But such a decision is to some extent based on the focus 
of analysis and how overall consistencies and inconsistencies are weighted. The account 
I will propose does not require such a decision for the major part of Leibniz’s writings, 
that is from his earliest publication in 1663 to the introduction of ‘simplicity’ in 16957 
(and to a good extent even for the following years). What will be carved out is an 
overall framework, within which the idea of substance has developed and sharpened 
until it culminated in the ‘monad’. This overall framework sets out to be rather general 
and focuses on the explanatory functions of terms rather than on the ontology of the 
underlying substances, i.e. while it is required that substances are active and unified, less 
attention will be paid to the question if they are atoms, Cartesian matter or something 
else, unless the argument demands such attention. These general considerations about 
the role of substance in various contexts lead the young Leibniz (especially during the 
1670s) to speculate about the existence and nature of material substances and how to 
explain their unity. Since he is, in those years, only limited in scope by very general 
assumptions, there is a wide variety of different explanations concerning the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ‘System of Nature’ (1695), G VI 482/AG 142. 
5 See, e.g., Daniel Garber, Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and 
Catherine Wilson, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989). 
6 See, e.g., Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994) and Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
7 ‘Simple substances’ appear for the first time in the unpublished ‘Remarques sur les Objections de M. 
Foucher’ (1695): “[I]n actual substantial things, the whole is a result or coming together of simple 
substances, or rather of a multitude of real unities.” (G IV 491/AG 146.) 
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constitution of the continuum and how continuous bodies cohere available to him, and 
he takes ample room for experimenting with these options, despite some of them being 
incompatible with each other.8 But there is a more general concern that all these 
approaches and solutions have in common, namely how to account for the unity of 
corporeal substances. After realizing that there are no continuous bodies in nature and 
that the solution to the problem of the continuum does therefore not deliver an 
explanation for the coherence of composed or aggregated things, Leibniz shifts his 
focus back onto substantial forms as a principle not only of unity, but also of 
indivisibility. By the time of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), it is the “indivisible forms 
or natures”9 that cause in some way the unity of substance. The indivisibility in the 
context of the Discourse and the following correspondence with the Jansenist Antoine 
Arnauld is closely connected with another feature of substance that Leibniz develops in 
those years (even though it clearly has Aristotelian roots), namely the impredicability of 
substance. And all these various concerns, driven by the wish to explain the phenomena 
of seemingly active and unified corporeal things we encounter in the world– hence all 
these considerations about activity, unity, indivisibility and impredicability – finally 
culminate in the notion of simplicity. 
Within this overall development, several different areas of science and philosophy 
have taken influence on Leibniz considerations. There is, obviously, an overarching 
metaphysical strand, which tries to capture a notion of substance that is in accordance with 
the requirements imposed by other, more specific strands. But the being in place of 
such an encompassing metaphysics does not require a subscription to the general claim 
that metaphysics is always, especially in the context of discovery and experience, prior. 
It is rather the case that some of the demands placed on the notion of substance 
originate from Leibniz’s reflections on physics, which guide his thinking from very early 
on, but possibly the most metaphysically important moment for the undertaking at 
hand is his introduction of the notion of force, which will be intimately connected with 
the notion of substance:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The most extensive treatments of Leibniz’s views concerning the continuum up to the 1680s can be 
found in the writings of Richard T. W. Arthur, especially his ‘Introduction’ to RA, and Philip Beeley’s 
Kontinuität und Mechanismus. Zur Philosophie des jungen Leibniz in ihrem ideengeschichtlichen Kontext. (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996 [= Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa Vol. 30.]). 
9 ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ (1686) §18, G IV 444/AG 52. 
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[T]he concept of forces or powers, which the Germans call Kraft and the French la 
force, and for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings 
the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of 
substance.10 
 
This is no surprise since Leibniz entertains the idea that metaphysics is required in 
order to ground key notions of physics throughout his philosophical career.11 But 
physics is by no means the only area that influenced his ideas on the notion of 
substance. Equally important are theological considerations, most importantly for the 
concern at hand is the simplicity of God and thus the hierarchy of monads or the 
similarity of monads with God: “[...] God alone is the primitive unity or the first 
[originaire] simple substance [...]”12 In Leibniz we find “a general top-down theory of the 
constitution (and not just the causation) of the constitutive properties, or realities, of finite 
things as deriving their positive content from those of the infinite being” 13 . If 
substances are similar to God in the sense that their positive properties are derived 
from God’s perfection, there might be a prima facie obvious way leading from a simple 
God to simple substances. But even if the positive content of a created substance is 
derived from God, it is less clear how one might account for limitation without adding 
anything and therefore risking the created substance to turn out to be complex and 
composed of distinct parts rather than genuinely simple.  
 Part of the answer to what we should regard and not regard as partless, i.e. 
simple, can also be found in Leibniz’s mathematical writings. First and foremost it is 
mereology that occupies itself with the notions of parts and wholes and will thus give 
clues as to how to understand terms crucially involved in the definition of ‘simplicity’. 
But there is another reason why mathematical insights prove fruitful for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance’ (1694): G IV 469/L 433. 
11 It seems to be another feature common to Leibniz’s considerations throughout the years that physics 
itself is incapable of explaining the activity of physical objects, though these reflections are first coined in 
terms of motion and only later on in terms of force. But at any stage of this development matter must be 
supplied with some substantial form or active principle in order to account for the phenomena we 
experience on a daily basis and that physics aims at describing. We will see later, in chapter 3.2. on the 
correspondence with De Volder, that things are a bit more difficult. Despite the claim that metaphysics 
grounds physics, we will see there one of the more explicit cases where Leibniz claims that physics is in a 
certain sense epistemologically prior or ‘the gate to’ metaphysics. But we will look at this claim in due 
course. 
12 ‘Monadology’ (1714) §47, G VI 641/AG 219. 
13 Robert Merrihew Adams, “The Priority of the Perfect in the Philosophical Theology of the Continental 
Rationalists,” in Rationalism, Platonism and God, ed. Michael Ayers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
103. 
13	  	  
illumination of ‘simplicity’: Leibniz often feels the need to resort to mathematics in 
order to build analogies with what he has in mind concerning the notion of a simple 
substance:  
 
We could call them [i.e. real unities] metaphysical points: they have something vital, a 
kind of perception, and mathematical points are the points of view from which they 
express the universe. [...] [M]athematical points are exact, but they are mere 
modalities. Only metaphysical points or points of substance (constituted by 
forms and souls) are exact and real [...]14 
 
 
It allows him, in addition, to unite the notion of a simple substance with the idea of a 
representation of a manifold of perceptions or the possession of a variety of different 
modifications: 
 
[...] the simplicity of a substance does not prevent the plurality of modifications 
which must necessarily be found together in the same simple substance; and 
these modifications must consist in the variety of relations [rapport] which the 
substance has with things outside. In the same way there may be found, in one 
centre or point, though it is perfectly simple, an infinity of angles formed by 
lines which meet in it.15 
 
 
But it is not only their position as a point of view and their ability to unify an infinity of 
perspectives that suggest mathematical points as a suitable and illuminating analogy. 
Leibniz, furthermore, employs mathematical ideas in order to explain how those simple 
unextended substances can enter into extended composite objects: 
 
One must not infer that the indivisible substance enters into the composition 
of body as a part, but rather as an essential, internal requisite, just as one grants 
that a point is not a part that makes up a line, but rather something 
heterogeneous which is, nevertheless, necessarily required for the line to be and 
to be understood.16 
 
This manifold of modifications might not arise from Leibniz’s attempt’s to supply his 
epistemological views and the phenomena we perceive with a metaphysical 
underpinning, but it is illuminated by considering them. These reflections are not only 
connected with simplicity by possibly posing a problem for it, namely the introduction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ‘New System’ (1695), G IV.483/AG 142.  
15 ‘Principles of Nature and Grace’ (1714) §2: G VI 598/AG 207. 
16 ‘Notes on Fardella’ (1690), A VI iv 1669/AG 103. 
14	  	  
of a multiplicity into a simple substance, but they are also related to the notion of force 
and the active character of substance:  
 
But if we take ‘action’ to be an endeavour towards perfection, and ‘passion’ to be 
the opposite, then genuine substances are active only when their perceptions (for 
I grant perceptions to all of them) are becoming better developed and more 
distinct, just as they are passive only when their perceptions are becoming more 
confused.17 
 
We see here a close connection between forces that are the dominant subject of 
Leibnizian physics, confused and clear perceptions, and perfection, which are all 
ultimately united in the metaphysical determination of what it is to be a thing that can 
be the subject of all these aspects: a simple substance. 
In addition, there are several years worth of thought leading up to the 
introduction of simple substances, in which Leibniz emphasized a conception of 
substance that had primarily its logical properties in view. This logical strand concerning 
the impredicability and role of being the ultimate subject of predication will also prove 
important for the development of simple substances. 
Once the development has been laid out, the possible intension of ‘simplicity’ 
becomes not only richer in content, but also more restricted in application. This 
provides in return further means to explain the constitution of simple substances.  
 
Now what seems quite puzzling is the fact that the notion of matter keeps 
popping up in Leibniz’s philosophy, also in the monadological writings18. The main 
question is, if and how matter can be at all belong to a simple substance. One way to go 
would be to rely heavily on the epistemological branch and ascribe a phenomenalism 
concerning matter to Leibniz. Matter, then, is just an appearance, though an ordered 
one, since its perception is pre-regulated by the perceptual harmony between things. 
This solution is indeed suggested in some of Leibniz’s writings, but it sits uneasily with 
the developmental story and the various strands entering into it, since it neglects the 
fact, among other worries, that the notion of substance is supposed to ground physics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1704) II.xxi.72, NE 210. 
18 I adopt the strategy of referring to Leibniz’s writings that explicitly include monads as fundamental 
constituents as ‘monadological’, while the name giving text is referred to as the Monadology. 
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as well. One might want, so to say, a matter more ‘real’ than just a phenomenon.19 
Another option is to claim that matter and form are united into one substance in a way 
that a monad is indeed a corporeal substance.20 But how would a substantial form 
achieve the required unification and is the resulting unity strong enough to establish 
genuine simplicity? Surely, a unification merely by means of perception seems too little 
to establish a genuine unity consisting of two drastically different constituents. But is 
there another option given by Leibniz? 
The following proposed ‘functionalist’ reading of form and matter tries to a 
certain extent to postpone the analysis of the ontological status of matter. It focuses 
more on the explanatory work it does and less on the ontological correlata they might 
have. Using the terms ‘matter’ and ‘form’ as explanatory principles for certain 
substantial features can already be found in Aquinas (even though he uses these terms 
also as metaphysical constituents – but these two uses do not always coincide). Leibniz 
seems to employ form and matter in a similar way: Matter is what accounts for the 
resistance, passivity, and limitation of a substance. This take on matter also explains why 
creatures, which are necessarily limited in their being and perception, are not perfectly 
moral, and why resisting can never happen without ‘body’ – which is a further core 
notion that is in need of additional analysis. If Leibniz did not employ a functionalist 
notion of matter, it remains rather unclear why he would claim that form, and therefore 
also the soul, can never be without matter at the time of the monadological system with 
mind-like substances as its fundamental ontological constituents, instead of keeping in 
line with the orthodox view which claims the soul can exist independently of the body 
in order to secure its immortality. The answer suggested in the following is relatively 
simple: Because it is matter that limits substances, therefore a substance can never be 
without matter, unless it is an unlimited substance free of all matter, i.e. God. Matter 
seen in this way is defined in a purely negative way: it is privation or negation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For a discussion concerning the compatibility of substance idealism, i.e. the assumption that the 
fundamental ontological constituents are monads, with a kind of ‘matter realism’, the assumption that 
matter can exist independently of being perceived by a mind, see Donald Rutherford, “Leibniz as 
Idealist,” Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4 (2008). 
20 As proposed for example by Pauline Phemister, Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, Passivity and 
Corporeal Substances in Leibniz's Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005). This view is also proposed as being 
one part of a set of options held by Leibniz in Glenn Hartz, Leibniz's Final System. Monads, Matter, and 
Animals (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), who argues that Leibniz’s ontological commitment has to 
be determined on a case-to-case basis.  
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therefore also does not add anything to the created substance. In the ‘Dialogue effectif’ 
from 1695, Leibniz equates imperfection and negation by stating that all created things 
“are bounded or imperfect by virtue of the principle of negation or of nothingness they 
contain, by virtue of the lack of an infinity of perfections in them”21 
Such an account of matter, firstly, is in accordance with the description of the 
constitution of substance as given in the correspondence with De Volder: 
 
I therefore distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy, i.e., soul; (2) matter, namely, 
primary matter, i.e., primitive passive power; (3) the monad completed by these 
two things [Monada his duabas completam]; (4) the mass [massa], i.e., the secondary 
matter, i.e., the organic machine, for which innumerable subordinate monads 
come together; and (5) the animal, i.e., the corporeal substance, which the 
monad dominating in the machine makes one.22  
 
This passage prima facie suggests a composition of a monad out of a formal and a 
material aspect, and a realistic view on corporeal substances. But on the reading 
proposed here we are not forced to regard the individual steps from (1) to (3) as treating 
different things, but distinctions the mind can make when looking at a substance. If (2) 
primary matter is in itself nothing and not really distinct from (1) entelechy, the former 
does not add anything to the latter when one takes (3) the complete monad into view. 
And as (4) secondary matter is essentially derived from the coming together of (3) 
monads, it does not seem to constitute a substantial part either but merely an ens per 
aggregationem. Whether or not (5) has to be regarded, speaking in metaphysically strictly 
terms, as a different kind of substance will be part of the following debate.  
But this reading points to another issue worth addressing. If this reasoning is 
correct, it will turn out to be highly questionable, if not impossible, to assign Leibniz a 
camp within the materialism-immaterialism distinction. For Leibniz, matter matters, it is 
an important principle that accounts for a variety of phenomena, despite the fact that in 
the case of primary matter it is in itself nothing positive – the case of secondary matter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ‘Dialogue on Human Freedom and the Origin of Evil’ (1695), Gr 364/AG 114; see also ‘Discourse on 
Metaphysics’ (1686) §30: “And it is to this [i.e. an original imperfection or limitation connatural to all 
creatures], in my view, that we must reduce the opinion of Saint Augustine and other authors, the opinion 
that the root of evil is in nothingness, that is to say, in the privation or limitation of creatures” (G IV 
455/AG 62). 
22 To De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 265. 
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as we will see, is a less straightforward case, but it is equally important. In this sense, one 
might be reluctant to call him either a materialist or an immaterialist.  
 
The answer to why Leibniz introduces simplicity seems clear: it is the most 
economic way of putting things, it captures all other features that are essential to 
substance and it does so apparently better than indivisibility and unity would do, since 
what has no parts cannot be divisible and is necessarily a unity. But this simplicity also 
crucially hints at a certain type of substantial composition that is in accordance with the 
partlessness of substances: While a substance consists of matter and form, the former 
amounts to nothing, i.e. it is not an ontologically positive constituent, not even an 
incomplete one. Primary matter as negation, limitation, or privation does not only 
preserve the substance’s simplicity, but it also features in the accounts of phenomena in 
a variety of fields, such as metaphysical evil (with the positive effect that as negation it 
would not be something created by God), epistemic confusion, physical resistance, etc. 
The notion of simplicity allows Leibniz to concentrate an array of conceptions and 
explanations onto the idea of an active substance.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 A similar view on primary matter is also proposed in Maria Rosa Antognazza, “Primary Matter, 
Primitive Passive Power, and Creaturely Limitation in Leibniz,” Studia Leibnitiana: Leibniz et les Scolastiques, 
ed. Arnaud Pelletier (forthcoming) and Shane Duarte, "Leibniz and Prime Matter," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 53.3 (forthcoming). Both are connecting the notion of primary matter as privation or non-being 
with Scholastic predecessors, Antognazza with the discussion concerning the status of primary matter 
between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, Duarte with issues concerning universal hylomorphism, 
predominantly in Bonaventure, and Aquinas. 
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1.1. Scholastic Legacy: A Thomistic Explanatory Framework 
 
Recollecting late in his life the steps in his philosophical development, 
Leibniz described his ways of thinking in a well-known passage from a letter to 
Nicolas Rémond in the following way: 
 
I discovered Aristotle as a lad, and even the Scholastics did not repel me; 
even now I do not regret this. But then Plato too, and Plotinus, gave me 
some satisfaction, not to mention other ancient thinkers whom I consulted 
later. After finishing the trivial schools, I fell upon the moderns, and I recall 
walking in a grove on the outskirts of Leipzig called the Rosental, at the age 
of fifteen, and deliberating whether to preserve substantial forms or not. 
Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to mathematics. It 
is true that I did not penetrate into its depths until after some conversations 
with Mr. Huygens in Paris. But when I looked for the ultimate reasons for 
mechanism, and even for the laws of motion, I was greatly surprised to see 
that they could not be found in mathematics but that I should have to 
return to metaphysics. This led me back to entelechies, and from the 
material to the formal, and at last brought me to understand after many 
corrections and forward steps in my thinking, that monads or simple 
substances are the only true substances and that material things are only 
phenomena, though well founded and well connected.24 
 
 
Given that we have such a seemingly clear description at hand it is not surprising 
that it has been widely acknowledged that Scholastic philosophy had a tremendous 
influence on Leibniz’s thinking. But there is hardly any consensus among 
commentators about the exact extent of this influence or when and in what way 
Leibniz emancipates himself from it at various stages of his life. Leibniz himself 
does not give any detailed information about or reasons for this alleged 
development from Scholastic philosophy to mechanism and mathematics and back 
again. The cited passage by itself indeed does not even establish a sufficiently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Leibniz to Rémond, 10 January 1714, G III 606/L 654-5. 
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strong basis for the assumption that the development Leibniz considers himself to 
have gone through is a fundamental change of mind and theory. It might equally 
well be just a description of a shift in emphasis, a change from an interest in 
Scholastic philosophy to physical and mathematical problems and back to 
metaphysics again. 25  But it is, in addition, not even clear which Scholastic 
philosophers had a lasting influence on Leibniz. Some commentators have 
recognized a strong influence of the philosophy of Francisco Suárez,26 especially of 
his nominalism, while others have felt it to be more appropriate to ascribe to him a 
rather Scotist position concerning some crucial issues27. It is, in general, difficult to 
evaluate the concrete influence of individual thinkers on Leibniz, given that any 
such ascription is premised on a certain interpretation of his philosophical position. 
But one way or another, it seems clear that there has been some kind of influence 
by the preceding tradition (also by Leibniz’s own admission) and bringing this 
tradition into relation with the problems that concern us in the following might 
turn out to cast light onto the issues we are dealing with here. And though we will 
return to Scotus below, we shall first take a slightly less orthodox look at a tradition 
that has been considered significantly less often, at least explicitly, namely the 
metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.  
One might with some right claim that there are interpretations of Leibniz’s 
philosophy which seem to (at least implicitly) cover a potential Thomistic influence, 
namely all those ascribing some Aristotelian hylomorphism to Leibniz.28 Aquinas is, 
after all, an important protagonist in the medieval Aristotelian tradition. But there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Especially the age of fifteen seems too early for a change towards mechanism, his Disputatio of 
1663 is clearly a rather Scholastic piece of work, which is unsurprising given the affinity of his 
teachers Thomasius and Scherzer towards Aristotle and Plato, but also considering their bias against 
the new mechanical philosophy. See Christia Mercer, “The Young Leibniz and his Teachers,” in The 
Young Leibniz and His Philosophy (1646-76), ed. Stuart Brown (Dordrecht: Springer, 1999) and her 
Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27-
38. 
26 See, e.g., Laurence B. McCullough, “Leibniz and Traditional Philosophy,” Studia Leibnitiana 10.2 
(1978), 254-270. For a more critical evaluation, see Andre Robinet, “Suárez im Werk von Leibniz,” 
Studia Leibnitiana 13.1 (1981), 76-96. 
27 See, e.g., Roger Ariew, “Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: Theory of Distinctions and 
Principle of Individuation,” in The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, ed. Benjamin Hill and Henrik 
Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 46-58. 
28 Most prominently Daniel Garber, “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years,” 
in The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz, ed. Kathleen Okruhlik and James Robert Brown (Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1985), 27-130 and his Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad. I might also consider Pauline 
Phemister’s Leibniz and the Natural World to fall into this category of interpreters, even though in a 
very different, less straightforwardly Aristotelian way. 
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are several reasons to look at Aquinas rather than at his Greek ancestor. First of all, 
Leibniz points several times in a positive way specifically to Thomas Aquinas, most 
prominently in his account of substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics and 
elsewhere: 
 
[I]t is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely and 
differ only in number [solo numero], and that what Saint Thomas asserts on 
this point about angels or intelligences (that here every individual is a lowest 
species) is true of all substances…29 
 
References like this usually do not receive much attention as it seems to be 
assumed that Leibniz’s claim here merely is that the fact that Aquinas considered 
each angel to constitute its own lowest species is true of all substances, and that he, 
Leibniz, happens to share this view. Aquinas’s reason for the assumption that each 
angel is its own lowest species is based on its lack of matter as a principle of 
individuation: “There can be many members of a species only because matter 
individuates the species form to make it this individual substance. Since the angels 
are pure forms without matter, each angel differs in kind or species from every 
other angel.”30 But there is the possibility that he wanted to indicate more with this 
reference, namely that something of the general constitution of Thomistic angels is 
also applicable to all individual substances, and it would be this constitution that 
grounds the further claim that each created individual is a lowest species. But at the 
moment, this is only a possibility, which I will explore further in a moment. Let us 
first consider other reasons that might make a look at Aquinas preferable to one at 
Aristotle. 
In addition to the frequent positive references, there are several important 
issues that both Leibniz and Aquinas feel the need to account for, but these are 
issues that are alien to Aristotle, since they are connected with certain theological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ (1686) §9, G IV 433/AG 41-2. Or similarly in ‘Primary Truths’ 
(1689):“[I]n nature, there cannot be two individual things that differ in number alone. For it 
certainly must be possible to explain why they are different, and that explanation must derive from 
some difference they contain. And so what St. Thomas recognized concerning separated 
intelligences, which, he said, never differ by number alone, must also be said of other things, for 
never do we find two eggs or two leaves or two blades of grass in a garden that are perfectly 
similar.” (C 519/AG 32) 
30 Brian J. Shanley, The Hackett Aquinas: The Treatise on the Divine Nature: Summa Theologiae I 1-13, 
transl., with commentary, by Brian J. Shanley, O.P., introd. by Robert Pasnau (Indianpolis: Hackett, 
2006), 286. 
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assumptions or constraints, such as creation, the simplicity and nature of God, or 
the immortality of the soul. Concerning the latter, Leibniz explicitly allies with 
Aquinas:  
I grant that the substantial form of the body is indivisible, and it seems to 
me that this is also Saint Thomas’s opinion; and I further grant that every 
substantial form or, indeed, every substance is indestructible and even 
ingenerable…31 
 
Not only these scattered positive references and shared interests, but also Leibniz’s 
persistent use of the notions of form and matter throughout his life should justify 
the effort of taking a closer look to see if Aquinas’s metaphysical system might 
provide some insight into Leibniz’s own theory. 
Like Aristotle in his Metaphysics, Aquinas takes some kind of familiarity with 
what types of things count as ‘substances’ for granted and as a starting point for 
further investigation. Those individual things we have some kind of familiarity 
with, i.e. humans, horses, etc. (or better: this human Socrates, the horse 
Bucephalus, and so on, since for him, as well as for Aristotle, what is a substance is 
always an individual, particular substance), are hylomorphic compounds, that is, 
compounds of matter and form. The first component of this compound, matter, is 
that which can have a form and which is potentiality, while the second component, 
form, is that which can be had by matter and which is actuality. Only together do 
they compose a persisting individual material substance of a certain kind, e.g. a 
horse, a human, and so on. Matter, as a constituent of actual corporeal individuals, 
is ‘signate matter’, i.e. “matter which is considered under determinate 
dimensions”32, and it is at the same time also the principle of individuation of this 
material substance.33 It is matter in this sense that explains why a being which is 
partly constituted of it is a material (or corporeal) object, such that the matter, bones 
and flesh of Socrates, explain why he is a material being, while his soul or substantial 
form explains why he is a human being. It seems obvious, at least for Aquinas, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 To Arnauld, 28 November/8 December 1686, G II 75/AG 78. 
32 Thomas Aquinas, Basic Works, ed. Jeffrey Hause and Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014), 
17. For a critical discussion of ‘signate matter’, see Christopher Hughes, Aquinas on Being, Goodness, 
and God (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 74-109. 
33 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: 
Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1911), I, qu. 75, art. 4: “[S]ignate matter […] is the principle of 
individuality […]. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, 
of this flesh, and of these bones”. 
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this type of matter cannot be part of the composition of an angel34 or any other 
incorporeal being. Slightly different is the situation concerning the human soul, 
which, even though it is naturally the form of some matter, can be, like angels in 
general, without such matter after the death of the corporeal human being (i.e. after 
the separation of signate matter and substantial form), even though only as 
incomplete35. This is the use of ‘form’ and ‘matter’ in the sense of ontological 
components of corporeal beings, a use that I would refer to as ‘substantial’, and 
which mirrors the use of these terms found in Aristotle.  
But form and matter are in the Thomistic framework not only basic 
constituents of material substances, they are also principles relevant to the 
explanation of several qualities observed in substances, one of the most important 
ones among them being change. This notion of change –borrowed from Aristotle 
and so far still in agreement with him – covers more than we might connect with it, 
but there is a rather simple general scheme underlying all change as Aquinas sees it: 
Something persists while something else connected with it changes. 
Hence there are two elements in each change, that is, in a temporal 
succession of two things which differ in some respect. In the case of substantial 
change, i.e. in the case of the corruption of one substance and the generation of 
another, what passes and is replaced by something else is a substantial form. In the 
case of the death of, say, Socrates the substantial form of Socrates, i.e. his soul, is 
replaced by the substantial form of the corpse, resulting in a material object that 
can only equivocally be called ‘Socrates’ body’ or even ‘human body’. But there is a 
more common kind of change, the one we encounter around us all the time, 
namely accidental change. Here an accidental form goes out of being and is 
replaced by a different accidental form, as happens when the still living Socrates 
enjoys the sunshine and changes from being pale to being tanned. In all cases of 
change there is also always some thing which remains or persists throughout the 
changing of the respective kinds of forms, i.e. a thing that is changed or underlies 
the change, which is called ‘matter’. Here we find another general division of a 
thing into form and matter, but in a different sense than in the substantial sense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Aquinas, Summa Theologia I, qu. 50, art. 1 & 2. 
35 ibid., qu. 75, art. 4. 
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that applies to the hylomorphic composition of corporeal substances and which is 
not coextensive with it. 
We are, in this way, able to identify two different notions of ‘form’ and 
‘matter’ in Aquinas: In a substantial sense we find (first and foremost substantial) 
form and matter to be the constituents of any material thing that qualifies as a 
substance. But we also find ‘form’ and ‘matter’ as used with respect to fulfilling a 
certain function in the explanation of how change takes place, and in this sense they 
are not coextensive with form and matter that are found to be the constituents of 
the corporeal composite substance. Phrased generally, matter in the functional 
sense is whatever it is that persists throughout change and, due to there being two 
different types of change, this ‘matter’ can and has to refer to different things in 
different kinds of change. In substantial change it is prime matter that constitutes 
the persisting component, as that which remains when the soul is substituted by the 
form of the corpse in the case of death. In accidental change, on the other hand, it 
is the whole substance, i.e. in the case of a corporeal substance it is the whole 
compound of substantial form and matter that persists and forms the matter of an 
accidental change. It is the form-matter-composite that is Socrates which remains 
and forms the basis for the change from pale to tanned when Socrates is spending 
time in the sun. Put in simpler terms: Since there are two different kinds of forms, 
substantial and accidental forms, there are two forms of change, one corresponding 
to each form. In the first case it is substantial form that goes out of being while 
another substantial form takes its place, while in the case of accidental change it is 
some accidental form of an individual substance that is being replaced by another.  
But some kind of change, because its definition is deliberately broad and is 
supposed to account for such a vast variety of cases, surely occurs in spiritual 
substances as well and we should, therefore, expect to find some kind of matter (in 
its function as an element in change, though not as a component of a corporeal 
substance) in them too. It might not be the kind of change of visible properties 
that we find when Socrates is tanning, but they nonetheless change insofar as they 
change place and gain knowledge.36 Aquinas himself did see the need to ascribe 
some kind of change to angels and hence the need to account for this change. He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ibid., qu.10, art. 5, resp. 
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goes about this by distinguishing matter in a ‘proper and generally accepted’ sense, 
which I have been calling ‘substantial’, from matter as it is used in the explanation 
of change. In the case of the former,  
 
the term "prime matter" is generally used to mean something which is in the 
genus of substance as a kind of potency, which is understood as excluding 
every species and form, and even as excluding privation, and yet is a 
potency capable of receiving both forms and privations […] Now if matter 
be taken in this sense, which is its proper and generally accepted meaning, it 
is impossible for matter to be in spiritual substances.37 
 
 
Here we have the notion of prime matter as pure potentiality38, as a formless39 mass 
which has only negative unity, i.e. is one due to a lack of any kind form40, which 
therefore does not have the kind of unity required for substantiality and which is 
not a unity by itself in a positive sense.41 While Leibniz will pick up “primary matter 
in the schools, if correctly interpreted”42 in order to illustrate the fundamental 
constitution of his notion of substance, it will not be the notion of a formless mass 
that is the fundamental substratum which is actualized by form that he picks up. 
This notion of matter as something akin to a bare substratum is, rather, a notion of 
matter Leibniz already criticises in his younger years. 
But in contrast to the ‘proper’, substantial notion of matter, Aquinas also 
recognizes that there is also the important functional role matter plays and “if we 
use the terms ‘matter’ and ‘form’ to mean any two things which are related to each 
other as potency and act, there is no difficulty in saying (so as to avoid a mere 
dispute about words) that matter and form exist in spiritual substances”43. Here 
Aquinas explicitly acknowledges that there is such a thing as matter in immaterial 
substances, even if it is not the kind of matter we primarily think of when we use 
the term. But we can find several other important functions that such a ‘matter’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Thomas Aquinas, On Spiritual Creatures (Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis), trans. M. C. 
Fitzpatrick and J. J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949), art. 1, resp. 
38 Aquinas, Summa Theologia I qu.77, art. 1, ad. 2. 
39 ibid., qu.47, art. 1, c. 
40 Thomas Aquinas, Basic Works, 20. 
41 It should be noted that there is not a univocal use of the term ‘prime matter’ in Leibniz’s writings, 
we find, for example, a different notion criticized in ‘De prima materia’ (1670—1671 (?)), A VI ii 
279-80, where the objections there are aimed at Aristotle and Cartesian ‘subtle matter’. 
42 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’, GM VI 237/AG 120. 
43 Aquinas, On Spiritual Creatures, art. 1, resp. 
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fulfils in Aquinas’s system, which surely are not restricted to corporeal substances 
either. One of them is, for example, its being the principle of passivity44. Aquinas 
himself seems to deny that the passivity, which is indeed also found in angels, 
requires matter, but that “a created spiritual substance is active and passive, not in 
consequence of form or matter, but according as it is in act or in potency”45. What 
he seems to have in mind here is that spiritual substances do not require matter in 
the substantial sense, but given that act-potency-relations can be spelled out as 
form-matter-relations, we could in this case refer to that which accounts for the 
passivity in spiritual substances nonetheless as being brought about as a function of 
some ‘matter’. What requires that all created substances have matter in the sense of 
potency is the presupposition that all creatures are, in contrast to their creator, 
necessarily limited and not purely active. Thus we find in Aquinas a way in which 
we can ascribe ‘matter’ to all created and hence limited substances in a functional 
sense, in their role in the description of the general constitution of creatures and in 
serving as a general explanatory principle, independent of the substances in 
question being material or immaterial. In this way it is also possible to ascribe 
matter (in a functionalist sense, though not in the substantial one) to purely 
spiritual substances, but without being committed to ascribing any corporeality to 
them. This ascription of certain limiting or passive principles alongside active 
principles or forms by itself does not require any commitment to further specified 
kinds of substances and can hence be applied to all substances that fulfil the 
criterion of limitation and passivity, which would be – for Aquinas, but also, as we 
will see, for Leibniz – all created substances. 
This distinction between a substantial and functionalist account of form 
and matter can be illustrated by a certain view held by Aquinas, which prima facie is 
at odds with his overall Aristotelian metaphysics. In Aristotle it seems to be clear 
that in the cases in which a substantial form and some matter are the constituents 
that enter into the constitution of a particular corporeal individual, the form is the 
form of some matter and thus it cannot be without it. There does not seem to be 
any space for a human soul existing independently of or prior to the human body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 ibid., art 1, obj. 16: “nothing is active and passive on the same basis, but each thing is active 
through its form, whereas it is passive through its matter”. 
45 ibid., art 1, resp. 
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of which it is the form, and the body is – properly speaking – only a human body 
as long as it is actualized by a human form, i.e. a soul. For Aquinas, who adopts the 
notion of the human soul as being essentially associated with a particular body, this 
brings about a certain conflict, because it seems to jeopardise the immortality of the 
soul. Any defence of immortality within this hylomorphic account of the human 
constitution seems to require that a human soul can be without a human body, at 
least for some time until they are reunited, since Aristotle is explicit that death or 
corruption is the separation of a substantial form from its matter. Aquinas 
acknowledges this difficulty and tries ease the tension by allowing the soul, 
although it is naturally the form of a body, to be without this body, even though 
only as an incomplete substance. But this problem arises only under the 
consideration of form and matter as ontological, positive, distinct constituents of 
material substances. It does not seem to be an immediate consequence of the 
functionalist view of matter and form, where matter as a principle of passivity and 
limitation, on the contrary, is even required to remain a constituent of the 
substance, lest substances should turn into purely active (and hence godlike) beings 
after their death. But it does not require that the body usually or naturally 
associated with the substance remains, since – within the functionalist framework – 
no decision has been made as to whether such bodies exist at all. It is possible that 
it is a view of matter similar to the functionalist one proposed here that Leibniz has 
in mind when he claims that no created substantial form (including that of an 
angel) could ever be without matter, also when considering its constitution after 
death.46 A similar view might also be ascribed to Aquinas’s souls after death: If they 
still undergo any change, they must have some matter. And if we emphasise the 
sense of ‘matter’ as an explanatory principle which accounts first and foremost for 
certain functions such as limitation and passivity, then we must surely understand 
all created substances to be composed of form and matter, even if they are not 
‘corporeal’ in a workaday sense. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 An early hint at this theory might already be found in the Correspondence with Arnauld: “[O]ne 
will easily convince oneself that corruption or death is nothing other than the diminution and 
envelopment of an animal which nevertheless goes on surviving and remaining alive and organic” 
(G II 123/LA 157). But at this moment, this amounts only to a tentative hint, at least until we have 
taken a closer look at this correspondence in the next chapter. 
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This distinction will prove relevant for further considerations about the 
nature of substance, especially in the case of Leibniz. We will see that throughout 
his philosophical writings, form and matter play an important role in his accounts 
of the constitution of substance, and often this usage has been regarded as 
involving several dramatic shifts over what these notions amount to. But the 
functional reading emphasizes an overall narrative that makes plausible the 
development from early considerations about cohesion and the continuum via the 
introduction of complete concepts to a culmination in simple substances. This 
development is driven by the search for an explanation of the unity and activity by 
which each substance is necessarily characterised, but it also incorporates an 
explanation of the essential limitation and passivity of creatures. While under a 
substantial reading of these notions, the claim of radical shifts in Leibniz’s 
metaphysics seems to be indeed suggested (even though it is still a matter of 
discussion as to when and to what extent these shifts take place), through the eyes 
of a functionalist reading, we find a unifying and unified train of thought. This 
latter reading also takes into account an aspect fundamental to unity and 
problematic on the substantial reading: The question of the relation between form 
and matter that allows them to form an individual substance. Depending on how 
strong the notion of unity is taken to be, there is a problem in the distinction 
between form and matter as two distinct components of one substance. If strict 
unity should turn out to involve the idea of inseparability of parts, it might be asked 
whether being united naturally – as Aristotelians would view the relation between 
form and matter in corporeal individuals – is sufficient. This question seems even 
more pressing in Aquinas, who in fact allows for a substantial form to exist 
independently of matter, even if only as an incomplete being. But a functionalist 
reading of form and matter does not by itself involve a commitment to there being 
two principles independent of each other and several passages in Leibniz will 
suggest that they are not indeed related to each other as two different components 
or parts of one thing. Rather they are one thing, that is, there is only a created 
substance, viewed under two different aspects. In this way the real unity that is a 
substance is ontologically prior to its active and passive constituent, in a way that is 
best captured by the notion of simplicity, since this allows for unity in the strictest 
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sense. And it is unity that consistently plays an important role in Leibniz’s 




1.2. Leibniz’s Early Years 
 
1.2.1. Fundamental Principles of Substantiality 
 
When it comes to Scholastic heritage in Leibniz, his Disputatio de principio 
individui47, written in 1663, is an obvious place to start. There are several reasons 
why this text is of interest. First, for systematic reasons, it should be noted that it 
was published with a preface by Leibniz’s teacher Jakob Thomasius, in which he 
“presented Aristotle’s doctrine regarding individuals as a distinction between 
‘monadic’ and ‘sporadic’ individuals. A monadic individual […] constituted a 
species on its own (such as, in Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation, each angel), 
whereas a sporadic individual was just one of the many individuals embraced by the 
same species.”48 Though it is clear that the monadological account is by no means 
present yet, it is remarkable that Leibniz’s later monads will each constitute their 
own species as well. But one must keep in mind that the Disputatio itself was written 
for the particular academic purpose of being awarded the degree of a bachelor by 
the not yet 17-year-old Leibniz, and therefore not everybody is convinced that this 
writing should be taken as an important piece for the interpretation of Leibniz’s 
philosophy. We are indeed warned that “the Scholastic arguments of the Disputatio 
are taken sometimes too seriously at their face value by interpreters.”49  
But even if several parts of this thesis seem to be not much more than an 
exhibition of the vast knowledge gained during his philosophical studies (and, 
according to his own testimony, it seems some of it was gained already in his 
childhood), it is nonetheless the first philosophical writing by Leibniz available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 ‘Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui’ (1663), G IV 15-26. 
48 Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 57. 
49 Stefano Di Bella, The Science of the Individual: Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual Substance (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2005), 25. 
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us and it is remarkable that he already in those early years lays down several 
important decisions about what a principle of individuation should be, even if 
some of the details might change over time: What Leibniz is looking for is 
“something real or what is called a physical principle that can serve as the 
foundation for the formal notion of individual in the mind”50, which is an internal 
principle of being (and not primarily one of knowing). Leibniz seems in general 
hesitant to admit that we can decide with certainty whether any individual we 
encounter in experience, apart from ourselves, is indeed a unified substance, i.e. if it 
is one body rather than many. But he is consistently clear about one aspect 
concerning the core of substance as a being, namely, that it must be a being which 
has unity. It seems thus that the intension of the concept ‘substance’, though the 
number of criteria involved increases over the years alongside the rigour with 
which they are interpreted, is regarded by him to be less contentious and 
problematic.51 But what falls within its extension seems to be a more puzzling 
question, and especially during the early years Leibniz seems to be keen on finding 
a way to leave open the possibility that the corporeal things we encounter in our 
daily lives be part of this extension, though, as far as I can see, he never seems 
sufficiently convinced to enter into a strong commitment to the existence of 
corporeal substances and the idea that they fall under the extension of ‘substance’. 
This seems to be true about his later years as well as about what we find in the 
Disputatio. 
But there are further decisions in the Disputatio that indicate the future path 
and general framework of Leibniz’s thinking. The principle sought in this writing 
should also be applicable to all individuals, i.e. material and immaterial (created) 
substances (§2), and here Leibniz already sticks to his general maxim that will play a 
role in a wide variety of arguments throughout his life: The number of assumptions 
should be kept at a minimum, and an account requiring fewer principles is always 
to be preferred to a more complicated one, given that it can deliver the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 ‘Disputatio’ §2, G IV 17. 
51 This does not strike me as an overly controversial claim, it has already been made explicitly by 
Look and Rutherford in their ‘Introduction’ to the Leibniz–Des Bosses correspondence (LDB xliv-
xlv) and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990), 96, but it furthermore seems in accordance with the majority of 
interpretations. 
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explanatory performance. He might, in addition, already hold the assumption that 
there is one general notion of substance applicable to all individuals that fall under 
it. Leibniz does not seem to think that there are good grounds to doubt that a 
single principle of individuation can be found that is valid for all substances, but 
furthermore that its discovery does not even require to first investigate which kinds 
of substances there actually are. Hence the general principle of individuation does 
not entail an ontological commitment to the existence of corporeal and/or 
incorporeal substances. Here, Leibniz claims, he is departing from Thomas 
Aquinas, to whom he attributes more than one principle of individuation, namely 
‘signate’ matter as the principle of individuation of corporeal substances and the 
whole entity in the case of intelligences (§3).  But this not a straightforward 
rejection of Aquinas’s view. Leibniz rather clears himself without further argument 
from the need to treat Aquinas’s principles alongside all the other classical 
Scholastic accounts of individuation. But he agrees with one half of the twofold 
Thomistic doctrine, namely with the part that claims that individuals are 
individuated by their whole entity. And, for Aquinas, it is the individuation qua 
whole entity in the case of angels that is also the reason why each angel forms a 
lowest species, a claim Leibniz will later pick up as well. For both their repeated 
claims that certain individual substances form their own lowest species is posterior 
to the claim about individuation qua whole entity – for Aquinas systematically, for 
Leibniz at least considering the chronology of his development. In addition, 
considering that Leibniz has just claimed that Aquinas does not have a hypothesis 
for all individuals, he makes a surprising move in the following passage of the 
Disputatio. Instead of consequently denying that form and matter would account for 
individuation (as there can be only one principle, which is the whole entity), he 
rather claims that these cases of individuation are not opposed to the whole entity 
account, but that they constitute just a subordinate case of it: “For what is matter 
and form united except the whole entity of the composite?”52. What he denies here 
is not an account of substance in terms of form and matter (and it is, in addition, 
unclear in which sense he understands form and matter in this context), but that it 
is just one of them that functions as the principle of individuation. Strictly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 ‘Disputatio’ §4, G IV 18. 
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speaking, this is not necessarily a subordination of the form-matter account under 
the whole entity view, but rather a preference in terminology: As the theory sought 
in the Disputatio is agnostic to the question as to which kinds of substances, 
whether corporeal, incorporeal or both, exist, Leibniz views ‘whole entity’ rather 
than ‘form’ and ‘matter’ to be the preferable phrasing, but he clearly indicates that 
this is primarily a pragmatic decision rather than one founded on metaphysical 
grounds. (§4)53 Hence viewing corporeal substances as being composed of form 
and matter is quite acceptable, but only once a case for their existence has been 
made – even though the principle of individuation does not demand their 
existence.  
Even if no immediate commitment to certain types of substances has been 
made so far, there is a further question we need to tackle if we then want to 
understand in which relation matter and form in substances might stand to each 
other in general, because these options will narrow down possible ontological and 
metaphysical commitments. It is also a step that Leibniz reckons to be important to 
be taken in the treatment of the individuation of substance in the Disputatio. In the 
Scholastic tradition, there are in general three different kinds of distinctions: a real 
distinction between separable parts of one thing in the world, a distinction of 
reason merely made by the mind, or a formal distinction (prominently in the Scotist 
tradition) which has a foundation in the thing prior to the operation of the mind 
but without the distinguished parts being separable or even different in re, such that 
“two realities – two aspects of one thing – are formally distinct if and only if they 
are both really identical and susceptible to definition independently of each 
other.”54 In the Disputatio Leibniz explicitly rejects formal distinctions altogether 
(§24).55 Not only are things that differ before the mind performs operations on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Making such a decision seems to be a natural way of reasoning within Leibniz’s thinking, 
considering his early appeals to the importance of clarity of words and of refraining from 
multiplying entities beyond necessity. (See, e.g. ‘Preface to Nizolius’, 1670, G IV 138-76.) 
54 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149. 
55 I do not see any evidence that Leibniz reintroduces the notion of formal distinctions later on, but 
rather that his accounts of created substances and his discussions concerned with distinctions (e.g. 
in his mathematical writings, but also of the continuum and part-whole-relations or even his 
accounts of the status of relations) suggest that there are only real and mental distinctions. There is 
also the further question of how Leibniz could incorporate formal distinctions, at least in the Scotist 
sense, at all: It seems difficult to square the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles with the idea that 
there two identical res that do not share all there properties and are hence susceptible to a different 
definition, but that are nonetheless the same and therefore sharing all their properties. Also, it seems 
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them separable from each other, but there also cannot be any real composition of 
parts, if not all of the parts are real: “Everything that before the operation of the 
mind really differs from another, in a way that none is part of the other, neither 
wholly or partly, can be separated from the other. For in adequately different things 
none needs the other for its own esse.” (§23) Or, in other words, “the only 
distinction on the side of the world is the real distinction“56 between separable res, 
while “the mental or rational distinction [...] is made by the mind and does not map 
onto any really distinct separable res.”57 This does not entail that such abstractions 
of different aspects of one thing do not play an important role. One example of a 
merely mental distinction in the Disputatio is, possibly aside from form and matter 
(though it is unclear if this is not rather considered to be a real distinction by 
Leibniz at this moment), is that of genus and species (§22), which is for sure not a 
mere fiction as these concepts play an important role already for the young Leibniz 
in a variety of ways, including an important function in the relation between 
language and certain knowledge.58   
But if there are only two ways available by which form and matter can be 
distinguished, at least at this moment in Leibniz’s writings and thinking, can there 
be a real composite composed of form and matter viewed as two really distinct 
entities, if what has been said so far is taken into account? The answer to this is not 
to be found explicitly in the Disputatio and there are several questions that could be 
asked. Any inseparability of form and matter could be based either on metaphysical 
impossibility of separation or on the fact that they are naturally joined (akin to 
Thomas’s view of the human soul and body). But the definition of at least prime 
matter, in the way it is presented by Leibniz in the Disputatio, seems to be one of 
pure potentiality.. He states that “[i]f essence is purely potential, then all essences 
are prime matter. For two purely potential things do not differ, not even by relation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  
that a formal distinction between two properties requires a certain relation to each other, which 
seems incompatible with Leibniz’s view of relations. (For an extensive treatment of the relational 
properties in Leibniz see Massimo Mugnai, Leibniz’ Theory of Relations, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 
(1992) [= Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa 28].) 
56 J. A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 37. 
57 ibid., 36. 
58 One of the earliest examples is to be found in ‘De Arte Combinatoria’ (1666), where Leibniz 
expresses the hope that his theory of complexions will enable to find the species of things (see G IV 
44). 
33	  	  
to act, because this relation, since it would be to a being in potency, is not real.”59 
(§15). This claim seems to entail the equation of pure potentiality with prime matter 
and to regard both of them as beings that are not real. Hence it seems as if prime 
matter cannot exist independently of form and, therefore, does not fulfil the 
criterion of either metaphysical or natural separability that is a mark of really 
distinct entities. And it is hard to see how this matter could be anything with 
positive attributes at all as it seems that every positive description requires that this 
prime matter is, at least in one respect, actualized by some form. In addition, this, 
along with his assumption that wholes can only be composed of parts that are 
themselves real, excludes prime matter as a part that composes, together with 
substantial form, a whole.  
But there is a tension between this early characterization of prime matter in 
comparison with the notion of prime matter in a letter to Thomasius, written only a 
few years later. In this letter we find a different notion, not one of pure potentiality, 
but something akin to Cartesian res extensa or Thomistic ‘signate matter’, the latter 
being primary matter actualized by some form such that it occupies a 
threedimensional part of space.60 We will return to this letter shortly. 
Another problem that would arise from a real distinction between matter 
and form seems even more fundamental to Leibniz’s undertaking. If matter and 
form could be separated, the question arises not only with respect to the 
composition of the whole that requires the existence of its parts, but also with 
respect to what it is that establishes the genuine unity of form and matter. As 
distinct entities they would need to be unified by some means, but it seems unclear 
how they can enter into one unified corporeal substance and why it should be this 
one corporeal thing that should be considered to be the substance, rather than its 
two constituents by themselves. Leibniz himself does not worry about this in the 
Disputatio, though he will do so in the years that follow afterwards. 
But if there are no formal distinctions and if there cannot obtain a real 
distinction between form and matter, then the distinction between these two needs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ‘Disputatio’ §15, G IV 22. I read this as implying that whatever is pure potentiality is prime 
matter. 
60  “Primary matter is mass itself, in which there is nothing but extension and antitypy or 
impenetrability. It has extension from the space which it fills.” (Letter to Thomasius, April 20/30 
1669, G I 17/L 95.) 
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to be a mental or rational one. What could it mean, then, to speak of form and 
matter and their difference at all? This brings us back to the different possible 
views on form and matter.  The ontological status of and relation between matter 
and form expounded within the limits set by the Disputatio, especially the refusal to 
specify which kinds of substances there are, give rise to a notion of matter that is 
functionalist rather than substantial, in accordance with his wish not to make a 
commitment to particular kinds of substance. If we view ‘matter’ as an explanatory 
principle, one that also accounts for limitation and passivity, then we must surely 
understand all limited, created, finite things to be composed of form and matter, 
even though they might not have any corporeal part. Hence whatever is a created 
whole entity is also a form-matter compound (though the word ‘compound’ in this 
context might turn out to be not necessarily the most appropriate term). 
But what does it mean to reconstruct form and matter in terms of activity 
and passivity or in terms of actuality and potentiality? And is there any basis for this 
reconstruction? In the Disputatio, as we have seen, Leibniz considers primary matter 
to be pure potentiality, which suggests something purely passive. As such it is a 
negation of action, but therefore also requires the action it negates to be present, 
since “every negation is of something positive; otherwise, there would only be 
verbal negation. Therefore, let there be two individuals – Socrates and Plato. Then 
the principle of Socrates will be the negation of Plato and the principle of Plato will 
be the negation of Socrates. In either case there will be something positive on 
which you can stand.” (§12). The example here draws on the contrast between two 
individuals, but it might equally be applicable to an individual substance itself, given 
that potentiality is the absence of actuality or passivity the absence of activity. This 
would also explain why Leibniz equates the notions of limitation and privation with 
negation: they are the negation of activity, of knowledge or of a property. Leibniz 
also seems, in addition, to lack certain essential resources to define ‘privations’ in 
the traditional sense in which they were viewed as distinct from ‘negation’. A 
‘privation’ is a perfection that is lacking in a substance that it is should have due to 
being the kind of substance it is. Being blind is a privation for human being, but it 
is not one for a newborn cat. Later on, when Leibniz regards each individual as 
constituting its own lowest species and as having a complete concept, he can claim 
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that there cannot be any perfection that is, strictly speaking, missing from its 
concept and that the individual should have due to the individual it is.  On the 
other hand, in comparison with the most perfect being, God, every perfection of a 
creature is falling short of the optimal or maximal case, and hence each limited 
perfection is also somehow privative.61 And if we assume that there are no genuine 
separable parts in an individual substance, Leibniz’s claim that “unity follows entity 
in the concept, it is the same in the thing”62 (§20) gets a more definite sense. It is an 
idea Leibniz will pick up again in his correspondence with Arnauld and elsewhere: 
The terms unity and entity are interchangeable.63 If the whole individual is an entity, 
even if we can distinguish or classify different aspects such as form and matter 
within it, it has essential unity. This claim does not necessarily commit to the 
stronger claim that the substance Leibniz has in mind here is something like a 
proto-monad, especially since when we talk about monads we might not only have 
a particular constitution of form and matter in mind, but also as something that 
fulfils the criteria of simplicity and mind-likeness. It is rather a more general 
account of the nature of substance under which, without further considerations 
limiting its scope, monads would fit as well as other constructions or kinds of 
substance. It seems nonetheless to be the case that we do find here in Leibniz’s 
earliest philosophical writing certain principles that form a framework he will never 
transgress in his metaphysics of substance: Distinctions within a substance are 
mental or rational rather than real (though this is a rather strong and probably also 
highly controversial claim), the substance has thus unity and inseparable 
components64 and these components relate to each other in terms of form and 
matter or actuality and potentiality. He furthermore maintains that there is a close 
connection between action and being, and he never abandons the idea that 
substantial individuals are characterized first and foremost by their activity.65 Even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Maria Rosa Antognazza, “Metaphysical Evil Revisited,” in New Essays on Leibniz’s Theodicy, ed. 
Larry M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 127-28. 
62 ‘Disputatio’ §10, G IV 20. 
63 See, e.g., G II 97/LA 121. 
64 The notion of ‘component’ comes dangerously close to suggesting a kind of formal, if not even 
real, distinction. But, as will become hopefully clear in the following, one of these two 
‘components’, the passive or material aspect, neither allows for a positive definition nor is it an ens at 
all.  
65 See e.g. ‘De primae philosophiae Emendatione, et de Notione Substantiae’ (1694): G IV 469/L 
433; ‘Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances’ (1695): G IV 478/AG 
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during the late 1660s and the early 1670s, i.e. what one might consider to have been 
the mechanistic phase Leibniz claims of having gone through according to his letter 
to Rémond, he emphasizes the role of motion (and later: of force) for matter and 
the impossibility of matter being capable of producing motion by itself. Already at 
this point one of matter’s crucial properties, motion, is dependent on some mind, 
though not yet always only on individual substantial forms, but in the case of 
inanimate objects it is dependent on God.66  
It is difficult to evaluate the importance of the Disputatio for Leibniz’s 
subsequent development. While the structure and the content, namely the authors 
and views covered in it, suggest to some interpreters that it is no more than “a 
scholastic exercise”67, others are inclined to take it as the starting point for a 
developmental story of Leibniz’s philosophy68. We have seen that the letter to 
Rémond seems to suggest a radical change in his thinking, 69 but also that this 
description is difficult to interpret – at least without some explanatory 
underpinning. Since Leibniz does ascribe to himself a conversion (though not a 
permanent one) to mechanical philosophy, having happened possibly before the 
time he finished university, this letter might suggest that he indeed wrote the 
Disputatio purely as a scholastic exercise without any commitment to the theses 
presented in it. But this is by no means what the letter explicitly states, and it is 
rather open what exactly it was that he abandoned. Christia Mercer stresses, in my 
opinion quite rightly, that his statements do not indicate “a conversion from 
Aristotelianism to modernism. Although he rejected scholastic physics, he did not 
reject Aristotelianism”70, but he rather “opt[ed] for the better of two explanatory 
models in natural philosophy”71. Limiting this claim down to a particular field of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  
139. There are countless examples for this as well as for the view that ‘actiones sunt suppositorum’ 
and that there is a connection between activity and essential unity (not only in Leibniz and the 
preceding Scholastic tradition, but in some sense also in the early modern mechanist philosophy.) 
66 For example the letter to Thomasius, April 20/30 1669 (G I 15-27/L 93-104) or ‘The Confession 
of Nature against Atheists’ (1669; G IV 105-110/L 109-113.) 
67 Garber, Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad, 55; for a discussion of the ‘Disputatio’, see ibid. 55-58. 
68 See, for example, Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation, 10-50. Also Benson 
Mates claims that “the rather unusual and implausible doctrine that things are individuated by their 
‘whole being’” survives from the 1663 to the end of Leibniz’s life. (Benson Mates, The Philosophy of 
Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 7.)  
69 To Rémond, 10 Jan. 1714,G III 606/L 654-5. 
70 Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, 45. 
71 ibid., 47. 
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interest such that it not have a major impact on the overall view on Leibniz’s 
philosophy allows one to uphold the idea that there is an overarching metaphysical 
framework within which his philosophy gradually develops from the early years 
into his late, full-blown mondadological metaphysics, while at the same time 
reminding us that there are significant changes happening to objects which are 
considered within this framework. While his commitment in his younger years (but 
also, to a certain extent, in his later monadological years) to mechanical principles is 
undeniable 72 , it does not necessarily contradict certain Thomistic-Aristotelian 
assumptions in metaphysics. It should not surprise us that Leibniz already at a very 
young age might have felt free to combine different positions such as various 
Scholastic assumptions with modern mechanical approaches, given the influence of 
his teacher Jakob Thomasius73:   
 
... J. Thomasius who, although he did not accept my doubts and was very 
little disposed to let me do such a reform of the substantial, incorporeal 
forms of bodies, engaged me very strongly to read Aristotle ... Aristotle 
seemed to me to admit, more or less like Democritus or, in my time, like 
Descartes and Gassendi, that there is no body which can be moved by 
itself.74 
 
Thomasius himself was an ‘eclectic’ and his conciliatory attitude towards 
philosophers and their theories was clearly shared – if not even surpassed – by 
Leibniz.75 In the last quoted passage and even more so in his 1669 letter to 
Thomasius, Leibniz, in accordance with this attitude, seems to attempt to reconcile 
the notions that form the core of Aristotelian philosophy with the notions that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Leibniz’s letter to Thomasius of 1669, G I 15-27/L 93-104 and Hypothesis physica nova 
(1670/71?), A VI ii 219-257. 
73 The influence of Thomasius’s thought on Leibniz in his younger years is generally acknowledged, 
but one of the few more extensive treatments of his philosophy is found in Mercer, Leibniz’s 
Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, esp. 32-36. For a short, but classical account of Thomasius, 
see Max Wundt, Die Deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1939), 142-
143. 
74 Foucher de Careil, Mémoire sur la philosophie de Leibniz, quoted in Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its 
Origins and Development, 43. According to Foucher de Careil, this passage has been written during the 
1660s. 
75 See, e.g., his 1669 letter to Thomasius, where Leibniz states that “I maintain the rule which is 
common to all these renovators [restauratores] of philosophy, [namely that] nothing ought to be 
explained in bodies except through magnitude, figure, and motion” (G I 16/L94), but later we can read 
in the same letter that “I do not hesitate to say that I approve of more things in Aristotle’s books on 
physics than in the meditations of Descartes” (G I 16/L 94). Or, late in his life, Leibniz writes to 
Rémond in 1714 that “I have found that most sects are correct in the better part of what they put 
forward, though not so much in what they deny…” (G III 607/L 655) 
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have taken their place in the explanatory model of mechanical physics of the 17th 
century. He even concludes in this letter that the subject of Aristotle’s physics is 
“figure, magnitude, motion, place, and time”76. But again he is talking about physics 
only, not about all of Aristotelian philosophy. Some commentators even deny that 
this letter should be taken as a serious exposition of his philosophical view.77 This 
suggested compatibility seems to be a rather odd claim and mechanical 
philosophers at the beginning of the 17th century might have begged to differ 
concerning the proposed view that mechanical philosophy does not stand in a 
complete opposition to Scholastic or Aristotelian philosophy. But it is indeed the 
case that this opposition seems to hold only if mechanical philosophy claims that 
the only interpretation concerning all fields of science, thus including metaphysical 
and ontological issues, permissible is quantitative, i.e. in terms of size, shape, and 
motion.78 Leibniz sees clearly that it is possible to be a mechanical philosopher 
concerning physical phenomena (thus abandoning Scholastic accidental forms as 
explanatory principles of the individual behaviour of physical bodies), while being 
an Aristotelian concerning substantial forms or the constitution of substance.79 But 
he furthermore claims (and this seems to be another constant throughout the years) 
that one must assume substantial forms in order to ground the phenomena in the 
natural world. While Leibniz accepts Descartes’ and others’ rejection of substantial 
forms in the explanation of concrete physical phenomena (a position he thought, at 
least in his younger years, could also be ascribed to Aristotle himself), he also 
assumed there must be something other than body that is the cause of motion, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 G I 21/L 98. 
77 Ursula Goldenbaum, “Transubstantiation, Physics and Philosophy at the Time of the Catholic 
Demonstrations,” in The Young Leibniz and His Philosophy (1646-76), ed. Stuart Brown (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 1999), 94. 
78 See Beeley, Kontinuität und Mechanismus, 3. Most early modern philosophers did not attempt a 
reduction of everything there is to mechanical qualities, at least not explicitly – Hobbes might be 
one of the few exceptions to this rule. This is not further surprising, since it seems prima facie 
incredibly difficult to bring such an explanatory model in accordance with an immaterial and 
possibly also free soul. 
79 Though his idea of physical explanation dramatically shifts over the years, especially due to the 
introduction of the notion of force into his metaphysics and the corresponding reasoning that 
physics is essentially dynamics, Leibniz from a very early age on holds that physical phenomena are 
explainable in quantitative terms. Even if one takes his self-depiction to Rémond at face value, it 
does not follow that Leibniz ever completely abandoned Aristotelian philosophy. There is good 
evidence that substantial forms (even though they appear under different names) form a constant 
feature of his metaphysics and play an essential role in the foundation of physics through to the end 
of his life. In this light, his depiction of his own development is rather emphasizing different ideas 
attached greater importance to at various points in his life than a story of shifting philosophies. 
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something that is distinct from body as such, and that this something falls into the 
realm of metaphysical rather than physical explanation. 
In these considerations we see a continuation of the general thought 
already present in the Disputatio, that substances do require a principle of activity, 
but this idea will in the years immediately following be accompanied by further 
thoughts connected with the idea of substance that will finally lead to and 
culminate in the introduction of ‘simplicity’ as a core feature. Leibniz’s 
consideration concerning the essence of substantiality in the following years is 
strongly influenced by his growing interest in physics, especially in the problem of 
the coherence of bodies and of the continuum, i.e. the possibility of corporeal 
substances or bodies having unity. While we still seem to see Leibniz trying to 
deliver an account of how bodies might be substances, his considerations will slowly 
but steadily draw him towards a more sceptical view, the investigation of which 
Leibniz will dedicate a significant amount time to in the years immediately 
following his university studies, and which we will take a look at after having 
covered some first thoughts on the notions of part and whole. 
 
Only a year after the Disputatio, Leibniz writes the ‘Specimen quaestionum 
philosophicarum ex jure collectarum’80, a piece that is first and foremost concerned 
with legal issues and their connection to philosophy. But it proves to be interesting 
for the purpose at hand for two reasons: In the context of legal accountability, 
Leibniz emphasizes the importance of the question what it is that accounts for 
sameness over time.81 And here he “indicate[s] substantial form as the key for 
transtemporal sameness” 82 . This implies that he has not adopted a purely 
mechanical philosophy, but also that he is still moving within a framework strongly 
influenced by Scholastic concepts. More importantly at this point, however, is the 
introduction of different ideas of ‘whole’. Following François Hotman, a French 
legal philosopher, Leibniz introduces three kinds of wholes: A continuum is what is 
naturally one, such as a human or a tree; the contiguous, which is something whose 
parts are connected but not forming a natural unity; and the discrete, whose parts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 ‘Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum ex jure collectarum’ (1664), A VI i 69-95. 
81 ibid. 90-91. 
82 Di Bella, The Science of the Individual, 119. 
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are distant. While all of them are types of composition and are referred to as 
‘wholes’, only items in the first category, i.e. only continuous things, form true 
unities, since they have a spirit (spiritus).83 We find in this very early text two things 
of importance for the following, on the one hand a very broad notion of what a 
whole is, a notion that does not require unity in a strict sense, and on the other 
hand the idea that a natural unity, as it is possessed by animate things such as 
humans and trees, is to be established by an immaterial principle.  
This interest in parts and wholes continues when Leibniz outlines in 1666 
for the first time his plan for a combinatorial science84 at the heart of which several 
explicit metaphysical assumptions lie. Here he continues the theme of unity, but in 
addition defines metaphysics as the doctrine of the whole and the parts (“doctrina 
de Toto et partibus”85), i.e. as mereology, and identifies “being and the affections of 
being”86 as its subject. Since this combinatorics is supposed to be universally 
applicable, it seems necessary for Leibniz to argue that the fundamental 
combinatory relation of part and whole is mirrored in the things themselves.87 
While substance is defined in accordance with his earlier and later writings as 
“whatever moves or is moved”, i.e. as something active and passive, the term 
‘whole’ is applied in a wider sense than might be desirable for metaphysics, but in 
accordance with the earlier judicial writing. For the purpose of his art of 
combination, Leibniz allows that any number of things may be treated as a whole. 
The only requirement for several things to be considered as being parts of one and 
the same whole is that these things have something in common. There is no further 
specification as to what this ‘something in common’ has to be, it is only required 
that it is of such a kind that it supplies a ground for our reason to apply one name 
to all these otherwise possibly widely different things. This whole is thus grounded 
in taking things simultaneously as one, while this ‘one’ is what is thought of in one 
intellectual act.88 Even though the term ‘whole’ as such might suggest some kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 ‘Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum ex jure collectarum’ (1664), A VI i 92-93. 
84 ‘Dissertatio de arte combinatoria’ (1666), G IV 27-104. 
85 ibid. G IV 36. 
86 “Metaphysica […] agit tum de Ente, tum de Entis affectionibus” (ibid. G IV 35). 
87 Cf. Beeley, Kontinuität und Mechanismus, 6 
88 ‘De arte combinatoria’ (1666), G IV 35. This idea that there is a mental act that is fundamental for 
the constitution of aggregates features more prominently in Leibniz’s later thought. For a 
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underlying unifying principle that, so to speak, glues the parts together into or 
provides the basis for summarizing them under ‘one thing’, we see here that this is 
not the case in Leibniz’s mereology. The parts of the whole can themselves be 
smaller wholes (as is required for his ars combinatoria) or a multitude of different 
individual objects, and Leibniz seems to be willing to reserve the term ‘whole’ and 
hence also that of ‘part’ for such liberal use. It looks, prima facie, as if this broad use 
of the term ‘whole’ allows for it to be applied to substances, but equally to 
collections of substances, and that there is, therefore, a fundamental difference 
between being a whole and being a unity – where the notion of ‘unity’ turns out to 
be prior to and more fundamental than that of ‘whole’: “The concept of unity is 
abstracted from the concept of one being, and the whole itself, abstracted from 
unities, or the totality, is called number. Quantity is therefore the number of parts. 
Hence quantity and number obviously coincide in the thing itself [res ipsa]…”89 
There are two questions to be raised concerning substances or individual things: Is 
every whole a substance? The answer to this is clearly ‘no’ – there is hardly any 
limitation on what a whole can be. And while unity is essential to substance, it does 
not seem to be essential to a whole. The second question is: Is every individual 
substance a whole? It seems possible that Leibniz has here in mind that the ‘thing 
itself’, the substance, is quantitatively and numerically one, i.e. has one part and is 
one thing. This might seem to be the preferable way to go for anybody who wants 
to see the beginnings of a monadological metaphysics very early in Leibniz. But 
one should keep in mind that a definition which identifies the overall ‘number of 
parts’ as one, i.e. the same number as that of the whole, threatens to violate the 
principle that the whole is greater than its part. While this is itself not problematic 
(one might for some reason want to allow parts that are not proper parts), it 
becomes problematic when one recalls that Leibniz seems to hold on to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  
discussion, see Paul Lodge, “Leibniz’s Notion of an Aggregate,” British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 9.3 (2001). 
89 “Abstractum autem ab uno est Unitas, ipsumque totum abstractum ex unitatibus seu totalitas 
dicitur Numerus. Quantitas igitur est Numerus partium. Hinc manifestum, in re ipsa Quantitatem et 
Numerum coincidere…” (G IV 35/L 76) 
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principle consistently throughout his life and that it carries quite a lot of 
explanatory responsibility.90 
As this passage by itself leaves us rather puzzled, one might need to take a 
further step, even though it is not explicitly entailed in Leibniz (though very likely 
in his spirit): If one regards it a necessity that every part of a whole is a proper part, 
one might think that in order to form a whole, there must at least be one other 
proper part, together with which the first part forms a whole. If this is allowed as a 
plausible thought, then it becomes impossible that something has only one proper 
part and thus, when there is only one part in a thing, then we cannot call this a ‘part 
proper’, but it is rather a part that collapses into or is identical with the whole, such 
that we would say no more than ‘the whole is the whole’.  
But it is also possible, because Leibniz does not clearly distinguish between 
metaphysical, physical and logical implications of the various definitions in this 
writing, that there are some significant differences between the whole of the logical 
calculus, the metaphysical whole and physical whole. The whole of the logical 
calculus can be broken up into parts which are smaller wholes and form the basis 
of complexions and which are ultimately analysable into smallest parts or unities, 
the situs.91 These parts are in their existence not dependent on the existence of the 
whole, but it is a rather contingent fact that some of them are thought of as 
belonging to one overarching whole or are thought of in one act, while others are 
not. A body, on the other hand, could be said to have an infinite number of parts, 
or in other words, the continuum is infinitely divisible.92 Bodies as such, it seems, 
do not seem to have any smallest parts or unities. A further difference might be 
that those wholes which are composed of an infinite number of parts – if they 
should exist at all – might have a different principle that underlies their ‘wholeness’ 
than just being thought of or abstracted by a mind in a certain way rather than 
another. Since matter by itself, for Leibniz, is uniform (in all of the different ways it 
seems to be entertained by Leibniz in his younger years, i.e. in a way resembling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Furthermore, this principle is also relevant for the basics of his combinatorics, since one of its 
fundamental operations is concerned with wholes (e.g. ABCD) and proper parts of these wholes 
(e.g. ABC, ABD, ACD, BCD or AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD). Here it is important that a thing 
cannot be a proper part of itself (and thus complexions of the form AAA or AA are impermissible). 
91 ‘De arte combinatoria’ (1666), G IV 36. 
92 ibid., G IV 32. 
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Cartesian res extensa as well as being close to Scholastic prime matter), there do not 
seem to be any grounds in matter in itself for regarding some bits of it as forming 
one body, while adjacent bits are excluded from it or maybe even forming a 
different body.  But at the same time, it does not seem to be arbitrary that we refer 
to something as ‘one body’ and where we claim to find a boundary between one 
body and the next. When it comes to bodies, there seem to be two options open 
for Leibniz, none of which he seems to consciously entertain in this particular 
writing, but, as we have seen, in other writings around that time: Either bodies are 
unified into wholes by something else, i.e. something not constituted by matter and 
thus immaterial such as a substantial form, or he denies that matter in this 
substantial sense does enter into wholes which have parts or indeed into wholes at 
all. I take him to start this thought process in the 1660s with the view that the 
former option is accurate, because he does not yet regard the idea of matter as 
infinitely divisible (and later as infinitely divided) as highly problematic. Once he 
has occupied himself with the problem of the continuum and reminded himself of 
the whole-part-axiom, there seems to be a gradual change towards the latter option. 
But even if this is the case, it does not touch upon the overall functionalist 
distinction into form and matter, since these explanatory principles allow Leibniz 
to entertain a variety of different positions concerning the ontology of form and 
matter – a liberty Leibniz makes generous use of. And with this development we 
see a clear difference between the wholes of the logical calculus and of physical 
wholes emerge, both in composition and analysis: In the case of bodies, in 
accordance with our experience, the application of the term ‘whole’ is regarded to 
be less arbitrary and better grounded than in the case of logical wholes, i.e. there 
seems to be more unity in a whole that is a body than in a whole that is merely a 
summarizing term. But also the analysis of these wholes seems to deliver different 
results: While there is an assumed bottom level in the decomposition of complex 
into simpler terms, this does not seem to be true about the decomposition of 
bodies into smaller bodies. We will encounter this opposition again when taking a 
closer look at corporeal substances, their aggregation and unity, which will be part 
of the reasoning that lead Leibniz to assume simple substances (similar to the 
simple parts of his combinatorics). In these years, Leibniz seemingly develops a 
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view on natural philosophy that regards physics as the meeting point between 
reason and experience, or between mathematics and nature. It is a view that tries to 
account for the fact that the hypotheses of reason and mathematical calculations do 
not absolutely match the phenomena, but that they are close enough such that the 
marginal error can be disregarded.93  
But what we have not accounted for yet is the phenomenon of what seems 
to be a stronger unity in bodies – a problem that occupied Leibniz especially during 
his time in Paris: What it is that makes a body’s parts cohere such that they form a 
body at all and how this body could be constituted. 
 
 
1.2.2. Continuum and Cohesion  
 
The question whether there is a bottom level in nature has been entertained 
by Leibniz from his early years on and he gives an almost excessive amount of 
different accounts of the possible constitutions of material things in the 1670s and 
1680s. A first Gassendian attempt hopes to solve the problem of the continuum by 
composing it of points separated by unassignable gaps, but this account is quickly 
substituted by the idea of a composition out of an infinity of parts that are smaller 
than any assignable part, and several other twists follow within a few years.94 
During those years, Leibniz also develops his infinitesimal calculus, and arrives in 
1676 at the conclusion that infinitesimals are ‘fictitious entities’95, i.e. not to be 
found in nature. Though Leibniz seems to have experimented with a wide variety 
of different positions, the sincerity of his commitment to any them and the various 
problems of the solutions are of less interest here. But there are several remarkable 
features to these manifold solutions. Firstly, Leibniz treats the problem of the 
continuum as a fundamental problem not only for mathematics and physics, but 
also for metaphysics: “Only Geometry can provide a thread for the Labyrinth of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Cf. Philip Beeley, “Mathematics and Nature in Leibniz’s Early Philosophy,” in The Young Leibniz 
and His Philosophy (1646-76), ed. Stuart Brown (Dordrecht: Springer, 1999), 123-145. 
94 For a detailed exposition of this development, see Arthur, “Actual Infinitesimals in Leibniz’s 
Early Thought” and his introduction to The Labyrinth of the Continuum, RA xxiii-lxxxviii. 
95 ‘Numeri infiniti’ (1676), AVI iii 499, quoted in RA xxiii. 
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the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum, and the 
unassignable and the infinite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics 
who has not passed through that labyrinth.”96 While geometry and the infinitesimal 
calculus are providing a solution for the geometrical continuum, it is metaphysics 
that tells us that such infinitesimals cannot be found in nature, such that there is 
“no portion of matter that is not actually divided into further parts, so that there is 
no body so small that there is not a world of infinitary creatures in it.”97 This 
rejection of infinitesimals as fictions might come as a bit of a surprise, since Leibniz 
seems to have more or less consistently held the view that matter was actually 
infinitely divided. We have already seen that Leibniz incorporates the view of a 
discrepancy between mathematics or reason and the phenomena, but is nonetheless 
reluctant to abandon phenomena. Despite trying to accommodate the corporeal 
objects of our daily encounters with the world, at some point almost Berkeleyan 
sounding views are tentatively proposed by Leibniz, which can be explained by his 
struggle with the nature of corporeal things and which suggest that the view that 
“[a]ccording to certain ways of reasoning, it follows that to be is nothing other than 
to be capable of being perceived”98 might be a viable option. 
A further reason for Leibniz’s consideration that what appears to us as 
extended is in fact not entirely what it seems and to an extent a phenomenon 
partially dependent on the perceiver might already lie in his definition of matter and 
body present in the 1660s, as a letter to his teacher Jakob Thomasius indicates:  
 
Primary matter is mass itself, in which there is nothing but extension and 
antitypy or impenetrability. It has extension from the space which it fills. 
The very nature of matter consists in its being something solid and 
impenetrable and therefore mobile when something else strikes it, and it 
must give way to the other.99  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 ibid.  
97 ‘Pacidius Philalethi’ (1676), A VI iii 566/RA 209. 
98 ‘De materia, de motu, de minimis, de continuo’ (1675), A VI iii 466/RA 31; see also ‘Corpus non 
est Substantia sed modus tantum Entis sive apparentia cohaerens’ (1689-1690 (?)) A VI iv 1637/RA 
259-260, where Leibniz concludes that bodies (in the sense of bulk) are therefore nothing but 
coherent appearances. 
99 Letter to Thomasius (1669), G I 17/L 95. 
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As the term ‘extension’ is by Leibniz equated with “mathematical body”100, we 
might consider this primary matter to be the infinitely divisible body of De arte 
combinatoria. (In difference to later writings, bodies here are infinitely divisible, not 
infinitely divided yet.) But this is not to say that Leibniz had anything like a 
Cartesian extended substance in mind – and we are indeed warned by Leibniz 
himself in the opening of the letter to his teacher that he is “anything but a 
Cartesian”101. This leads us to the second feature present in his writings on the 
continuum, which seem to be already found in his earlier writings, even though not 
thoroughly exploited, namely that matter on its own is insufficient for explaining 
the phenomena of the physical world and for being considered to be substance by 
itself, because it lacks a principle of activity or motion. In an unanswered letter to 
Thomas Hobbes, written in 1670, Leibniz declares his sympathy with the 
Englishman’s definition of sensation as permanent reaction, but at the same time 
he points out that there is no truly permanent reaction in the nature of merely 
corporeal things. Even though, Leibniz claims, it may appear to our senses as if 
there was such a permanent sensual response, it is in fact only a discontinuous 
reaction which constantly needs to be simulated by a new external cause. Thus, 
Leibniz concludes, true sensation cannot be explained by motion of bodies alone.102 
But Leibniz is, on the other hand, very sympathetic towards Hobbes’s account of 
conatus and aims to broaden it in such a way that it can include minds in an 
essential function as well. Minds, during the early 1670s, are thought of by him as 
conatus as well, a view with which Leibniz hoped to solve the problem of the 
interaction between mind and body as well as a reconciliation of Christian 
doctrines, mechanism and the philosophical tradition.103   
While this criticism as presented to Hobbes might be read as being limited to 
sensations, we do find a similar but more general argument in the Confession of 
Nature against Atheists (1669). As the title already suggests, this piece of work is 
aimed at providing a proof for the existence of God by showing that corporeal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 ibid. G I 24/L 100. 
101 ibid. G I 16/L 94. 
102 Letter to Thomas Hobbes (1670), G VII 574/L 107. 
103 See Goldenbaum, “Transubstantiation, Physics and Philosophy,” 93. 
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phenomena cannot be explained without some incorporeal principle. Even here 
Leibniz is rather sympathetic towards the new mechanical philosophy and its 
principles, as “in explaining corporeal phenomena, we must not unnecessarily 
resort to God or to any other incorporeal thing, form, or quality […], but that so 
far as can be done, everything should be derived from the nature of body and its 
primary qualities – magnitude, figure, and motion”.104 Leibniz holds that in the 
realm of physics, that is, for the explanation of ‘corporeal phenomena’ and the 
behaviour of bodies, only a few properties are required. But he also holds explicitly 
only that motion cannot be the essence of extended things or an essential attribute 
thereof.105 A few years later, we will find the additional criticism that extension 
itself is not a primitive quality, but one that arises from the diffusion or repetition 
of impenetrability. Though Leibniz seems to vacillate between the idea of matter as 
pure potentiality and matter as extended, impenetrable stuff, the idea that an 
essential principle, which is necessarily required not only for grounding the 
explanation of physical phenomena but also for substantiality in general, is missing 
in matter taken by itself: activity, which, in the case of bodies, is motion (and which 
is later going to be substituted by force as the most fundamental principle). Thus 
bodies are not self-sufficient and cannot subsist without an incorporeal principle. 
(Here he seems to be going the first way mentioned above, entertaining the idea 
that bodies require some kind of incorporeal principle in order to exist.) We find 
something similar indicated in the letter to Thomasius: There is nothing in bodies 
which does not follow from the definition of extension and antitypy.106 But motion 
cannot be derived from either of the two. Therefore, there is no motion as a real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 ‘Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas’ (1668), A VI i 489-90/L 110. 
105  Christia Mercer traces this back to the inability to deduce motion from extension and 
impenetrability. See her Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, 123-24. But one might regard 
it as a more general criticism: Nothing purely passive, such as a merely extended, impenetrable being 
can, in principle, be the origin or even genuine bearer of any active properties such as motion. 
106 It is remarkable that already the very young Leibniz seems to hold that the Cartesian definition of 
one type of substance as having extension as its only principal attribute is insufficient, such that he 
feels the need to complement it with ‘antitypy’ (or ‘impenetrability’). This insufficiency will be, later 
on, one of the explicit and driving forces in his pronounced criticisms of Descartes’ conception of 
extended substance. 
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entity in bodies.107 This argument is even more clearly developed in a text on 
transubstantiation, probably written in around 1668:108 
 
(1) Whatever is a substance has a principle of action within itself. 
(2) Every action of a body is motion. 
(3) No body has a principle of motion within itself apart from a concurrent 
mind. (No reason for motion can be found in bodies left to themselves.109)  
Therefore: Body apart from a concurrent mind is not a substance. 
(4) What is not a substance is an accident or an appearance. 
Therefore: Body apart from a concurrent mind is an accident or appearance. 
 
The assumption underlying (3) is the fact that extension and its modes cannot 
account for motion by themselves, an assumption that is not original to Leibniz, 
but also shared by others such as Descartes or Gassendi, who introduce God as the 
maintainer of motion in the world or God as the creator of atoms endowed with 
motion, respectively. For both, therefore, motion is not intrinsic to or generated by 
extended bodies by themselves.  
The conclusions from this argument are interesting in several ways. On the 
one hand, body as an accident or an appearance is an unorthodox view to arrive at 
and seems to suggest that body is some kind of property of a substance, either just 
as inhering in a substance (as an accident), a kind of secondary quality, that merely 
appears to be in a certain way, or even merely a perception or appearance. In either 
case, it seems that the substantial thing is the concurrent mind rather than the body 
– independent of the body being regarded as related to the concurrent mind as an 
accident or an appearance. On the other hand, that the origin of motion cannot be 
found in bodies themselves is supported by a further argument in the Confessions of 
Nature against Atheists, where Leibniz aims to show that the contrary assumption 
leads to a dilemma. It would require that either motion has been in a body from all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Letter to Thomasius (1669), G I 26/L 102. 
108 ‘De transubstantiatione’ (1668?), A VI I 508-09/L 115-116. 
109 ‘Confessio Naturae’ (1668), A VI i 419/L 111. 
49	  	  
eternity – but eternity does not give a sufficient reason for why something is nor 
can it be considered to be the cause of anything –, or motion has been transferred 
to one body by another body, but this other body must itself have gained its 
motion previously from a third body, and so on, such that this explanation gets 
caught in an infinite regress of reasons. In either case, Leibniz claims, no full 
explanation or sufficient reason can be given for the motion of body considered in 
itself and indeed cannot be given until one takes the existence of incorporeal 
principles into account.  
But even though we cannot ascribe existence or subsistence to matter by 
itself, Leibniz indicates that we can nonetheless think of it without taking its 
substantial form into account at the same time: “I call appearance whatever can be 
thought of in a real body deprived of substantial form, that is, matter taken with its 
accidents.”110 A few years later, in 1671, Leibniz thinks again about the possible 
phenomenal character of bodies and its relation to the essence of a thing:  
 
By the word thing we mean that which appears, hence that which can be 
understood; because when we are deceived and recognize our error, we 
may still rightly say that something has appeared to us not that it has 
existed. 
The nature of a thing is the cause, in the thing itself, of its appearances. 
Hence the nature of a thing differs from its phenomena as a distinct 
appearance differs from a confused one… [W]e think of a body whenever 
we think of extension being somewhere but at the same time think of a 
phenomenon.111 
 
It is hard to see in this short passage what Leibniz is exactly aiming at, but he seems 
to suggest that there is a tension or difference between the essence or nature of a 
thing and its body. One reason for introducing the idea that bodies are to some 
extent phenomena, i.e. something analogous to confused appearances, might be 
grounded on the fact that his idea of the nature of matter seems to have changed. 
In his Theoria motus abstracti (1671), Leibniz explicitly formulates a change in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 ‘De transubstantatione’ (1668), A VI i 511/L 117. 
111  ‘An Example of Demonstrations about the Nature of Corporeal Things, Drawn from 
Phenomena’ (1671), L 142-3. 
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views on the continuum and thus on bodily (spatially extended) substances: “(1) 
There are actually parts in the continuum […] and (2) these are actually infinite, for 
Descartes’s ‘indefinite’ is not in the thing, but the thinker.”112  
It becomes clear that from the Disputatio on, Leibniz’s thought in various 
areas is occupied with answering the question how not only to think of an infinitely 
divided thing, but also how the apparent coherence as one individual thing can 
come about at all. And while there are drastic changes in the underlying physical 
theories, there seems to be an overarching theme: Leibniz’s train of thought starts 
from the scholastic idea that substances are necessarily active and obtain their 
activity from some substantial form (be it a soul, God, or some other active 
principle). “His thought seems to have progressed from bodies held together by 
endeavours, to atoms held together by minds, to divisible bodies held together by 
harmony of motion, but whose unity comes from a principle analogous to a 
mind.” 113  In the end, mind-like substances are the conditio sine qua non for 
substantiality and unity. 
Before moving on to more thoroughly developed metaphysical writings by 
Leibniz, it might be wise to take stock: The picture drawn from a plethora of 
different writings by Leibniz, before he presents a rather systematic account of his 
picture of substance and creation to Arnauld, suggests a severe uncertainty 
concerning the status of extended things. He tries to come to grips with the tension 
of his rational metaphysics and mathematics with the phenomena we encounter 
and the extended things that form the basis of our physical systems. The thread we 
see running through all of these considerations is a strong hold onto substantial 
forms as the driving principle that accounts in some ways for the possible unity of 
bodies and their seeming activity. While Leibniz does not seem certain yet about 
the ontological status of bodies, and partly does not seem ready to abandon them 
at this point, a significant amount of the explanatory weight is by the end of the 
1670s already deferred to the substantial forms. By the time he presents his views 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Theoria motus abstracti (1670/71 (?)), A VI ii 264/RA 339. 
113 RA xliii. 
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to Arnauld, substantial forms will be the driving and fundamental metaphysical 
principle.  
But what has to be kept in mind is that Leibniz is adamant in distinguishing 
sense experience that provides us with acquaintance of phenomena and forms the 
basis for physics from rational and mathematical principles reason provides us 
with. While he does not think that senses deceive us (even though they might 
suggest misleading information, which we have to analyse correctly and should not 
be overly hasty to accept as an accurate picture of the world), he thinks that reason 
gives the fundamental principles, which tell us what the objects of our perceptions 
can and cannot be. This view also means that the talk of extended things, such as 
those we perceive, does not necessarily entail that these can enter the realm of 




2. To Arnauld: Complete Concepts and the Unity of Substance  
 
 
Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld (1686-90), facilitated by the 
transmission of a cursory summary of the Discourse on Metaphysics via an 
intermediary114, is a valuable source for several reasons. It seems to be the first 
extensive work by Leibniz that contains a more or less fully developed 
metaphysical view, which might be seen as a step away from the younger years of 
search and wonder or as a first decisive move towards the later monadological 
writings. But, most importantly, in contrast with the Discourse itself, Leibniz 
continued to edit the manuscripts of his correspondence with Arnauld with the aim 
of its publication in the long run. Even by the time he had introduced explicitly 
simple substances in the mid-1690s and even far later and deep in the 
monadological period, Leibniz still showed interest in these texts – presumably 
because they had interesting insights to contribute to his philosophical views.115  
The beginning of the exchange of letters is dictated by Arnauld’s worries 
concerning one of the most fundamental assumptions concerning substances that 
Leibniz presents, namely the idea that what characterizes any individual created 
substance is the possession of a complete concept. This is not, as far as Leibniz is 
concerned, a radical claim but rather a consequence of his – and, so he assumes, 
also for others plausible – view on truth and true predication. But once Leibniz 
removed, at least in Arnauld’s opinion, the looming threat of fatalistic 
necessitarianism from the correspondence (or, alternatively, when Arnauld let the 
subject go in order to proceed in the discussion), the question of the unity and 
nature of substance in general and bodily substance in particular becomes 
prominent. Even though the correspondence ends rather abruptly due to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This intermediary was Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels. For information on him and his 
relation to Leibniz, see Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, 15-25.  
115 See LA xiii-xiv and A II ii XXIX-XXX. As Woolhouse and Francks (WF 116, fn. 94) point out, 
there is also an announcement of the upcoming publication of the correspondence to be found in 
the Mémoires de Trévoux from July 1708. But this aim of publication also brings with it a further 
complication, namely that of textual evaluation: Leibniz continued to draft and re-draft the 
correspondence and added remarks later. See Anne Becco, “Aux sources de la monade: 
Paléographie et lexicographie leibniziennes,” Les Études philosophiques 3 (1975). 
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absence of incoming replies and objections by Arnauld, it provides an interesting 
insight into Leibniz’s views on the problem of substantial unity on a logical as well 
as physical-metaphysical level. We will look at both in turn now.     
 
2.1. The Logical Strand: Complete Concepts and Individual Substances 
 
The beginning of the correspondence is set off by a rather brief outline of 
the individual paragraphs of the Discourse, beginning with a clarification of divine 
perfection and the nature of miracles, followed by an explanation of the concept of 
an individual substance: “[E]ach individual substance is an expression of the entire 
universe after its own manner, and [...] in its concepts all events that occur in it are 
included with all their circumstances and the whole succession of external 
things.” 116  This completeness of substance entails, among other things, that 
substances are self-sufficient and sheltered from any kind of direct causal influence 
from other created substances. Hence the notions of ‘action’ and ‘passion’ require a 
reformulation in accordance with this independence claim, at least if one wants to 
speak metaphysically strictly and accurately. This reformulation is provided by 
Leibniz in terms of an increase and decrease, respectively, of expression within the 
individual complete substance itself.  
Arnauld is, in his initial reaction to this very short summary of the contents 
of the Discourse, first and foremost concerned about the fact that the completeness-
of-concept claim seems to entail that once Adam, the first man, is created, 
everything that happens afterwards happens by necessity (since it is already 
included in Adam’s complete concept). But these worries are of less interest here.117 
In answering to these worries, Leibniz is also forced to spell out in greater detail 
what the notion of a complete concept amounts to and why he introduces it as a 
criterion of substantiality. He claims that God chooses “a particular Adam of 
whom a perfect representation exists among the possible beings in God’s ideas, 
accompanied by particular individual circumstances and possessing among other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 G II 12/LA 5. 
117 For a thorough discussion of this topic and worries about the threat of necessitarianism in 
Leibniz in general, see Adams, Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 9-52, and Sleigh, Leibniz and 
Arnauld, 48-94. 
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predicates also that of having in the course of time a particular posterity.”118 It is 
this complete concept that also serves as the means to distinguish the actual Adam, 
who in some way includes the course of the actual world in his complete concept, 
from an infinite number of other very similar persons (or Adam-counterparts, if 
you wish). It thus serves as a principle of individuation that allows for picking out 
and distinguishing its bearer from all other created, as well as possible, substances. 
In order to fulfil this function, the concept must be complete since “the nature of 
an individual must be complete and determinate. I am even very much persuaded 
of what St. Thomas had already taught regarding intelligences, and which I 
consider to be generally true, namely that it is not possible for there to be two 
individuals entirely alike, or differing in number only.”119 While Leibniz presents his 
motivation for complete concepts to Arnauld primarily in terms of God’s decision 
to create this particular possible world with this particular Adam and all of his 
posterity, when pressed by Arnauld’s concerns about the consequences, he supplies 
a further argument for the requirement of complete concepts, namely his idea of 
truth: “[A]lways, in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, 
universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of 
the subject; the predicate is present in the subject [praedicatum inest subjecto]; or 
else I do not know what truth is.”120 There are two major questions here. On the 
one hand, there is a question about the connection between the logical notion of a 
complete concept and the metaphysical notion of substance as the thing which has 
a complete concept. Leibniz himself does not further elaborate on the relation 
between these two notions, if they are indeed two notions at all. This question is 
complicated by Leibniz’s lack of further clarification and also of clarity in general 
on this point.121 But this is not the place for a discussion of this topic and it might 
suffice to say that, for Leibniz, there must exist some connection between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 G II 19/LA 14. 
119 ‘Remark on Arnauld’s letter concerning complete individual concepts', G II 42/LA 45. 
120 G II 56/LA 63. 
121 Benson Mates, quite justly, complains that Leibniz “often confuses propositions with sentences, 
ascribing to the former various features that properly belong to the latter. More generally, he 
amalgamates concepts of all kinds with the linguistic expressions that are supposed to represent 
them. […] He also does not always attend properly to the distinction between concepts and the 
individuals falling under them. Thus, for example, when he speaks of the “subject” of a proposition, 
he may be referring to a word or to the subject concept of the proposition or to the individual or 
individuals that fall under that concept.” (Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz, 50). 
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terms of a true proposition, such that all particular ‘events’ and ‘denominations’ 
that can truly be predicated of a substance as the subject of a proposition must be 
contained in the concept of this substance and that, therefore, its concept must be 
complete. But the foundation of what truth is for Leibniz cannot be based solely 
on the relation between concepts and there must be, in addition, a “real connection 
between the predicate and the subject”122. This idea is also echoed in the Discourse: 
 
Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of 
things and that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when the 
predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it 
virtually. ... Thus the subject term must always contain the predicate term, 
so that one who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also 
know that the predicate belongs to it.123 
 
But, on the other hand, there is the question of the nature of complete 
concepts themselves. There has been a significant amount of discussion concerning 
this issue, especially concerning the question if superessentalism (i.e. each 
individual substance has all of its properties necessarily) or superintrinsicalness (i.e. 
if a substance would not have any of its properties, it would not be that substance) 
is the position which should be ascribed to Leibniz.124 Be that as it may, it seems 
required by the function the complete concept has to fulfil, especially in its role to 
prevent transworld identity, that the complete concept is maximal in some sense: 
“We assume an enumeration of primitive properties, with concepts formed by 
selecting, for each primitive property in the enumeration, either it or its 
complement. Concepts so constructed, under which some individual could fall, are 
complete concepts.”125 The maximality of complete concepts, such that no further 
property can be added without provoking a contradiction, seems important in 
order to prevent it from being the case that a possible substance can be a member 
of two different possible words or that two different substances, even if they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 G VII 300 [1686/87 (?)]: “connexio realis inter praedicatum et subjectum”. 
123 ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ (1686) §8: G IV 433/AG 41. 
124 The distinction is proposed by Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, 67-72; a similar distinction is also 
proposed by Adams, Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 75-110. Cover and Hawthorne-O’Leary, 
Substance and Individuation, 87-142, and Fabrizio Mondadori, “On Some Disputed Questions in 
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125 Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, 50. 
56	  	  
members of two different worlds, can share all their properties. This is clearly a 
stronger notion of completeness than Leibniz explicitly presents to Arnauld. 
What follows from this completeness of the concept of substance are several 
crucial characteristics of substantiality, most of which encapsulate some kind of 
independence. Because each complete concept contains not only all the subject’s 
intrinsic properties, but also, at least derivatively, all the substance’s connections to 
its surroundings and in further consequence all events in its universe, it is in itself 
an expression of this universe in its entirety. But since each substance expresses all 
events of the universe it is a part of, the overall content of an expression is the 
same for each substance within one and the same universe. The distinguishing 
difference lies not so much in what is expressed, but in how it is done, i.e. in “the 
point of view from which it looks at the universe; and [...] its succeeding state is a 
sequel [...] of its preceding state, as though only God and it existed in the world: 
thus each individual substance or complete entity is like a world apart, independent 
of everything except God.”126 As expressions of the same universe, substances are 
designed to harmonize in their expressive content, and it is this harmony, in 
combination with the degrees of distinctness and confusion of expression, that 
incites us to ascribe interaction. This explanation, so Leibniz, applies equally to the 
interaction between a mind and its body:  
 
[W]hat happens to the soul is born to it in its own depths, without its 
having to adapt itself subsequently to the body, any more than the body to 
the soul. Each one obeying its laws, with the one acting freely and the 
other without choice, they agree one with another in the same 
phenomena. The soul, however, is nevertheless the form of its body, 
because it is an expression of the phenomena of all other bodies in 
accordance with the relationship to its own.127 
 
What is already alluded to here is confirmed in the next letter to Arnauld, namely 
that it is the soul that is an individual substance, that is the kind of being whose 
concept includes everything: “Now, since the soul is an individual substance, its 
concept, notion, essence or nature must include everything that is to happen to 
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127 G II 58/LA 65-66. 
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it”128. Here Leibniz clearly identifies the soul as a substance, while the status of 
body remains in this letter unclear, and so far we know only that its relation to a 
soul consists in a relation of expression. But Leibniz introduces, in addition, the 
further notion of ‘bodily substances’, to which the independence claims concerning 
substances should, as substances, surely equally apply. In doing so, he is aware that 
the claim that there is no interaction between substances in general, but especially 
the denial of interaction even between bodies, will be conceived of as being highly 
controversial. He acknowledges this immediately, but also suggests that the 
assumption of substantial forms is inevitable: 
 
One will perhaps be more surprised to find that I deny the action of one 
bodily substance upon the other, though this appears to be so evident. 
But apart from the fact that others have already done so, one must 
consider that it is a play of the imagination rather than a distinct idea. If 
the body is a substance and not a simple phenomenon like a rainbow, nor 
an entity united by accident or by aggregation like a heap of stones, it 
cannot consist of extension, and one must necessarily conceive of 
something there that one calls substantial form, and which corresponds in 
a way to the soul.129  
 
While he had previously distinguished between the soul and its body, he seems to 
be willing to claim here that the body is a substance as well. But, at this point, this 
is far from clear, firstly, because it is not obvious that corporeal substance (substance 
corporelle) refers to the body of the soul that he has been previously talking about, 
that is, the body with which the soul stands in a harmonized relation of expression. 
But, secondly, while it is clear that a corporeal substance will be some kind of 
substance, to which, as it seems, also the characteristics of causal independence 
should apply, Leibniz might be seen as adding a further question: Independent of 
corporeal substance and souls, there is the further question whether the body (le 
corps) is a substance at all or only a mere phenomenon. And if the former is to be 
the case, Leibniz claims, ‘it cannot consist of extension’. At this point Leibniz 
introduces again a dichotomy between metaphysics and physics: While the 
metaphysical explanation of bodies, if there are such things, requires substantial 
forms, particular physical phenomena themselves, the behaviour and laws of 	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extended objects, are to be explained without recourse to these forms, but merely 
in mechanical terms.  
But the notion of complete concepts entails a further question: If it is the 
substantial form or soul that corresponds to it and which is the metaphysical 
correlate that entails the basis for all true predications, it seems to do the majority, 
if not all, of the explanatory work on a metaphysical level. It is the substantial form 
that entails the basis for the true ascription of properties and it is ‘like a world 
apart’. But what job is there left to do for an additional ‘body’? It might be 
suggested that “[w]hatever these unities are that make up real bodies, they do not 
seem to be souls simpliciter.”130 This seems a fair point, and so far we still have the 
unexplained notion of ‘corporeal substance’ up our sleeve. We will return to one 
aspect of this point below, when looking at the motivation from the argument of 
borrowed reality. But for the moment, let us look into its relation to the claim that 
individual substances have complete concepts. 
Leibniz himself does not explicitly seem to connect the idea of complete 
concepts with that of bodies or corporeal substances. Apart from what seems to be 
an identification of souls or substantial forms with the bearers of complete 
concepts, he leaves it open how this would play out in the case of corporeal 
substances. But it does not seem clear that Leibniz is committed to corporeal 
substances composed of a soul as their substantial form and a body consisting of 
an infinite number of further substantial form-matter composites divided to infinity 
at all. On such an account, the soul serves as “a kind of incorporeal glue”131, such 
that the composite yields a kind of unified, but (presumably) nonetheless extended 
kind of substance. While there are possible accounts of what this notion of 
‘corporeal substance’ might amount to, it seems prima facie problematic to describe 
it as something quasi-Aristotelian. Neither, it seems, would the addition and 
existence of such a body add anything to the content of the expression of the soul 
that is the unifying substantial form, since everything is already contained in its 
complete concept, nor is it clear how such an account would relieve Leibniz’s 
worries about the nature of extension and its incapability to constitute an individual 
being. But apart from the vagueness of how the details of such an account would 	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131 ibid. 
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work, there is also a further worry that is brought about by the maximality of 
complete concepts and the thereby entailed independence of the bearers of such 
complete concepts: If we assume that one substantial form (a soul) unities in some 
way other substantial forms (those which unite the diverse parts of the soul’s 
bodies, and which themselves are divided into further parts that are united by a 
substantial form, and so on to infinity), we have a situation where the soul’s uniting 
– as it should be more than mere expression and yield a unity stronger than a 
merely perceptual one – needs to unite an infinite number of substantial forms with 
complete concepts specific to them and which are, therefore, necessarily different 
(even if only marginally, in at least one out of an infinite number of aspects) from 
the uniting soul. Each of the complete concepts that inform or unify the various 
parts of its body must have each at least one property whose opposite or negation 
is part of the complete concept of the soul. In short, if maximality is assumed, each 
actual (as well as possible) substantial form must have a complete concept that 
differs in at least one property from all other (actualized as well as possible) 
complete concepts. If we now look at the complete concept of the soul in its 
relation to the complete concept of any of the other, subordinate substantial forms 
it supposedly unites, then we get the following picture: There must be one property 
in each of these subordinate substantial forms that is not only not a constituent of 
the complete concept of the soul. But, due to maximality criterion, it must further 
be the case that the negation of this property is a constituent of the soul’s complete 
concept, since for each property it is the case that either it or its negation is entailed 
in any complete concept. It seems hard to see how the soul could unite an infinite 
number of such substantial forms, some of whose properties stand in contradiction 
to its own complete concept, in a more substantial sense than by expression, i.e. it 
is hard to conceive of a way that the soul could be the unifying principle for a body 
consisting of all those individual bodily parts informed by their own substantial 
forms, such that one being or a substance results from it.  
It seems that during the 1680s, Leibniz not only further develops the role 
of substantial forms in metaphysical explanations, but that he also strengthens its 
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independence and self-sufficiency.132 While the correspondence with Arnauld itself 
does not seem to allow for a definitive ascription of a certain ontology to Leibniz, 
the notion of a complete concept seems to limit the possible options. But it is by 
no means clear that the question of ontology is one that is pressing for Leibniz at 
this point in time. 
 
 
2.2. The Problem of Extension and the Unity of Substance in the Mid-1680s 
 
While Arnauld seems satisfied with Leibniz’s explanation of complete 
concepts as grounded in his notion of truth, he immediately picks up on Leibniz’s 
suggestion that any explanation of the existence of bodies demands the 
introduction of substantial forms, even though he introduces a twist to Leibniz’s 
original formulation. While Leibniz only states that ‘if body is a substance’133, 
Arnauld paraphrases it as ‘in order for body or matter’ 134  not to be a mere 
phenomenon, the introduction of substantial forms is required. It is not Leibniz 
himself who introduces matter into the discussion, but he also does not seem to 
object much to this intrusion. In his answer, Leibniz is rather tentative and seems 
unwilling to make an explicit commitment to the existence of bodies at all. Hence 
his elucidations seem to be based on the conditional that if there are bodies, then 
certain, metaphysically severe consequences will follow.135 And these consequences 
illuminate certain passages from the summary he had originally sent to Arnauld. 
Having occupied himself for years with questions concerning the constitution of 
physical objects and the question of their unity, Leibniz seems to have, by the time 
of his writing to Arnauld, found decisive reasons to doubt the fundamentality of 	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extended substances. In his summary this reads as follows: “That the notions involved 
in extension contain something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of body”136, and 
the corresponding paragraph in the Discourse claims  
 
that the notions of size, shape, and motion are not as distinct as is 
imagined and that they contain something imaginary and relative to our 
perception, as do (though to a greater extent) color, heat, and other 
similar qualities, qualities about which one can doubt whether they are 
truly found in the nature of things outside ourselves. That is why qualities 
of this kind cannot constitute any substance.137 
 
This idea is one Leibniz developed already several years before the Discourse. The 
relativity of motion is based on his claim that it cannot with certainty be attributed 
to one particular body, but is rather ascribed based on other considerations, 
predominantly on the question which ascription yields the simplest explanation of 
the phenomenon.138 Though he alludes to the vagueness of the terms relating to the 
modes of extension, this thought plays a less prominent role in the argumentation. 
Arnauld rather pushes Leibniz towards an explanation of his notion of an aggregate 
and why he would hold the view that aggregation puts substantiality under threat. 
The argument Leibniz puts forward is prima facie rather simple: There is also 
something imaginary and mind-dependent that partly constitutes aggregates.139 
 
For let us assume that there are two stones, for instance the diamonds of 
the Grand Duke and of the Grand Mogul: one and the same collective 
name may be given to account for both, and it may be said that they are a 
pair of diamonds, although they are to be found a long way away from 
each other; but it will not be said that these two diamonds compose one 
substance. Matters of degree have no place here. If therefore they are 
brought closer to one another, even to the point of contact, they will not 
be more substantially united on that account; and even if after contact one 
were to add some other body calculated to prevent their separating, for 
example if one were to set them in a single ring, all that will make only 
what is called ‘one by accident’. For it is as though by accident that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ (1686) §12, AG 44. 
137 ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ (1686) §12, G IV 436/AG 44. 
138 See, for example, ‘Motion is something relative’ (1977), A VI 4 360/RA 228, and ‘Matter and 
Motion are only Phenomena’ (1678-9?), A VI 4 277/RA 256. 
139 This mind-dependence of aggregates here seems to be, at least on the face of it, different from 
the mind-dependent and imaginary character of extension. The former is mind-dependent insofar it 
is based on the essential activity of a mind that takes a number of things as belonging together, 
while the latter is primarily characterized by a lack of clarity in the perceiving mind.  
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are forced into one and the same movement. [...] There is as much 
difference between a substance and such an entity as there is between a 
man and a community, such as a people, army, society or college, which 
are moral entities, where something imaginary exists, depend upon the 
fabrications of our minds. Substantial unity requires a complete, 
indivisible and naturally indestructible entity, since its concept embraces 
everything that is to happen to it, which cannot be found in shape or in 
motion [...], but in a soul or substantial form after the example of what 
one calls self.140 
 
Here we find further support for the claim above that soul is the bearer of the 
complete concept and a substance in its own right. And even though Leibniz later 
admits that there are degrees of justification for calling certain aggregates ‘one’, 
when it comes to real unity, there are no degrees to be found. Hence something is 
an aggregate regardless of whether its constitutive members are far apart from each 
other, in contiguity, or even united in a way that ensures common movement over 
a period of time. But Leibniz also emphasizes that he cannot with certainty ascribe 
the status of substance to most things, such as the sun or trees. But, he claims, “at 
least I can say that if there are no bodily substances such as I can accept, it follows 
that bodies will be no more than true phenomena like the rainbow”141. Here again, 
we see the use of two different notions, ‘bodily substances’ on the one hand and 
‘bodies’ on the other, but with the restriction to ‘bodily substances such as I can 
accept’ [my emphasis] and not an outright commitment to a common sense or 
traditional notion of bodily substances. One possible reasoning behind this claim is 
that the infinite divisibility of matter of bodies prevents one from arriving at some 
one thing which can be considered to be a genuine entity, i.e. to arrive at “animate 
machines whose soul or substantial form creates substantial unity independent of 
the external union of contiguity. And if there are none, it follows that apart from 
man there is apparently nothing substantial in the visible world.”142 Without being 
aggregated of something ultimately real, i.e. real unities, the aggregate itself must 
lack reality.  
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141 G II 77/LA 95. 
142 G II 77/LA 95. 
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This line of argument is not new to Leibniz’s thinking. Already by the end of 
the 1670s we find a similar argument, though even more explicitly directed against 
Cartesian extended substance:143 
(1) What has no greater unity than bricks placed on top of each other is not 
properly one entity. 
(2) It is assumed that there is nothing intelligible in a body other than 
extension. 
(3) Every body is actually divided further bodies. 
(C1) There is no such thing as one body. 
(C2) There are no bodies. 
The argument in this text seems straightforward: Sheer placing next to one another, 
i.e. mere contiguity, is insufficient for producing an entity. There must be some 
stronger connection between the parts, if they are to compose a unity at all. Since 
in bodies there is nothing but extension and its modifications and every extended 
thing is divisible into extended parts (the Cartesian claim), there is nothing that 
could account for any connection beyond contiguity of parts. Therefore, nothing 
that is a merely extended thing is an entity, and since body is defined as a merely 
extended thing, a body is not an entity. Hence, Leibniz further concludes, either 
bodies are pure phenomena or the notion of body on which this argument is based 
is incorrect or at least insufficient. Even though Leibniz is not always explicit on 
the status of extension, it seems that already throughout these writings, extension is 
nothing fundamental, primitive or ultimately real, and nothing that plays a 
grounding role in metaphysics. 
The general worry about the unity of extended things is augmented by a 
related worry at the time of the correspondence with Arnauld. The infinite 
divisibility or division of extended substance threatens no longer only the unity of 
extended things, but also their reality: If the reality of the whole is dependent on 
the reality of its parts, and these parts have parts themselves and are therefore 
equally dependent on the reality of their parts, then the fact that we do not arrive at 
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a bottom level there implies a lack of grounding of the reality of the whole we 
started with.144 
What gives rise to interpretative problems concerning the concrete status of 
extension and the nature of bodies is connected to Leibniz’s lack of any explicit 
commitment to a particular ontology.145 Another source of problems is the fact that 
Leibniz seems to run together two different arguments for the introduction of 
substantial forms. One is the argument above, that in order for a composite to be 
real, all of its parts must be real, because the reality of a composite, if it has any, is 
dependent on the reality of its parts. But it is important to distinguish this 
argument from a related one that seems to argue from the unity of corporeal 
substance, which cannot be bestowed on it by mere extension, to the existence of 
unifying substantial forms. This latter argument seems to be premised on the 
assumption that there are at least some corporeal substances: “If there were no 
composite beings whose unity had to be secured in order for them to be 
substances, there would be no reason to propose substantial forms to secure their 
unity.”146 But so far, as we have seen, it seems to be unclear in which sense 
substantial forms could fulfil this role. It seems, in addition, equally unclear why 
Leibniz should be seen as requiring such a strong notion of unity in order to 
motivate his argument for substantial forms: Even if bodies only have phenomenal 
unity – or even more so –, then some substantial forms, in this case souls, who 
perceive these bodies as unities and who provide ultimate reason for this 
phenomenal unity, are required.  
Similar to his early Disputatio, what Leibniz seems to be presenting to 
Arnauld is not a definite catalogue of kinds of substances found in the world, but a 
general definition of substance without any clear commitment to a certain 
ontology.147 His definition is supposed to be read as a general description of what it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Samuel Levey, “On Unity and Simple Substances in Leibniz,” The Leibniz Review 17 (2007), 
61-106. 
145 There are many passages which might suggest that Leibniz is in fact in those years committed to 
corporeal substance, or at least has them as an implicit remainder of his earlier thought looming the 
background. If that is the case, it is difficult not to ascribe to Leibniz the adherence to several 
incompatible systems during the years of his correspondence with Arnauld. See Wilson, Leibniz’s 
Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study, 79-110. 
146 Samuel Levey, “On Unity: Leibniz-Arnauld Revisited,” Philosophical Topics 31.1-2 (2003), 270. 
147 A similar view is indicated by Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, 96-97, pointing out that Leibniz seems 
very aware of the intension of ‘individual substance’ and the theses following from it.  
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means to be a substance, and from it the further definitions of individual created 
substances of certain kinds, such as corporeal or incorporeal substances, would 
follow: “[A]s the concept of individual substance in general which I have provided 
is as clear as that of truth, the concept of bodily substance will so also, and 
consequently that of substantial form”148. In opposition to Arnauld’s claim that his 
definition of substance is arbitrary, Leibniz holds that the requirement of true unity 
is neither arbitrary nor uncommon, but in accordance with those philosophers who 
“have taken this term more or less in the same way, distinguishing between a unity 
per se and a unity by accident, substantial form and accidental form, composite 
substances perfect and imperfect, natural and artificial”, but considering “matters at 
a much more general level, and abandoning the use of terms, I believe that where 
there are only entities through aggregation, there will not even be real entities”149.  
The concern expressed here seems similar to the one of borrowed reality. It 
is grounded in the worry that if one never arrives at basic unities, the reality of the 
aggregate lacks a foundation and this lack would render the aggregate a mere 
phenomenon. But Leibniz connects it here with a worry about the nature of 
substance as that which possesses a correlating complete concept and this 
reasoning poses a further problem for aggregates:  
 
You say you do not see what leads me to admit these substantial forms or 
rather these bodily substances endowed with true unity; but it is because I 
cannot conceive of any reality without true unity. And to my way of 
thinking the concept of an individual substance embraces consequences 
incompatible with an entity through aggregation; I conceive of properties 
in substance which cannot be explained by extension, shape or motion150. 
 
Substances as expressions of the universe are mirroring the works of God and in 
this way even further increase the perfection of the world. What contains the 
expression of each individual substance at each moment in time is its complete 
concept. What is the bearer of the complete concept is the substantial form. Hence 
it seems as if only substantial forms qualify as substances. But clearly Leibniz 
assumes that we experience bodies, and their foundation must be explainable 	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principally without recourse to extension and its modes. Whatever seems to be an 
extended thing, is at least partly phenomenal, since “everything is strictly indefinite 
where extension is concerned, and what extension we ascribe to bodies is merely 
phenomena and abstractions”151. Now every human being seems to have an 
extended body that is somehow connected to his or her soul. But while Leibniz is 
denying that the property of being extended as well as its shape and motion are 
more than a phenomenal quality of this body, similar to its colour, he is more 
reluctant on giving a definite answer what the ultimate constitution of this body is. 
“However, although it is possible that the soul has a body made up of parts 
animated by separate souls, the soul or form of the whole is not on that account 
made up of the souls or forms of the parts.”152 These claims fit in neatly with the 
independence of substantial forms and the worry that bodies cannot be aggregates 
of bodily parts informed by their own substantial forms and united by a soul.  
The status of the soul as a substance seems very clear by now; the status 
and constitution of the body much less so. But, Leibniz emphasises, while the body 
might be made up of parts of some kind, the soul is not. He seems to stress that 
while the body might be an aggregate of animated parts, the soul clearly is not. This 
emphasis is demanded by the notion of an aggregate already touched upon. Even 
though Leibniz accepts that there are degrees of accidental unity, for example that 
we are correct in ascribing more unity to an ordered society than to a ‘chaotic 
mob’, “all these unities are made complete only by thoughts and appearances, like 
colors and other phenomena, which one nevertheless calls real”153: 
 
Our mind notices or conceives of certain genuine substances which have 
various modes; these modes embrace relationships with other substances, 
from which the mind takes the opportunity to link them together in 
thought and to enter into the account one name for all these things 
together, which makes for convenience in reasoning. But one must not let 
oneself be deceived and make of them so many substances or truly real 
entities; that is only for those who stop at appearances, or those who 
make realities out of all abstractions of the mind, and who conceive of 
number, time, place, movement, shape, perceptible qualities as so many 
separate entities. Whereas I maintain that one cannot find a better way of 	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restoring the prestige of philosophy and transforming it into something 
precise than by distinguishing the only substances or complete entities, 
endowed with genuine unity, with their different states which follow one 
another; all the rest is merely phenomena, abstractions or relationships.154 
 
According to this picture, the connection between a soul and its body seems to be 
not as close as one might expect, the soul far from having a relationship to the 
body that would allow to talk about the composite of the two as a real unity. The 
understanding of the relation between a mind and its own body as well as all other 
bodies is further deepened by the explanation of the notion of expression. “One 
thing expresses another (in my terminology) when there exists a constant and fixed 
relationship between what can be said of one and of the other. [...] Expression is 
common to all forms, and it is a genus of which natural perception, animal 
sensation and intellectual knowledge are species”155. The knowledge concerning our 
body is based on the correspondence of certain more or less confused perceptions 
in our soul with all the movements of our body. But even though we have a closer, 
i.e. more immediate, perceptual connection to our body, it does not seem that this 
entails the claim that we form a substance or real unity with it. This is illustrated by 
Leibniz’s example of the connection between an act of willing and the 
corresponding movement: “my hand moves not because I will it to do so (for it is 
useless for me to will a mountain to move [...]) but because I could not will it with 
success, except at the precise moment that the elasticity in my hand is about to 
slacken in the requisite way to achieve this result”156. The main difference between 
my body and a mountain, or any other corporeal object distinct from my body, 
seems to be a closer correspondence of the former with the expressions in my soul, 
but without rendering it a part of myself or the substance that is me. It remains an 
object external to me and related to myself, like the assumed mountain is, by the 
expressions I find within my soul. 
While Leibniz prefers to talk about ‘bodies’ and ‘bodily substances’, 
Arnauld is concerned rather with ‘matter’ and wonders how the conjunction with a 
soul could render it one entity, whilst matter as such is infinitely divisible and hence 	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lacks any worthwhile notion of unity.  Leibniz’s answer to this query indicates that 
there are two ways of conceiving of matter, either as a component of the substance 
or abstracted from it.  
 
I answer that it is the animate substance to which this matter belongs 
which is truly an entity, and the matter considered as a mass in itself is 
only a pure phenomenon or a well-founded appearance, as also are space 
and time. It has not even precise, fixed qualities which can give it the 
appearance of a specific entity.157 
 
This is due to the fact that it neither can have a precise shape due to the infinite 
divisibility of matter, nor that motion and magnitude are less phenomenal than 
colours or sounds, and if there would be extended mass constituted only by such 
qualities, it would only be a phenomenon. “[I]t is form which gives determinate 
being to matter [...]. Only indivisible substances and their different states are 
absolutely real.”158  
Leibniz later added to the manuscript the following supplement: 
 
But if one considers as matter of bodily substance not formless mass but a 
second matter which is the multiplicity of substances of which the mass is 
that of the total body, it may be said that these substances are parts of this 
matter, just as those which enter into our body form part of it, for as our 
body is the matter, and the soul is the form of our substance, it is the 
same with other bodily substances. [...] The problems that are raised on 
these topics originate inter alia from the absence usually of a distinct 
enough concept of the whole and the part, which basically is nothing else 
but an immediate requisite of the whole, and in a way homogeneous. Thus 
parts can constitute a whole, whether it has a genuine unity or not. It is 
true that the whole which has a genuine unity can remain strictly the same 
individual, although it loses or gains parts, as we experience in ourselves; 
thus the parts are only temporarily immediate requisites. But if one were 
to understand by the term ‘matter’ something that is always essential to 
the same substance, one might in the sense of certain Scholastics 
understand thereby the principle of passive power of a substance, and in 
this sense matter would not be extended or divisible, although it would be 
the principle of divisibility or of that which amounts to it in the 
substance.159 
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We will encounter similar thoughts a few years later in writings that deal with 
simple substances. Hence it might be argued that this later addition was made after 
a shift in Leibniz’s thinking had already taken place, even though Leibniz clearly 
thinks that this addendum sits well with the rest of the text. It introduces a 
distinction that might indeed make things clearer. On the one hand, one might talk 
about man as “an entity endowed with a genuine unity conferred on him by his 
soul, notwithstanding the fact that the mass of his body is divided into organs, 
vessels, humours, spirits, and that the parts are undoubtedly full of an infinite 
number of other bodily substances endowed with their own entelechies”160, but this 
does not amount to saying that man is a real unity or substance composed of a soul 
and a body. This body itself, even though it might be the body of a human being, 
might not be a real unity at all. In his last letter to Arnauld, written in 1690, Leibniz 
claims that it is this notion of body that has been the subject of the thoughts he has 
shared with Arnauld in their correspondence, and it is a thought similar to the one 
we have already encountered in the argument against Cartesian extended substance 
from the late 1670s: “Body is an aggregate of substances, and is not a substance 
properly speaking.”161 
But does this stand in opposition to Leibniz’s frequent use of the notion of 
‘corporeal substance’ or ‘bodily substance’? Not necessarily. Already a few years 
before the correspondence, Leibniz entertained the idea that corporeality is 
independent of extension and that corporeal substances are constituted differently 
and possess different essential attributes than usually assumed by his 
contemporaries: 
 
Extension does not belong to the substance of a body, and neither does 
motion, but only matter, i.e. the principle of passion or of a limited nature, and 
form, i.e. the principle of action or of unlimited nature. For every created 
thing contains both the limited and the unlimited: the limited in respect of 
distinct cognition, and the irresistible power, and the unlimited in respect of 
confused cognition and of diffused action. For every soul, or rather every 
corporeal substance, is confusedly omniscient and diffusedly omnipotent. [...] 
Every created thing has matter and form, i.e. is corporeal.162 
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Now we shall take a look at how this claim that matter as the passive 




3. The Metaphysics of Simple Substance 
 
 
3.1. Simple Substances and Substantial Forms 
 
Regardless of the question to what extent simple substances can be traced 
back to Leibniz’s writings of the 1680s or even earlier, there is a rather decisive 
moment that encourages the ascription of a simple substance ontology in the mid-
1690s. In these years, the possibly first time Leibniz explicitly mentions simple 
substances, is in a defence of his metaphysics, which were put forward in the ‘New 
System’ (1695) against objections that were raised by Simon Foucher. In this 
response he claims that “in actual substantial things, the whole is a result or coming 
together of simple substances, or rather of a multitude of real unities.”163 While this 
is clearly a tremendous step towards, if not an arrival at, the substances later to be 
termed ‘monads’164, it is less clear when exactly the idea as such arises. Therefore, it 
will prove useful to look at the wider context, which culminates in this explicit 
adoption of a simple substance ontology (while leaving for the moment undecided 
whether this is an ontology that contains exclusively simple substances or one that 
allows for other substances, e.g. corporeal substances, as well).  
What seems to be the main, if not only, criterion for simplicity by the time 
of the Monadology is the impossibility of being resolved into parts, i.e. partlessness: 
“The monad […] is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites – 
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simple, that is without parts.”165 Already in some notes on a conversation Leibniz 
had with Fardella166, written down in 1690, Leibniz gives an argument similar to the 
one he will later suggest in the Monadology and elsewhere as to why there must be 
more fundamental substances that constitute bodies. Body, Leibniz reasons, “is an 
aggregate of substances, since it is always further divisible”167, but as such it can 
only be real if there are substances that are truly one and indivisible, and which 
form the basis for a body’s constitution. Such indivisible substances are 
characterized not by being a part of a body they compose, but “rather as an 
essential, internal requisite, just as one grants that a point is not a part that makes 
up a line, but rather something of a different sort which is, nevertheless, necessarily 
required for the line to be, and to be understood”168. Because these ‘internal 
requisites’ are not parts of the aggregate, they do not need to be homogeneous with 
the whole, i.e. they do not need to share the properties of the whole. In the case of 
parts, there must be some property that forms the basis for regarding all these parts 
as belonging to the same whole.169 But in the case of simple substances as the 
foundation for aggregates, this requirement – due to the denial that they are parts 
of the whole – is not necessarily entailed. They can, therefore, differ in fundamental 
respects, and indeed even in all respects, even though, as we will see, at least the 
well-founded properties of the whole might need to supervene in some sense on 
the properties of its constituents.170  
The parts of a merely extended substance, on the contrary, must themselves 
be extended, and, for Leibniz at least, therefore also infinitely divisible. This 
supposition is, in Leibniz’s view, as true for Cartesian res extensa as it is for the 
smallest, only allegedly indivisible particles of the atomists and corpuscularians.171 
But this supposition by itself does not contain any rejection of extension as such. 	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Even though what is extended is divisible, this does not mean that anything that is 
extended cannot be such a fundamental unity. It only means that anything that is 
nothing but extended can function as such a unity, since it will always be further 
divisible. This leaves open the possibility that some unifying principle might be 
added to this extended, divisible matter in order to achieve such a unity. But we 
have already seen that there are independent grounds for assuming that extended 
objects are, for Leibniz at least, highly suspicious and that details of how the 
unifying by a substantial form or by any other means available to Leibniz could 
proceed is difficult to comprehend. 
This possibility of a further principle added to mere extension seems also to 
be ruled out by the illustration Leibniz chooses in order to motivate the existence 
and to explain nature of these requisites. The paradigmatic case of such a 
fundamental substance is introduced now by reference to introspection. The 
reference to one’s own experience as an ‘I’ is used to suggest the existence of a 
single, indivisible substance, which cannot be resolved into any further parts or 
substances. 
This ‘I’ is, in addition, the permanent subject of one’s actions and passions, 
and hence necessarily persisting over and above the changeable human body that is 
attached to it: “Hence, since I am truly a single indivisible substance, unresolvable 
into many others, the permanent and constant subject of my actions and passions, 
it is necessary that there be a persisting individual substance over and above the 
organic body.”172 
This is a clear reference back to the Aristotelian notion of substance as the 
ultimate subject of predication in its strict sense that Leibniz has already utilized as 
the basis of the complete concept theory in the 1680s. Based on this list of 
properties that the ‘I’ as a paradigmatic substance possesses, Leibniz concludes that 
“there must be some incorporeal, immortal substance in man, over and above the 
body, something, indeed, incapable of being resolved into parts.”173 Clearly, the ‘I’ 
as experienced through introspection shows remarkable resemblance, not least due 
to the emphasis on being ‘unresolvable’ and a ‘permanent subject’, with the mind-
like simple substances of the monadology and it is present already in this text 	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dating back to 1690. It is also worth noting that Leibniz regards this indivisible 
substance as being “completely different from the nature of body”, since it is 
“incorporeal” and “immortal”174. And even though this sounds remarkably similar 
to how one might describe a monad and as if Leibniz is suggesting that this 
indivisible substance is the soul or whatever corresponds to the soul in animals and 
plants, when pressed by Fardella he is eager to record that the soul as such is not a 
substance but “a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the 
first act, the first active faculty”175. We have already encountered this apparent 
ambiguity or indecision on Leibniz’s part in the 1680s, where he equally vacillated 
between the suggestion that souls are substances and the rejection or moderation 
of this claim. And again, we might be able to employ the same reasoning in order 
to resolve this tension and suggest that what Leibniz has in mind is that an 
indivisible substance is not exclusively constituted by a substantial form176 (even 
though Leibniz is here silent on what else it might be that enters into the 
substance), but also that it is neither corporeal (since it is qualified as ‘incorporeal’) 
nor resolvable into further parts (since it is a fundamental unity, though the 
partlessness might already suggested by its incorporeality). On the one hand, being 
‘incapable of being resolved into parts’ is not necessarily equivalent to being 
‘without parts’ (i.e. simple), since there might be a sense in which something can 
have inseparable parts; but given the assumption that for two things to stand in a 
parthood relation to one another homogeneity and separability are required, not 
being resolvable into parts seems to entail the absence of parts altogether and 
therefore partlessness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 ibid. It is hard to see how these ‘incorporeal’ substances, which are, in addition, ‘completely 
different in nature from the nature of bodies’, and therefore presumably also not extended, could be 
somehow similar to paradigmatic Aristotelian substances such as the horse Bucephalos or the man 
Socrates.  
175 ibid., AG 105. 
176 One might claim that Leibniz is just not careful in distinguishing between substance and 
substantial form in the present context. Robert Adams, for example, suggests that in order to gain a 
consistent reading of the Fardella memo, ‘soul’ and ‘substance’ need to be treated partly as 
equivalent, partly as distinct. (Adams, Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 275-276.) But this seems 
implausible given that this is a relatively short text and that the importance of this distinction is 
explicitly raised. Therefore, also readings that see the origin of simple substances in the mere 
resolution of matter into forms and hence into simple substances, e.g. Levey, “On Unity and Simple 
Substances in Leibniz”, seem to be misguided. 
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But this text itself is too short to paint a clear picture. And Leibniz himself 
complicates things at the end of this text by claiming that  
 
[f]or if a man is the I [Ego] itself, then he cannot be divided, nor can he perish, 
nor is he a homogeneous part of matter. But if by the name 'man' one 
understands that which perishes, then a man would be part of matter, 
whereas that which is truly indestructible would be called 'soul,' 'mind,' or 'I,' 
which would not be a part of matter.177 
 
Here we might have a hint at a possibly worry of Leibniz concerning Fardella’s 
understanding of the notion of substance such that he feels the need to distinguish 
a more common notion of the substance ‘man’ as an individual material, animate 
being from ‘man’ considered under his own, stricter notion of an indestructible, 
incorporeal substance, at this point taken to be the substantial form only. He could 
be seen to equate the ‘I’ as the paradigm of an indivisible substance with ‘soul’ and 
hence substantial form.178 Or one might claim that what Leibniz is doing in this and 
other texts of the time is that when he “talks about corporeal substances [...], he 
means corporeal substances: the unity of a soul or form and a body or matter, 
understood in very roughly the way the terms would have been used by an 
Aristotelian of his day.”179 Such a reading suggests that substantial forms are 
necessarily the forms of a body and hence that corporeal substances are 
“substances, though complex and made up of smaller substances, bugs in bugs, are, 
nevertheless, indivisible.”180 The Fardella Memo, taken by itself, seems to be too 
vague concerning the concrete constitution of bodies in order to identify reliably 
the underlying metaphysical structure of substances. But is the use of Aristotelian 
language sufficient to motivate such a reading of the Fardella Memo in the first 
place? It seems that the answer to this question has to be negative, since Leibniz 
continues to employ an ‘Aristotelian’ language frequently in his monadological 
writings as well, not the least by allowing that “[o]ne can call all simple substances 
or created monads entelechies”181 or by continuing to describe the constitution of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 ‘Notes on Fardella’ (1690), AG 105. 
178 See Adams, Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 275. 
179 Garber, Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad, 92. 
180 ibid., 84. 
181 Mon §18, G VI 609-10/AG 215.  
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monads in terms of matter and form182. Due to a lack of clarity in the notes on 
Fardella, it might be wise to postpone a judgment until we have looked at further 
texts of this time, which might be more explicit on this question. 
A more direct reference to simple substances can be found in the ‘New 
System’, where Leibniz describes the fundamental “atoms of substance” as “real 
unities absolutely destitute of parts”183. While the notion of an atom entails the idea of 
something indivisible, which might have been a component of Leibniz’s notion of 
substance that was in place before the 1690s, the notion of being ‘absolutely 
destitute of parts’ is a clear indication of partlessness, simple substances. The 
argument he employs in order to establish these ‘atoms of substance’ is similar to 
the one found in the Fardella Memo, namely that the principles of real unity cannot 
be found in matter, since matter is divisible to infinity and, also in accordance with 
the interchangeabililty of being and unity184, the reality of a multitude – due to not 
being a genuine unity and hence not being a genuine being by itself – is only to be 
derived from true unities.  
 
Therefore, in order to find these real entities I was forced to have recourse to 
a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both material and, at the 
same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity [later 
changed by Leibniz to: ‘Therefore, in order to find these real unities, I was 
forced to have recourse to a real and animated point, so to speak, or to an 
atom of substance which must include something of form or activity to 
make a complete being’]. Hence, it was necessary to restore, and, as it were, 
to rehabilitate the substantial forms which are in such disrepute today, but in a 
way that would render them intelligible, and separate the use one should 
make of them from the abuse that has been made of them. I found then 
that their nature consists in force, and that from this there follows 
something analogous to sensation and appetite, so that we must conceive of 
them on the model of the notion we have of souls.185 
 
But we have to proceed carefully here. It remained open in the Fardella Memo 
whether substances and substantial forms amount to the same, and a similar 
question arises with respect to this passage. In the printed version of the New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 E.g. in his correspondence with De Volder and Des Bosses. 
183 ‘New System’ (1695), G IV 482/AG 142, my emphasis. 
184 G II 97/LA 121. 
185 ‘New System’ (1695), G IV 478-79/AG 139. 
77	  	  
System, the real entities that are the basis for reality of bodies are ‘formal atoms’. 
This would suggest that they are essentially forms, while matter or any material 
aspect, on the other hand, seems to be dismissed as not capable of playing a role in 
the constitution of such an indivisible substance. The immediately following 
passage would then suggest that this formal atom was identical with the substantial 
form and that its nature would consist in force. But this is by no means the only 
way to understand this passage. The crucial question in order to make sense of it is: 
What does ‘material thing’ mean here? Earlier in the text, Leibniz justifies his 
motivation for the rehabilitation of substantial forms with the difficulty of finding 
“the principles of a true unity in matter alone, or in what is only passive, since 
everything in it is only a collection or aggregation of parts to infinity”186 or of 
placing unity in “extended mass alone”187. Matter seems to be here used less as a 
technical term, but rather aiming indiscriminately at Cartesian res extensa and at the 
notions of matter prevailing in general in early modern mechanical philosophy. 
With a denial of matter taken in this sense, formal atoms would be perfectly 
compatible with containing matter in a different sense, e.g. Leibnizian primary 
matter as a negation or privation. But more revealing is the amendment made by 
Leibniz later, which suggests that he came to realize that the term ‘formal atom’ 
might be misleading, inappropriate or at least not necessarily required, and is to be 
replaced with ‘real and animated point’, while at the same time any explicit mention 
of ‘matter’ is dropped. Instead, some form or activity is introduced, which makes 
this fundamental substance a complete being. Since this form only completes the 
substance, it seems that something else is required which enters with the form into 
the complete substance. The most obvious candidate would be some kind of 
matter. But the fact that ‘matter’ is the most obvious candidate for something that 
might complete ‘form’ does not mean that this ‘matter’ is equivalent to the 
Cartesian res extensa or traditional early modern matter, both of which have been 
criticized earlier in the New System. Neither does it have to be some kind of 
Aristotelian matter. Given the later amendment and the dropping of what seems to 
be matter in all these senses, it appears to be the case that if there were some kind 
of matter in Leibniz’s mind at this point, as the second notion involved in the 	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completion of a substance, it is probably some kind of primary matter in Leibniz’s 
own, specific sense, and something that is essentially unextended.  
Since these ‘true unities’ are ‘absolutely destitute of parts’, and not merely 
indivisible, neither form nor matter can be parts of a substance emerging from this 
union, i.e. they cannot be separable or really distinct. And, in addition, if one 
emphasises the absolute nature of the partlessness indicated here, neither of them 
seems capable of having parts by themselves. This view is also supported by the 
description of these real unities as ‘points’: These emerging unities can also be 
referred to as ‘metaphysical points’, which are contrasted with physical points that 
would be the result of a contraction of a corporeal substance. Such “physical points 
are indivisible only in appearance […]. Only metaphysical points or points of 
substance (constituted by forms or souls) are exact and real, and without them 
there would be nothing real, since without true unities there would be no 
multitude.” 188  Presumably, physical points are indivisible only in appearance, 
because they are still extended. In contrast, the ‘metaphysical points’ are truly 
indivisible and, arguably, therefore also unextended. This would suggest that if 
there is matter involved in the constitution of a substance, it is significantly 
different from the matter as the merely extended, or at all extended, mass that was 
introduced earlier in the ‘New System’.  
Such a different notion of matter, in return, does not give rise to the 
problem which was the starting point of Leibniz’s argument for simple substances, 
namely the worry how something that essentially has parts (if what it means to be 
extended is to have “parts inside parts”189, to be ‘divisible into parts’ or to be 
‘composed of parts’) can enter into something that is essentially destitute of parts 
or into something that is a true unity. On the account presented here, the question 
of what unifies the most fundamental substance does not need to be asked, since 
its constituents do not stand in the relation of parts that enter into a common 
whole to each other nor do they themselves consist of any parts. A substance 
constituted in this way is qua its constitution simple, i.e. without parts, and a 
genuine unity and hence does not require a unifying principle that ensures and 	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189 Descartes to Henry More, 5 February 1649, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Volume 3, 
trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 364. 
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upholds this unity. But Leibniz does not seem to be overly eager in this writing to 
explain in great detail how these real unities are constituted, but keener on 
introducing his solution for the mind-body-problem in form of the pre-established 
harmony and emphasizing the shortcomings of Cartesian and Occasionalist 
solutions. (He seems to have saved the task of a deeper analysis of the constitution 
of substances for the ‘Specimen Dynamicum’; see chapter 4.) 
Also Foucher seems to have read Leibniz as claiming that his fundamental 
substances are unextended things, since he agrees with Leibniz that extension 
requires unities, but he claims, in difference to Leibniz, that these unities cannot 
possibly be points, since points as unextended entities could not constitute any 
extension at all.190 And Leibniz does not show any indication that he wants to 
disabuse his fellow philosopher of the opinion that his view is indeed that the most 
fundamental substances are unextended. Pressed on this issue, Leibniz only denies 
that these fundamental substances form parts from which any extended thing could 
be composed. Hence he is implicitly reiterating that the parts of an extended object 
must themselves be extended. But he suggests, in addition, that extension is not a 
wholly or truly real thing, but rather puts it in the same ontological category as 
space and claims that they are both only systems of relations.191 Given Leibniz’s 
view on relations, it is clear why extension would not be fully real, but reducible to 
or grounded in intrinsic states of substances that stand in some way in the relation 
of extension to each other.  
In general, Leibniz points out, there are different criteria for parthood and 
for foundation. Concrete things are wholes composed of parts and are the result of 
the coming together of their individual parts, which must therefore be prior to the 
whole. Ideal wholes, such as space and mathematical extension, on the other hand, 
are prior to any parts that we might conceive in them. A concrete whole such as a 
herd, for example, can only exist if the individual sheep exist. But this analogy 
merely illustrates how an aggregate is in its reality dependent on the existence of its 
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191 ‘Note on Foucher's Objection’ (1695), G IV 491/AG 146. This is a stronger claim than the one 
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constituents. But this is not where Leibniz stops. He goes on to point out that each 
individual sheep is itself composed of parts, each of which has parts itself, and so 
on to infinity. But from this, so the claim, follows that there must be true unities: 
“Although this [i.e. parts being divisible into further parts] goes on to infinity, it is 
evident that, in the end, everything reduces [revenir à] to these unities, the rest of the 
results being nothing but well-founded phenomena.”192 
Therefore, any aggregate, and hence bodies as aggregates, are in their reality 
dependent on fundamental, indivisible unities from which they derive their reality. 
But the mere existence of indivisible unities seems insufficient for an account of 
aggregates. There is, therefore, another aspect that comes into play in their 
formation. An aggregate, as Leibniz has already discussed it in the 1660s in the 
realm of his art of combination and holds, still or again, in the early 1690s, is, in 
addition to being dependent on unities, also essentially dependent on an 
aggregating mind: 
 
[F]or an aggregate it is sufficient that many beings distinct from it, are 
understood to agree in a similar way with respect to it; namely if A, B, C are 
considered in the same way, and by that [consideration] L is understood to 
be established, A, B, C will be the things aggregated and L the whole made 
by the aggregation.193 
 
It seems, therefore, not even to be required that the aggregates themselves are 
unified in any other way than by being grouped and perceived together by some 
mind. In this sense, the parts of an extended aggregated whole are ‘one’ first and 
foremost because they are perceived by the mind as belonging together, rather than 
because they form by themselves a whole. This might entail the worry that for 
Leibniz our perceptions are to a great extent unreliable: Even though we perceive 
something as a composed or aggregated, i.e. as a body which has a stronger unity 
than other objects that are merely arbitrarily taken together, what there indeed and 
truly is, is something unrelated before the operations of the mind. But there is an 
argument Leibniz puts forward against the charge that God would deceive us if 	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things that seem to interact do not in fact interact at all, which could also be 
employed in the case of extension and the unity of aggregates: “God is not obliged 
to make a system about which we could not make mistakes, just as he was not 
obliged to avoid the system of the moving earth in order to save us from the error 
into which nearly all astronomers fell before Copernicus.”194 Leibniz is especially 
critical of Descartes’ proof for the existence of the material things based on the fact 
that God is not a deceiver. 195  Neither is it necessary that being deceived is 
disadvantageous for us nor does the source of deception ever lie outside ourselves: 
Since being deceived in believing in the existence of material extended objects 
independent of our own mind would be based on the judgment that the cause of 
perception lies outside of us and that these objects are constituted in the way we 
perceive them to be, and since this judgement originates in us, the deception does 
as well.196 
Given the amount of uncertainty that Leibniz shows as to what the nature 
of extension could amount to and as to how reliable our perception is as a source 
of metaphysical knowledge, one might wonder what notion of substance he exactly 
has in mind. In a contribution to the Acta eruditorum in March of 1694, entitled ‘On 
the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance’ 197, he accuses 
Descartes of having an insufficient understanding of the general terms used in 
metaphysics as well as of the nature of substance and that he, Descartes, due to 
these shortcomings, “absurdly put the nature of corporeal substance in 
extension”198. There are two aspects of Descartes’ philosophy Leibniz rejects in this 
passage. One of them is any characterisation of a kind of substance as essentially 
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extended, which seems in turn to be derived from Leibniz’s general conviction that 
“the concept of forces or powers, which the Germans call Kraft and the French la force, 
and for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the 
strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance.”199  
By now, it should not be of any surprise that Leibnizian substances are 
fundamentally active and hence that the notion of force plays an important part in 
their constitution. And, as we have seen above, in order to ensure this essential 
activity, Leibniz feels forced to “rehabilitate the substantial forms” 200 . But this 
emphasis on the essential activity of substances leads Leibniz further to a denial of 
extension as a part of the essence of corporeal substance at all: 
 
I say that this power of acting inheres in all substance and that some action 
always arises from it, so that the corporeal substance itself does not, any 
more than spiritual substance, ever cease to act. This seems not to have 
been perceived clearly by those who have found the essence of bodies to be 
in extension, alone or together with the addition of impenetrability, and 
who seem to conceive of bodies as absolutely at rest. It will be apparent 
from our meditations that one created substance receives from another 
created substance, not the force of acting itself, but only the limits and the 
determination of its own pre-existent striving or power of action.201 
 
Not only is extension not to be regarded as essential to corporeal substance, 
Leibniz indicates here moreover that the only property required for adequately 
describing substances is its essential activity and the limitation thereof. But what 
might give us an occasion to pause is the distinction between ‘corporeal’ and 
‘spiritual’ substances. It seems to suggest that the underlying ontology is comprised 
of at least two different types of objects, corporeal substances and spiritual 
substances, both of which – qua being substance – need to be active. Equally well, 
though, one might read the passage as suggesting that corporeal substances do not 
cease to act since they are fundamentally composed of active, ‘spiritual’ substances. 
Hence the constant action of the latter would show itself in the constitution of the 
former. Therefore, even though some corporeal substances seem to us as being at 
rest at some points in time, once we have gained insight into their fundamental 
constitution, we realize that there must nonetheless be constant activity and hence 	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motion. This text, like most others of the early to mid-1690s, is not by itself 
decisive on the constitution of substance, but if we focus on what other passages 
we have already looked at indicate, we might get a clearer picture.  
But the first fundamental question that still has not been sufficiently 
answered needs yet to be addressed, namely that concerning the relation between 
substantial forms and substances. While in some passages Leibniz clearly 
distinguishes them, there are others where he seemingly equates both notions. The 
passages here might give an answer that does not rely on ascribing an overly 
ambiguous use of terms to Leibniz. First and foremost, substances in Leibniz’s 
system are characterized by their activity. In this way, it does seem reasonable to 
identify a substance merely with its substantial form, i.e. with its principle of 
activity. But while a (created) substance is fundamentally active, it is also limited in 
this activity, i.e., it is not God-like, and this limitation arises in some way due to the 
presence of other substances. But in the system of pre-established harmony, there 
is no causal interaction between substances. Therefore, this limitation in activity 
cannot be causally introduced from the outside, but must lie within the limited 
substance itself. And taking this limitation into account would constitute a different 
way at looking at a created substance. Therefore, when looking at an (essentially 
active) substance, one can also consider the limitations imposed on its activity, not 
as limitations imposed on it from something distinct from it, but as the internally 
arising limitations of the substance’s essential activity itself. (The only way in which 
other substances might indirectly limit the activity of the substance in question 
would be due to the requirements of pre-established harmony that allows the 
construction of internal states of a substance as a mirroring or expressing of the 
states of all other substances in the universe.) These self-imposed limitations do 
not seem to add another positive constituent to the substance, but merely hinder its 
primary, active aspect in the full enforcement or development of its abilities. Hence 
we can view substances also as that which is the substantial form with its 
limitations.202 Having possibly this view in mind, Leibniz writes to Bossuet in 1694, 
that “I do not see that it is possible to find in substances anything more basic than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See also Antognazza, “Primary Matter, Primitive Passive Power, and Creaturely Limitation”, and 
Duarte, “Leibniz and Prime Matter”. 
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the principle of all of that – that is, than force.”203 Here we do not find any 
indication that there are two components of substance, an active substantial form 
united with a somehow Aristotelian matter or any other additional passive 
constituent, but rather the view that there ultimately are only (limited) substantial 
forms. This allows Leibniz, to some extent, to use substantial form and substance 
interchangeably, depending on whether the focus lies on the essential activity of 
substance or on its limited and imperfect character. And this essential activity is 
furthermore the only positive component of the substance. Its limitation, on the 
other hand, though it can be termed ‘matter’ (or, more precisely, ‘primary matter’ 
or ‘primitive passive power’) due to its opposition to ‘form’, is not a distinct 
incomplete being that enters into the composition of substance in order to 
constitute the counterpart to the equally incomplete substantial form.204 And these 
simple substances are the most basic constituents of the world: “The key to my 
doctrine on this subject consists in the consideration of [...] that which is genuinely 
a real unity, a monad.”205 
Further support for this view might be drawn from one of the rare texts by 
Leibniz that were written in German. In Von der wahren Theologia Mystica206 he 
explains the origin of creatures and their limitations while attempting to avoid the 
conclusion that God is the source of any evil: 
Their [i.e. the creatures’] self-being [Selbstwesen] is of God, their nonbeing 
[Unwesen] is of nothing. (Numbers too show this in a wonderful way, and 
the essences of things are like numbers.)  
No creature can be without nonbeing; otherwise it would be God. Angels 
and saints must have it.207  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 To Bossuet, ‘Reflections on the Advancement of True Metaphysics’ (1694), WF 35. 
204 For a radically different view on what the incompleteness of form and matter amounts to, 
namely as a sign for the ineliminable status of matter in a physicalistic sense, see Andreas Blank, 
“Incomplete Entities, Natural Non-Separability, and Leibniz’s Reply to François Lamy’s De la 
conoissance de soi-même,” The Leibniz Review 13 (2003). 
205 To l’Hôpital, July 1695, GM II 297/WF 57. 
206 DS I 410-13/L 367-370. [Loemker dates this text 1690 (?), but that seems a bit too early – also 
since it has not yet been published in the Akademieausgabe.] Ross estimates the composition date to 
be 1696, because it includes a reference of the constitution of substance to the binary system, in 
which Leibniz was interested predominantly in the mid-1690s. (See George MacDonald Ross, 
“Leibniz and Renaissance Neoplatonism,” in Leibniz: Critical Assessments, ed. Roger S. Woolhouse 
(Routledge: London, 1994), 500, note 31. Loemker translates ‘Selbstbestand’ as ‘substance’ and 
‘Unwesen’ as ‘nonbeing’, while he regards the latter to stand for ‘matter’ (L 367) without 
qualification. The connotation of the former seems to be better captured by ‘self-subsistence’ or 
‘self-being’. The notion of ‘Unwesen’ in German seems to, in addition, have a slightly negative 
connotation. 
207 DS I 411/L 368. 
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Here Leibniz seems to suggest something similar to the interpretation given above. 
Substance or ‘self-being’ [Selbstwesen] is essentially limited by the absence of 
something, i.e. by some kind of nonbeing [Unwesen]. While a creature’s perfections 
come from God, its essential and original limitation does not. Given the orthodox 
view, God is pure act and absolutely perfect, without any passivity or limitation. 
Hence the natural reading of nonbeing here is as referring to whatever is absent in 
God, i.e. to passivity and limitation. As nonbeing these limitations (and the moral 
failures of creatures originating from them) are not created at all – since they have 
no being – and therefore cannot be attributed to God as their source. And, as 
nonbeing, they also cannot form a positive or ‘real’ constituent of creaturely 
substances. Similarly, in the ‘Dialogue effectif’ from 1695 Leibniz claims that all 
created things “are bounded or imperfect by virtue of the principle of negation or 
of nothingness they contain, by virtue of the lack of an infinity of perfections in 
them”208. But this view is by no means original to Leibniz’s philosophy in the 
1690s. Already in the Discourse, we find the idea that limitation and privation 
originate from nonbeing: “And it is to this [i.e. an original imperfection or 
limitation connatural to all creatures], in my view, that we must reduce the opinion 
of Saint Augustine and other authors, the opinion that the root of evil is in 
nothingness, that is to say, in the privation or limitation of creatures”209. We see 
that in Leibniz’s philosophy there is an intimate relationship between the essential 
limitation of substances and the idea of an involvement of nonbeing in the 
explanation thereof, i.e. a constitution of substance in terms of being and non-
being, which maps onto the relation between form and matter or between activity 
and passivity. But such a reading also gives rise to the notion of a simple substance: 
The basic explanatory principles, which ground the varied phenomena we perceive, 
are an infinite number of essentially active forces. As created forces, they are 
essentially limited in their activity, and this essential limitation is non-being of some 
kind. But non-being is not a component or part of this active force, but the 
signalling of an absence. Therefore, this active force is a unity in the strongest 
sense, it is a partless being that does not require a further explanation of its unity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Gr 364/AG 114.  
209 Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) §30 (G IV 455/AG 62). 
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The support for the idea that there are such simple, indivisible, active unities is 
provided by introspection. Our minds present themselves as such beings. 
 
 
3.2. To De Volder 
 
The correspondence Leibniz began with the Dutch Cartesian Burchard De 
Volder210, which started in 1698 and lasted for about seven years, is for several 
reasons of great interest. First of all, we can see here Leibniz engaging with a 
philosopher who is appreciative of Descartes’ philosophy, even if he is not one 
who regards himself as fully committed to all of its details.211 And although Leibniz 
seems somehow reluctant to reveal his own metaphysical views throughout the 
correspondence, we eventually find an important and much discussed, rather 
complex picture of monads and their connection with ‘corporeal substances’ laid 
out in it.212 But in another respect, the correspondence is also slightly disappointing. 
A great deal of it, almost all of the first two years, is spent by Leibniz with the 
attempt to convince De Volder of the accuracy of his measure of force as opposed 
to the one offered by Descartes. Possibly dishearteningly for Leibniz, it is an 
example supplied by Bernoulli213 that finally convinces De Volder of its accuracy 
and allows them to turn towards more metaphysical issues.214 But even then the 
following years are spent mainly with Leibniz urging De Volder to present his own 
position, despite the latter’s insistence throughout the correspondence that he 
would be far more interested in hearing Leibniz’s arguments for the necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 For details about De Volder, see LDV, xxiv-xxv. 
211 In fact, De Volder complained not only to Leibniz himself, but also to Johann Bernoulli, who 
initiated the exchange of letters and facilitated major parts of the correspondence, that Leibniz 
seemed to think of him as being so blinded by his commitment to Cartesianism that he, De Volder, 
dismisses arguments without basis. (See, e.g., De Volder to Leibniz, 12 November 1699, LDV 134-
45; Bernoulli to Leibniz, 7 August 1699, LDV 116-17). 
212 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 255-69. 
213 LDV, 173-75. 
214 Another possible source of disappointment is the fact that Leibniz and De Volder hold “such 
radically different conceptions of the nature of extended things [that it] precludes any serious 
discussion of the question of whether extension is independently conceivable. Leibniz has a 
conception of body that precludes such a view. De Volder has one that sanctions it. Nothing that 
the two say in any other context brings either closer to the other’s view. Nor do they say anything 
that approaches the issue more directly.” (Paul Lodge, “The debate over extended substance in 
Leibniz’s correspondence with De Volder,” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 15.2, 2001, 
160.) 
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activity of substance. Only about one third of the letters then contain mainly 
Leibniz’s own metaphysical views, scattered with Anti-Cartesian arguments. But he 
fails to fully convince De Volder, who eventually stops replying to Leibniz’s letters 
and thus finally closes down the correspondence.215 The correspondence itself, like 
most other texts, is not directly concerned with the simplicity of substances, but it 
is required as background for the understanding why simplicity forms a core 
notion.216 
It is relevant to keep the way the discussion evolved in mind for several 
reasons. Firstly, a change in terminology within the correspondence might 
correspond to a change in topic, even if this may not be made explicit. In the first 
letters, while discussing the correct measure of force and the problems of 
mechanical descriptions of the world in terms of extension and impenetrability, 
hence while discussing physical rather than metaphysical issues, and in the attempt 
to convince De Volder of his view, Leibniz is engaged with the objects of physics 
or what can be explained mechanically, which he will later in the correspondence 
refer to as phenomena217 , rather than being, metaphysically strictly speaking, 
committed to corporeal substances.218 Leibniz himself gives the following overview 
of his position to Bernoulli, before engaging with De Volder directly: 
 
I have often said (and you seem not to disapprove) that it belongs to the 
nature of body that all the phenomena in bodies, even elastic force, can be 
explained mechanically, but that the principles of mechanism, i.e., of the laws 
of motion, cannot be derived from the consideration of extension and 
impenetrability alone. And so something else must be judged to be in bodies 
from whose modification conatus and impetus arise, as figures arise from the 
modification of extension. 219 
Since Bernoulli was familiar with and sympathetic to Leibniz’s position, it might 
not have been required for Leibniz to be overly careful in how he phrases his 
thoughts. But if one assumes a certain diligence on Leibniz’s part in the explication 
of his system, this passage is rather puzzling and interesting at the same time. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 For a more detailed account of the content of the correspondence, including Lodge’s view on 
Leibnizian aggregation and corporeal substances, see Paul Lodge’s introduction to his translation of 
the Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, LDV, xxvii-ci. 
216 This will be further exploited in 3.4. 
217 See, e.g., Leibniz to De Volder, Early 1703, 20 June 1703, LDV 259-61. 
218 For a contrary view, see Garber, Leibniz. Body, Substance, Monad, 303-350. 
219 Leibniz to Bernoulli, 1 September 1698, LDV 9. 
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Firstly, we find the claim that the mechanical explicability of bodily phenomena 
belongs to the nature of bodies, but at the same time that the principles of 
mechanism themselves are not derivable from extension and impenetrability alone. 
Bodies seem here to present a kind of mediating position between the phenomena 
and their metaphysical foundation. While they behave according to the laws of 
motion, their nature, or what grounds these laws, is something distinct from the 
properties we perceive them to have. Here we find bodies as objects of our 
perception and as the objects of physics. But since bodies in these senses cannot be 
the source of their perceived and experimentally produced behaviour, their nature 
must be something that gives rise to such appearances and requires the assumption 
of something essentially active, a metaphysical basis, on which the phenomena of 
physics supervene. Instead of trying to motivate the assumption of an active 
substance, in its nature distinct from extended objects, by referring to introspection 
and the experience of an ‘I’, Leibniz presents here a different motivation, drawing 
from the shared experience of extended moving objects. And he continues to 
illustrate this view by offering a summary of his metaphysical views, which will turn 
out to provide also an overview of the issues that will be further discussed in the 
correspondence with De Volder himself: 
By monad I understand a substance truly one, which, of course, is not an 
aggregate of substances. Matter itself, intrinsically, i.e., bulk [moles], which you 
can call primary matter, is not a substance; indeed, it is not an aggregate of 
substances, but something incomplete. Secondary matter, i.e., mass [massa], is 
not a substance, but substances. So not the flock but the animal, not the fish 
pond but the fish, is one substance. But even though the body of an animal 
or my organic body is, on the contrary, composed of innumerable 
substances, they are not parts of the animal or of me. But if there were no 
souls or analogous things, then there would be no I, no monads, no real 
unities, and so there would be no substantial multitudes. Indeed, everything 
in bodies would just be phantasms. Whence one can easily judge that there is 
no part of matter in which monads do not exist.220 
Not surprisingly, we find in the letters to Bernoulli an explicit commitment to 
monads as true unities, which are to be contrasted with primary matter or ‘matter 
itself’ as something incomplete and secondary matter as a collection of substances. 
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But it is not immediately obvious what Leibniz is trying to tell us here about the 
connection between monads and animals, and neither was it to Bernoulli, who 
questioned Leibniz further on this account. And Leibniz delivered in his reply 
further definitions of the terms involved:  
 
[M]atter in itself, that is, primary matter, or bulk [moles], as separated from 
secondary matter. I respond it is that which is merely passive, and separated 
[sejunctum] from souls or forms. You ask, second, what is ‘incomplete’ for 
me here? I respond: it is the passive without the active, and the active 
without the passive.221  
 
We might say, so far so good, and in accordance with what we have already seen 
indicated in the various metaphysical writings of the 1690s. And, equally 
unsurprisingly, Leibniz continues by describing portions of mass as having “as 
many individual substances in it as there are animals or living things or things 
analogous to them…”222 But then, he continues by a somewhat surprising further 
definition of what a monad is:  
 
(4) What I call a complete monad or individual substance [substantia 
singularis] is not so much the soul as it is the animal itself, or something 
analogous to it, endowed with a soul or form and an organic body. 
(5) You ask how far one must proceed in order to have something that is a 
substance, and not [a collection of] substances. I respond that such things 
present themselves immediately and even without subdivision, and that 
every animal is such a thing. For none of us is composed of the parts of our 
bodies.223 
 
Prima facie, this seems to suggest that a monad is a corporeal substance, i.e. a 
substance composed of a substantial form united with secondary matter that 
constitutes its organic body. But this is by no means the only possible reading. 
Given what we have already seen and what stands written before us, it could 
equally well be that this animal itself (taken analogous to the ‘I’), as it is stated here, 
is equivalent to the monad, but does not immediately include secondary matter, 
since animals, and that we are, though we have an organic body, are nonetheless 
not ‘composed of the parts of our bodies’. And, as Robert Adams points out, “[i]t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Leibniz to Bernoulli (20/30 September 1698), GM III 541-42/AG 167. 
222 ibid., GM III 542/AG 167. 
223 ibid. 
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is natural to take that as implying that the parts of the body are not constituents of 
the substance. And one might think that if the parts are not constituents of the 
substance, neither is the whole body, which is the sum or aggregate of the parts.”224 
Hence one might be entitled to think that in the preliminary letters to Bernoulli, 
Leibniz presented a metaphysical view that requires only simple substances as the 
fundamental explanatory principles. 
Let us turn now from the preliminaries of the correspondence to the 
discussion Leibniz had with De Volder himself. A first relevant aspect of the 
structure of the correspondence is Leibniz’s insistence that physical issues need to 
be resolved before he is willing to delve into metaphysical discussions. This might 
be partly based on his eagerness to convince De Volder of the correctness of his 
physical views, but it might also indicate that for Leibniz there is, in some sense, an 
epistemic priority, or at least importance, of phenomena or physics over substances 
or metaphysics in the order of discovery.225 It is the behaviour of physical bodies 
that can form a starting point of investigation and lead us to metaphysics in general 
and to the adequate notion of substance in particular, though the reasoning that is 
involved in this process includes the application of principles and notions that are 
not gained from experience. Therefore Leibniz demands patience from De Volder 
and tries to persuade him that the manner in which they are proceeding, i.e. one 
that starts with explicating the measure of force and the nature of physics, is the 
one that needs to be taken: 
 
I have learned from our friend Mr. Bernoulli that it seems more important 
to you that light be shed on the activity of substance than that the force of 
bodies be measured. I agree, and I approve of your judgment. But 
nonetheless, it has always seemed to me that this is the gate through which 
to pass to true metaphysics. The soul is gradually freed from the false 
notions of the populace, and even the Cartesians, concerning matter and 
motion and corporeal substance, when it has come to understand that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Adams, Leibniz. Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 280. For thorough discussion of this passage from the 
letter to Bernoulli, see ibid. 277-281. 
225 See also New Essays, Preface, NE 50: “It would indeed be wrong to think that we can easily read 
these eternal laws of reason in the soul [...]; but it is enough that they can be discovered within us by 
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rules of force and action cannot be derived from these notions...226 
Even though Leibniz regards it as essential to agree on basic issues in physics, his 
insistence on not moving on seems, at least in part, to be based on the further 
desire to convince De Volder of his measure of force, and not merely as a 
prerequisite for entering into metaphysics. Leibniz admits to Bernoulli, in one of 
the letters that precede the actual correspondence with De Volder himself, that any 
conservation of force, independently of how it is measured, requires that there is 
something in body beyond extension and impenetrability.227 And on this point, 
there is no need to convince De Volder, since he already assumes the Cartesian 
principle of the conservation of motion and pleads that if only Leibniz could give 
“an a priori demonstration that every substance is active, I might easily persuade 
myself that from this most fruitful source of truth follows […] the resolution of my 
worries [i.e. what the source of motion is]”. What seems, therefore, more important 
than the correct measure of force in the first part of the discussion are the reasons 
Leibniz gives for the insufficiency of matter as conceived of by the Cartesians.  
One of his main criticisms is, as we have already seen, aimed at the use of the 
notion of ‘extension’ itself. In difference to Descartes228, Leibniz argues now 
explicitly that it is not a primitive notion, but rather  
that it is a resolvable and relative notion. For it is resolved into plurality, 
continuity, and coexistence, i.e., the existence of parts at one and the same 
time. [...] But from this it appears that something must always be assumed 
that is continued or diffused, such as whiteness is in milk […] and resistance 
is in matter. For, in itself, continuity (for extension is nothing but 
simultaneous continuity) no more completes a substance than multitude or 
number, where there must be something numbered, repeated, and 
continued. And so I believe that our thinking is completed and terminated 
more in the notion of dynamism than in that of extension, and no other 
notion of power or force should be sought than that it is an attribute from 
which change follows whose subject is substance itself.229 
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228 See Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rules 12, in Rene Descartes, The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes. Volume 1, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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As a relative notion, extension must be, for Leibniz, grounded in some other 
property, a property that is non-relative, but this also requires that there are some 
things that are unextended, which are the bearers of this property. It is essential 
that they are unextended, because otherwise we would need to ask again what their 
extension, as a relative property, is grounded in, and we would not be any closer to 
an explanation of ‘extension’. Leibniz seems to have no difficulty in identifying 
what this property is that grounds extension, i.e. what the property is that both (or 
all involved) relata that stand in the relation of extension to each other must 
possess. Extension as a ‘simultaneous continuity’ requires something that is 
continued, and this is a ‘dynamism’, the ‘notion of power or force … from which 
change follows whose subject is substance itself’. But there is, therefore, so Leibniz 
claims, a difference between Descartes’ opinion that matter is indifferent to being 
in this or that state and his own view that there is a resistance or opposition in 
matter to changing its state, i.e. an inclination to remain in the state it is already in. 
“[S]ince matter intrinsically resists motion by means of a general passive force of 
resistance, but is put into motion by a special force of action, i.e., an entelechy, it 
follows that, even with enduring motion, inertia constantly resists the entelechy, 
i.e., the motive force”230. This active principle or entelechy is indispensible, since 
changeable active forces and motions, as changeable and hence temporary, need to 
be modifications of some persisting substantial thing, i.e. they are accidents that 
need to inhere in a substance. But as they are, nonetheless, forces and actions, they 
cannot be modifications of a passive thing such as matter. “It follows, therefore, 
that there is a primary active, i.e., substantial, thing, which is modified by the added 
disposition of matter, i.e., that which is passive. Hence secondary, i.e., motive, 
forces and motions themselves should be attributed to secondary matter, i.e., to the 
complete body itself that results from the active and the passive.”231 It should be 
noted that this disposition of matter added to the substantial thing is what gives 
rise to the perceived derivative forces of the body, which thus seem to stand in 
some kind of supervenience relation to the active substantial thing with its passive 
disposition. And this active principle is related to extension in a similar way, since it 	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231 ibid. LDV 77. Note that the complete body itself as secondary matter is not composed of the 
active and the passive, but rather results from it.  
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is “something prior to extension and constitutive of the very substance that is in 
that which is extended.”232 Extension as such, on the other hand, is therefore 
“nothing but an attribute of an aggregate resulting from many substances”233. In 
later letters Leibniz frequently has the opportunity to return to the notion of 
extension and describes it as “bring[ing] nothing to mind except a certain diffusion 
(i.e., a continuous repetition) of some common nature throughout a plurality of 
coexisting things. Moreover, it does not describe what in the world this nature 
might be but presupposes it.”234  
Several things in this passage are noteworthy. Firstly, the phrasing is strongly 
reminiscent of what we have already heard about the mind-dependence of 
aggregates: It is the mind that picks up a certain common element, a common 
nature, in a plurality of things, and subsumes those things under the notion of an 
extended whole. We find, secondly, that extension does not tell us directly anything 
about the nature that grounds it. The passages we have seen before were mostly 
phrased in terms of there being something required over and above mere extension 
or in addition to extension rather than prior to extension. But from this, thirdly and 
more interestingly, the question concerning the characteristics of this diffused 
nature arises. This nature that is a prerequisite for extension and has so far been 
described as a ‘primary active’ and ‘substantial’ thing and which is said to be 
diffused, is now termed a “dynamism, from which there is action and passion”235 
or, put differently, “this nature that is supposed to be diffused, repeated, or 
continued is that which constitutes physical body, and it can be found in nothing 
other than the principle of acting and being acted upon, since nothing else is 
suggested to us by the phenomena.”236 But that whose nature is diffused, the active 
and passive principle, even though it constitutes the nature of extension, cannot 
itself be extended. We have seen that extension as a relation requires a foundation 
in properties that themselves are non-relational. But if extension is a relative and 
resolvable notion, the properties it can be resolved into do not involve themselves 
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233 ibid. 
234 Leibniz to Bernoulli, 27 December 1701, LDV 227. 
235  Leibniz to De Volder, April 1702, LDV 240-41; for a discussion of dynamism in the 
correspondence with De Volder, see Lodge’s introduction to this text at LDV lxxix and xc. 
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extension. Leibniz’s reasoning here suggests that the fact that we perceive extended 
objects, in combination with the claim that extension is a merely relative notion, 
requires the assumption of partless, simple substances. This is a slightly different 
reasoning than the one that proceeded from worries about the unity of extended 
objects. It is not the problem about unifying something that is composed of an 
infinite number of parts, but the fact that the composition of extended parts is 
merely a relative, perceptual quality of the thing, which demands grounding. It is 
not essential, in this line of reasoning, that the grounding substance is a unity, but 
that it is unextended and partless. But due to being unextended and partless, it will 
also be essentially a unity.  
Furthermore, this extended thing, whose extension is based on the diffusion 
of some active and passive natures, even though I might refer to it as ‘my body’, is 
something my soul has, so Leibniz’s claim, no immediate control over. To clarify 
this point, a further distinction is put in place, concerning the notion of body:  
 
When I say that the soul or entelechy has no power over the body, I 
understand by body, not the corporeal substance whose entelechy it is, 
which is one substance, but the aggregate of other corporeal substances 
constituting our organs. For one substance cannot influence another, let 
alone an aggregate of others. What I mean is this: Whatever happens in a 
mass or in an aggregate of substances in accordance with the laws of 
mechanics is expressed in the soul or entelechy [or, if you prefer, in the 
monad itself, i.e., the one simple substance consisting of both activity and 
passivity] through its own laws. But the force of change in any substance is 
from itself or from its entelechy. [… S]ince there are so many individual 
entelechies in the mass of our body, it obviously follows that not everything 
that happens in our body is to be derived from our entelechy, even if it 
agrees with it. Without a doubt, entelechy, i.e., force, i.e., activity, differs 
from resistance, i.e., passivity. You could take the former for form and the 
latter for primary matter. However, they do not differ in such a way that 
they should be regarded as two distinct substances, but as constituting one. 
And the force changing the primary matter is certainly not a force that is 
proper to it but is the entelechy itself.237 
 
We see here a clear distinction between corporeal substance on the one hand and 
the body as an aggregate of corporeal substances on the other. While the former 
seems to be intimately connected to the notion of monad, the aggregate of 	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corporeal substances is not. As an aggregate, it is rather constituted by an infinite 
number of corporeal substances other than the corporeal substance that is 
connected with the entelechy, and since there is no interaction between substances, 
there cannot be one between the soul and a collection or aggregate of substances 
distinct from it.  
But none of this answers De Volder’s primary question, namely how 
Leibniz can show that substances are intrinsically active. In a remark on a letter by 
Bernoulli from 10 February 1700, Leibniz notes: “I define substance as that which 
acts or is acted upon. Whatever can be acted upon can necessarily act as well. 
Whatever acts is intrinsically active.”238 It is clear that De Volder, had he seen this 
definition, would not have impressed by it, since as an answer to his question this 
seems to be insufficient at best. But even though it is only a short comment, it 
allows some insight into Leibniz’s idea of how activity and passivity are connected 
in a substance. It is not that the two just come together, but that they depend on 
each other.239 But given Leibniz’s view that substances do not stand in any kind of 
causal interaction with other substances, this mutual dependence of action and 
passion is purely intrasubstantial. Hence Leibniz’s definition as given here applies 
presumably only to created substances, since God is not and cannot being acted 
upon. But it is a definition that is also aimed at convincing Cartesians that the 
assumption of a concrete, purely passive matter is inconsistent. Bernoulli wonders 
what this matter might be that souls act on and Leibniz notes in response on his 
copy of that letter that “[i]t is a passive power, which corresponds to our souls as 
active. It is not an extended thing (primary matter, I mean)”.   
Leibniz does not send this definition of substance to De Volder, but instead 
sends him a rather sketchy hint at how the necessary activity of substances might 
be derived, namely from the incommunicability between substances joined with the 
experience that substances nonetheless act.240 But as a first step Leibniz demands 
that they agree on a definition of substance, indeed an important prerequisite in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 To Bernoulli, he sent a slightly expanded version of this thought: “If, like all the scholastics, we 
mean by substance that which can act or be acted upon, and, moreover, nothing is acted upon 
unless it also acts, it follows that every substance can act. For, if it is already established that every 
substance that can act is intrinsically active, it follows that every substance is like this.” (Leibniz to 
Bernoulli, 8 March 1700, LDV 163.) 
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undertaking any a priori proof, in order to then show how activity follows from the 
nature of substance.241 Even though Leibniz is not satisfied with the definition 
proposed by De Volder and highlights its shortcomings, the discussion gives him 
also occasion to offer glimpses of his own notion of substance. In a marginal note, 
probably not sent to De Volder, Leibniz states that “[a] substance is a complete 
atom, an intrinsically complete atom, i.e., an atom completing itself. From this it 
follows that it is a vital atom, i.e., an atom having an entelechy. The same atom is 
that which is truly one.” 242  The notion of unity Leibniz proposes here and 
elsewhere in the correspondence seems to be stronger than might be assumed at 
first sight. He contrasts De Volder’s Spinozistic proposal243 that there might be in 
fact only one extended substance which has individual bodies as its modes (rather 
than there being a plurality of extended substances) with his own notion of a 
simple substance as that which lacks parts. He concedes that  
 
if all the things that have a necessary connection with one another were one 
substance, it would follow – at least on the assumption that the vacuum was 
excluded – that all the parts of matter would compose one substance, 
because they have a necessary connection. But through this very 
[reasoning], a substance would be confused with an aggregate of 
substances.244   
 
The phrasing of this passage indicates that while Leibniz agrees with the 
assumption that there is no vacuum245, he disagrees with the claim that ‘all things 
that have a necessary connection with each other are one substance’. Hence it 
seems that necessary connection does not make unity and, due to the fact that unity 
is a characteristic of substance, necessary connection does not make substantiality. 
Therefore, bodies, even if their corporeal parts were to stand in any necessary 
connection to each other, would not constitute a substance. We see indicated here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 In fact, Leibniz pushes De Volder to present his own definition of substance, which is followed 
by a discussion about the adequacy of the notion he proposed. For a detailed analysis of this 
discussion and its general implications for the whole correspondence, see Lodge, “Leibniz’s Notion 
of an Aggregate” and LDV, li-lx. It should also be kept in mind that an a priori proof in pre-
Kantian times is a proof that proceeds from cause to effect and gives insight into why the effect 
obtains (cf. LDV, xlvi). How Leibniz thought such a proof, that would need to be based on the 
experience that substances act, would proceed, I do not know. 
242 Leibniz to De Volder, 6 July 1701, LDV 205. 
243 For details see Lodge’s Introduction to the correspondence at LDV li-liii. 
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that, for Leibniz, there is a general problem and that wholes, i.e. things that have 
parts, may never, strictly speaking, qualify as substances, but also that his notion of 
unity is extraordinarily strong: even necessary connection between two things does 
not suffice to make them one substance. One might be tempted to think that only 
something that is simple, and therefore not requiring even a necessary connection 
between components, can therefore be a substance. But these remarks are 
prompted by De Volder’s definition of substance and in this strength, as far as I 
can tell, not found elsewhere in Leibniz. 
But the most thorough exposition of his notion of substance in the whole 
correspondence is found in a letter to De Volder, written on 20 June 1703. Here 
Leibniz starts by arguing, among other things, for a necessary correspondence 
between matter and resistance, whose cause “is the fact that every substance is 
active and every finite substance is passive, and passivity is connected to resistance. 
Therefore, the nature of things demands such a conjunction. It cannot be so 
impoverished that it lacks a principle of action, and it no more allows a vacuum in 
forms than in matter.”246 In difference to the definition of substance that Leibniz 
gave earlier to Bernoulli, he presents here a general definition of the nature of 
substance (activity) and a further limitation on this notion for finite substances 
(passivity). But the use of the term ‘matter’ is not immediately clear, hence Leibniz 
further explains: 
 
Properly and rigorously speaking, perhaps one will not say that the primitive 
entelechy impels the mass of its body, but only that it is joined with a 
primitive passive power that it completes, i.e., with which it constitutes a 
monad. However, it cannot influence other entelechies and substances, 
even those existing in the same mass. But in the phenomena, i.e., in the 
resulting aggregate, everything is indeed explained mechanically, and masses 
are understood to impel each other. And in these phenomena, nothing is 
needed except the consideration of derivative forces, once it is agreed where 
they result from, namely, the phenomena of aggregates from the reality of 
monads.247 
 
We have here a distinction between monads on the one hand, which are 
constituted of primitive powers, and the aggregates of them, which we then in 	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some way perceive, i.e., the phenomena, on the other. While there is no interaction 
between monads, the phenomena can be explained mechanically, as if there was 
interaction between bodies. And even though there is no causal interaction, there is 
nonetheless some kind of connection between the soul and the body, namely one 
of expression. But we also get, now more explicitly then before, an indication of 
several metaphysical layers and the relation between substances and phenomena, 
and between primitive and derivative forces: “I regard the substance itself, 
endowed with primitive active and passive power, like the I or something similar, as 
the indivisible, i.e., perfect, monad, not those derivative forces that are continually 
found to be one way and then another.”248 The derivative forces arise from mass 
and belong to aggregates, i.e. to the phenomenal realm. But there is nonetheless a 
connection between them and the primitive forces that are found in the substances 
themselves, insofar as derivative forces are “modifications and echoes of primitive 
forces”249. Bodies cannot be solely constituted of derivative forces joined with 
resistance, because every modification presupposes something lasting, something it 
is a modification of, and, therefore, bodies or the properties we perceive them to 
have presuppose substances.250  
But there is also a similarity between substances and phenomena: There is 
not only no interaction between monads, but the same holds for phenomena and 
derivative forces. It is not the case that some mass supplies another given mass 
with new force by impact, but its existence is the reason for the change in the 
determination of the force that is already existing in this given mass. Hence it 
seems as if, though there are collision and impulse to be found in the appearance of 
aggregates or phenomena, it is not the derivative force itself that is transmitted 
from one body to another. The grounding substances transfer their causal 
independence onto the aggregates that result from them. 
Following all these arguments, the expanded view on the nature of monads 
and corporeal substances that follows is not surprising, but nonetheless worth 
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quoting in full:251 
 
If you take a mass to be an aggregate containing many substances, you can 
nonetheless conceive of one substance that is preeminent in it, if indeed 
that mass constitutes an organic body animated by its primary entelechy. 
For the rest, in the monad, i.e., the complete simple substance, I do not 
unite anything with the entelechy except a primitive passive force related to 
the whole mass of the organic body. Indeed, the remaining subordinate 
monads placed in the organs do not make up a part of the organic body, 
although they are immediately required for it, and they come together with 
the primary monad for the organic corporeal substance, i.e., the animal or 
plant. I therefore distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy, i.e., the soul; (2) 
matter, namely, primary matter, i.e., primitive passive power; (3) the monad 
completed by these two things [Monada his duabas completam]; (4) the mass, 
i.e., the secondary matter, i.e., the organic machine, for which innumerable 
subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, i.e., the corporeal 
substance, which the monad dominating in the machine makes one.252 
 
This passage prima facie suggests a composition of a monad out of a formal and a 
material aspect and a view that incorporates corporeal substances as composed of a 
monad and its organic body. But on the reading proposed here we are not forced 
to regard the individual steps from (1) to (5) as different things, but distinctions the 
mind can make when looking at a substance. As (2) primary matter is in itself 
incomplete and not really distinct from (1) the entelechy, the former does not add 
anything positive to the latter when one looks at (3) the complete monad. 
(Therefore Leibniz will say in the same letter that there “is almost nothing in body 
[and we might add: in its foundation, the substance] but entelechy”253.) In a certain 
way, the ontological basic unity, a simple substance, is constituted by two 
explanatory principles, and this simple substance and its constitution is regarded as 
being sufficient in order to account for or ground all the phenomena we perceive. 
And as (4) secondary matter is derived from the primitive powers of the monads 	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aggregated in it, and is, moreover, a phenomenon, it does not seem to constitute a 
substantial part either. As a phenomenon, it is, however, grounded in the reality of 
monads that form the basis of its properties and in this way it is different from a 
mere illusion.  
But the beginning of this passage might still make us feel a bit uneasy about 
this interpretation, since it seems to suggest a different view. But when compared 
with an earlier draft of the letter, a different picture emerges. Here, the first passage 
is phrased in the following way:  
 
If you take a mass to be an aggregate containing many substances, it will by 
no means be one thing with the preeminent monad of the primary mass, for 
one entelechy together with others does not constitute a monad. And so in 
one monad, i.e., a complete simple substance, I do not conjoin anything 
with the entelechy except a primitive passive force expressing the whole 
mass, for which the remaining subordinate monads placed in the organs are 
nonetheless immediately required.254 
 
Here, it seems to be suggested that, even though there might be found a dominant 
monad, the mass of its organic body will nonetheless not form a unity. There is 
connection between the dominant monad and its body, but it is not one that results 
in a unified corporeal substance that is composed of smaller corporeal substances. 
But there is a further essential part that the simple substances, despite – or 
rather: due to – their role as persisting beings, must play. They must change 
internally in order for there to be any change in things at all. Since they cannot 
interact with other simple substances and, therefore, cannot be causally influenced 
by them, change can only come from within themselves. But in the phenomena or 
aggregates, change can be ascribed to collision in accordance with laws described 
partly by metaphysics and partly by geometry, as Leibniz explains, “[f]or one needs 
abstraction in order to explain things scientifically.”255 Hence, in a mass, the parts 
are regarded as incomplete things that contribute something to the whole mass, 
which, in return, can be regarded as being completed by the coming together of its 
parts. But the substance itself is complete by itself and involves everything: “For 
there is as much difference between a substance and a mass as there is between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Earlier draft of Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 265. 
255 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 267. 
101	  	  
complete things, as they are intrinsically, and incomplete things, as they are 
comprehended by us through abstraction.”256  
The relation of expression between monad and its body is supplied with a 
further aspect, which enriches or expands on the notion of harmony among things. 
Any body expresses all other bodies in the universe and any soul or entelechy 
expresses its own body and through it everything else. This situatedness of monads 
is essential to their having a point of view, but it is, at the same time, puzzling. 
How are monads situated in extension, though they are unextended? Leibniz, aware 
of this difficulty, attempts to solve the problem by the following explanation: 
 
For even if monads are not extended, they nonetheless have a certain kind 
of situation in extension, i.e., they have a certain ordered relation of 
coexistence to other things, namely, through the machine over which they 
preside. I do not think that there exist any finite substances that are 
separated from every body and therefore lack situation or order in relation 
to the other coexisting things in the universe. Extended things involve 
intrinsically many things endowed with situation. But things that are simple, 
even if they do not have extension, must nonetheless have a situation in 
extension, although it may not be possible to designate it precisely, as with 
incomplete phenomena.257 
 
We see that extension is intimately connected with the notion of substance. But 
there is a qualitative difference between extended things such as bodies and simple 
things. After metaphysical analysis, a priority of the active unity over all other 
aspects becomes visible: “Since there is almost nothing in body but entelechy, I do 
not see how it could be deprived of it. Certainly there cannot be a substance 
without an entelechy. When I say that at creation force was impressed on body, I 
mean nothing other than that it had no existence before it had force. I add that it 
could not have had any existence before it had force.”258 
De Volder further questions Leibniz on these issues and correctly points out 
that Leibniz’s theory seems to suggest that a substance does not resist another, 
strictly speaking, but only its own active force. And Leibniz agrees that this is 
indeed the case: 	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You think that the resistance in a substance can bring about nothing other 
than the fact that the substance opposes its own active power. But this 
should not seem absurd to you, since it is also the case in quasi-substances, 
i.e., bodies, that the bulk restricts the speed that another tries to impress. 
Certainly there must be a principle of limitation in limited things, just as 
there must be a principle of action in acting things.259 
 
Here, a further aspect of created simple substances is indicated. As we have seen 
above, Leibniz has already expressed his opinion that finite substances are 
necessarily to a certain extent passive, and he now connects in a similar vein the 
limitation of these substances with their resistance or their passive aspect. And here 
again, we find that limitation works on the metaphysical as well as the phenomenal 
level and that what we perceive on the phenomenal level is the starting point for 
our considerations of the constitution on the metaphysical level. Leibniz claims 
“that derivative, i.e., accidental, forces are mere modifications, and that that which 
is active cannot be a modification of that which is passive, since in modification 
there is only a variation of limits. And so modes only limit things and do not 
increase them, and therefore they cannot contain an absolute perfection that is not 
in the thing to be modified.”260 The argument Leibniz seems to have in mind is that 
if modes require subjects in which they adhere and if they, furthermore, only limit, 
but do not increase their subjects, then derivative forces require primitive forces. 
“[D]erivative force is the present state itself insofar as it tends toward a following 
state, i.e., preinvolves a following state”261 and stands in contrast to the persisting 
thing, which is the primitive force which is to be limited and which involves all 
states. Hence “primitive force is like the law of a series, and derivative force is like a 
determination that designates some term in the series”262. The fact that Leibniz 
suggests here that only derivative force requires a substance it inheres in, but 
primary force does not, opens another interesting problem about the constitution 
of his simple substances, which is connected to the question of what it means not 
to have parts. This problem is furthered by the fact that he points out to De Volder 
that there is nothing permanent in these real unities apart from the law itself and 	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that the law is distinct from the individual states (which are derivative). Hence it 
must be the case that what constitutes a substance is not the sum of its states263, 
and as John Whipple points out, this is important, since otherwise a substance 
would run the risk of being nothing other than an aggregate of distinct perceptual 
states, but not a metaphysical point.264 That force is not something substantial, but 
something inhering in a substance, is correct for changeable, i.e. derivative, force; 
but force as the principle of action and passion, i.e. as primitive force, is what 
persists and grounds the notion of extension265 as well as derivative forces. Here 
the underlying primitive force is not merely an active force, but at the same time it 
is set in analogy with the ‘law of a series’. Individual substances are “intrinsically 
active, ‘spiritual automatons’, which spontaneously change from one state to 
another by [their] inherent dynamism”266. It seems that it is not this or that state 
that constitutes the nature of a substance, but the law of development from which 
all those states are derived. 
We have already seen that extension, for Leibniz, is a relative notion that is 
resolvable into others, and we have seen that this fact serves as argument for 
simple substances. But in the De Volder correspondence, Leibniz introduces also a 
further argument, which we have already seen indicated in writings of the early 
1690s (and indeed even earlier) and which will later reappear in shorter form in the 
second paragraph of the Monadology, namely an argument based on the notion of 
‘aggregate’. Leibniz holds that monads or true substances are perfect unities, from 
which all other things result. Hence a substance cannot be an aggregate (and vice 
versa), since a substance has genuine unity while an aggregate has its unity from an 
aggregating mind.  He already indicated in his letter from 20 June 1703 that any 
being through aggregation, such as a flock or an army, is only an ‘apparent being’. 
He expands on this thought in a later letter (from 21 January 1704) by presenting 
an argument that should lead from considerations about the nature of aggregates to 
the existence of simple substances: 
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First, that which can be divided into many is constituted, i.e., aggregated, 
from many. Second, things that are aggregated from many are not one thing 
except from a mind, and they have no reality except that which is borrowed, 
i.e., that is from the things from which they are aggregated. Therefore, third, 
things that can be divided into parts have no reality unless there are things 
in them that cannot be divided into parts. Indeed, they have no reality other 
than that which is from the unities that are in them.267 
 
If one considers Leibniz commitment to the convertibility of unity and being, the 
argument seems to suggest that “for bodies to be real, their existence must be 
explained in terms of principles of reality, which are necessarily principles of 
unity”268. The guiding thought is, then, that if material or aggregated things are real, 
their existence must be explained by the prior reality of substances of some kind, 
either by asserting that at least some bodies are genuine unities or by positing 
incorporeal unities in matter. But we have already seen that these fundamental 
unities, in order to ground extended things – which are also aggregates things – 
must be simple unextended substances or unities.  
But there is further reason to ascribe to simple substances the function of 
grounding aggregates. For Leibniz, in concrete things, i.e. bodies, as opposed to 
merely ideal things, parts are actually assigned in a certain and determinate way 
according to the divisions nature imposes on bodies by different motions; they are 
in fact aggregates and dependent on the parts they are aggregated from. The 
division of parts proceeds to infinity, therefore its extended parts can never ground 
the reality of the extended whole. But these parts nonetheless ultimately result from 
an infinite number of real unities.269 There is an ambiguity here that Leibniz seems 
well aware of. It is not the division of extended parts, i.e. parts of bodies, that 
finally terminates in substantial unities. No matter how far this division proceeds, 
the result will always be smaller, but still extended parts. Hence, when Leibniz 
relates bodies to monads, it is not a relation of a whole to its smallest or ultimate 
parts, as an atomist, for example, would have it. It is rather the case that  
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accurately speaking, matter is not composed of constitutive unities; rather it 
results from them, since matter, i.e., extended mass, is nothing but a 
phenomenon founded in things, like the rainbow or the perihelion. And 
there is no reality in anything except the reality of unities, and so 
phenomena can always be divided into lesser phenomena that could appear 
to other more subtle animals, and the smallest phenomena will never be 
reached. By contrast, substantial unities are not parts, but the foundations 
of phenomena.270 
 
In real concrete things, the unities are prior to the multitude; multitudes exist only 
through unities. Matter as extended mass, on the other hand, is not continuous, but 
discrete and actually divided to infinity,271 but therefore also a phenomenon.  The 
existence of extended masses requires, in the last analysis, the existence of simple 
substances. 
While Leibniz attempts for the majority of the correspondence to motivate 
his claims for the existence of essentially active unities and simple substances by 
referring to the phenomena we perceive, he turns towards the end of the 
correspondence to the argument from introspection. Under the assumption that 
the nature of things is to a certain extent uniform, the natures of various simple 
substances cannot differ to such a degree that they would constitute different kinds 
(a thought that is also supported by the idea of a continuous hierarchy of 
substances). Therefore, the nature we are best acquainted with, i.e. our own, can 
serve as a paradigm for substance in general (and indeed has to do so, since we 
have no immediate knowledge of any other substance). Hence there is something 
analogous to perception and appetite in the principle of action in all other simple 
substances. “Moreover, matter and motion are not so much substances or things as 
the phenomena of perceivers, the reality of which is located in the harmony of 
perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with other perceivers.” This 
analogy gives Leibniz the means to connect the arguments from the physical 
phenomena with the better-known notion of a monad as a mind-like being. 
Secondary matter as a derivative force is based on the primitive forces of the 
individual monads that come together in the mass or extended matter, and the 
appearance of this derivative force is due to the fact that all these monads have 	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expressive capacities. Body is, therefore, reducible or resolvable, since “a corporeal 
mass that is believed to have something besides simple substances is not a 
substance but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have 
unity and absolute reality.” 272  Accordingly, derivative forces, as the forces of 
corporeal substances, fall into the realm of phenomena as well.  
And Leibniz neatly wraps up the system he has finally arrived at:  
 
There is an active force and a passive force in every perceiver; the active in 
the transition to the more perfect, the passive in the opposite. And there is 
an infinity of perceivers. Indeed, there are as many as there are simple 
substances, i.e., monads. The order of these among themselves, expressed 
by our phenomena, constitutes the notions of time and space. That which 
results from the passions of the perceivers and limits the phenomena 
themselves, taken as a whole, gives rise to the apparition of bulk, i.e., of the 
passive force of bodies.273 
 
What started of in the correspondence as a reasoning from the behaviour of 
physical objects and their necessary ground in the form of unextended, partless, 
simple unities is finally connected with our experience of ourselves as active minds. 
 
 
3.3. To Des Bosses 
 
Leibniz’s correspondence with Jesuit Bartholomew Des Bosses is another 
of his epistolary exchanges of great interest, not only due to its abundance, but also 
for a seemingly peculiar feature or twist in Leibnizian metaphysics, namely, the 
introduction of a ‘substantial bond’ in order to account for corporeal substances.274 
This is especially surprising since there seems to be little to no evidence of such 	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thoughts in some classical writings produced by Leibniz around the same time, 
such as the Monadology and the Principles of Nature and Grace. But there seem to be 
two driving considerations for this new approach or amendment of his basic simple 
substance ontology, which are already indicated in the plan proposed by Des 
Bosses right at the start of the correspondence, namely, “that with your notions 
preserved so far as possible, I may accommodate the substance of them with the 
doctrines of Aristotle, or rather, accommodate the former with the latter and both 
with the dogmas of the Church.”275  
Any reconciliation with the doctrines of Aristotle seems to require the 
admission of corporeal substances as an obvious step to take, since humans, trees 
and animals are the paradigmatic substances in the metaphysics of the Stagirite. But 
also, at least from a Roman Catholic point of view, more than monads are required 
in order to account for certain commitments imposed by faith, especially in order 
to account for transubstantiation. It hence seems possible that it is the plan of 
reconciliation rather than reconsidering his basic philosophical doctrines that 
motivates Leibniz to introduce this substantial bond in addition to monads.  
But this correspondence is of additional interest, because Des Bosses 
questions Leibniz on some of his basic assumptions, such that he himself gets a 
clearer picture of the Leibnizian system, but – in difference to De Volder – not 
from a position of doubt, but as somebody who already embraces, or is at least 
highly sympathetic to, the monadological metaphysics. Therefore, less time is spent 
with arguing about what the notion of substance amounts to, but the focus lies on 
the details of the account. 
As we have already seen happening before, Leibniz’s favourite way of 
spelling out what substances and their effects are is again in terms of powers and 
forces. But we get a clearer picture of the relation between souls and extended 
bodies, now more frequently spelled out within the framework of the pre-
established harmony:  
 
When I say that the soul makes nothing happen in matter, I mean only 
that the material laws of motion are not changed by the soul. In general, 
the soul is an entelechy or primitive active power in a corporeal substance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 January 1706, LDB 7. 
108	  	  
through which the matter or primitive passive power of the same 
substance is completed; and by means of the modification of these 
primitive powers, actions and passions are produced in the corporeal 
substance itself.276 
 
One of the questions that forces itself on philosophically minded people since 
Descartes is the question of how any interaction or other influence between mind 
and body can be accounted for. And Leibniz is very clear on this point: The soul 
does not exercise any influence on matter, at least the matter that is subject to the 
laws of motion, i.e., the matter that forms an integral part of the objects of physics. 
This is not only demanded by the system of pre-established harmony and the 
assumption that substances are causally independent, but it also gives an 
explanatory basis why bodies do behave in accordance with the laws of motion and 
cannot be ‘sidetracked’ by the mind-like forms that are connected with them. But, 
Leibniz claims here, the soul, together with its passive counterpart, completes a 
‘corporeal substance’. In the definition here, even though the elements introduced 
are those we have already seen in the correspondence with De Volder, i.e. primitive 
active and passive power, what arises from their combination is termed a ‘corporeal 
substance’ rather than a ‘monad’. This might be seen as a first, crude attempt to 
accommodate Aristotelian intuitions in his system or just as sheer carelessness. But 
we have already seen a similar use of ‘corporeal substance’ indicated in the 
correspondence with Arnauld and with De Volder, hence it might be worth 
reconsidering the understanding of ‘corporeal substance’ not as a substance 
endowed with an organic body, but rather as a substance that is constituted by 
form and matter (and might enter into the composition of an organic body 
alongside an infinite number of other corporeal substances of this kind). In any 
case, this short description seems opposed to monadological writings, not only 
because the product of the combination of primitive forces is a corporeal 
substance, but also because the derivative forces, hence secondary matter, are 
ascribed directly to this substance as well, rather than being viewed as a result of it.  
But Leibniz returns quickly to more a familiar way of putting his views and 
keeping an eye on the distinction between primitive and derivative forces. While 	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things will change significantly once the substantial bond is introduced, at the 
beginning of the correspondence (and indeed throughout major parts of it), we find 
a new uneasiness concerning the status of secondary matter: “Matter (that is, 
secondary matter), or a part of matter, exists in the same manner as a herd or a 
house, that is, as a being by aggregation.277” A similar reasoning was already present 
in the letters to De Volder, but it does by now more explicitly incorporate 
secondary matter as an aggregated being. While secondary matter is dependent on 
monads to constitute it, it is not dependent on this or that particular monad. No 
dominating entelechy is fixed to a specific part of secondary matter, and therefore 
it is possible, as experience also shows us, that certain parts of matter are 
substituted for others while the composite thing constituted by those parts 
endures.278 But things are different with relation to primary matter: 
 
It is otherwise if you mean primary matter or primary passive power [to 
dynamikon], primary substratum [proton hypokeimenon], that is, primitive 
passive power or the principle of resistance, which consists not in 
extension but in a prerequisite of extension, and completes the entelechy 
or primitive active power, with the result that it produces a complete 
substance or monad, in which modifications are contained virtually. We 
understand such matter, that is, the principle of passion, to endure and to 
adhere to its entelechy; and in this way from many monads there results 
secondary matter, together with derivative forces, actions, and passions, 
which are only beings through aggregation, and thus semi-mental things, 
like the rainbow and other well-founded phenomena.279 
 
Here we seem to have the classical De Volder picture of monadic constitution in 
front of us, even though with a minor addition. The monad is not only completed 
by primitive active and passive powers, but the modifications of these principles 
are contained in it only ‘virtually’ and they are the basis for secondary matter in 
cases where a multitude of monads, or their passive principles, not only comes 
together but is, in addition, perceived by a mind. While this primary matter is 
inseparable from its entelechy, there is no need to assign even an infinitely small 
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portion of extended matter, i.e., a certain quantity of secondary matter, to any 
entelechy in the way Des Bosses suggests Leibniz would be required to do. This 
addition entails a clearer picture of the nature of extension. While towards the 
semi-Cartesian De Volder, Leibniz merely indicated the relational character of 
extension, he is now openly claiming that the relata, whose connections give rise to 
extension, are reducible to something within the simple substance. 
In this context it is unfortunate that Leibniz, despite the fact that the topic 
is touched upon, does not elaborate on his view about what the relation between 
angelic substances and primary as well as secondary matter amounts to. He does 
suggest in a draft not sent to Des Bosses that angels are like humans and endowed 
with matter as well as a mind, with the difference that they are of greater perfection 
than human creatures are. This must be the case since “God alone is a substance 
without matter, for it is he who created matter itself”280. Presumably, Leibniz has 
here in mind matter as the immediate consequence of the creation of beings which 
could not but be limited, i.e. primary matter, and its derivative consequences. It is 
not only the lack of an extensive treatment that makes it difficult to evaluate 
Leibniz’s view here. There is, in addition, what seems to be a tension between 
Leibniz’s different presentations of his views on angels. On the one hand, he claims 
that “[t]hose who have made all angels corporeal creatures are rightly dismissed”281, 
while he suggests, on the other hand, that angels are never completely separated 
from bodies282. Unfortunately, Des Bosses does not press Leibniz further on this 
point. But semi-religious discussions like this give Leibniz occasion to allude to 
additional functions matter serves. Among other things, he tries to incorporate the 
Peripatetic doctrine that numerical distinction requires a relation to determinate 
matter (except, of course, in God’s case). “[I]t is natural for created things to have 
matter, [in the draft: (to be sure, secondary matter)] and they are not possible in any 
other way, unless God fulfils the function of matter through a miracle.”283 All these 	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discussions about angels and the function of matter unfortunately evolve primarily 
from considerations about secondary, rather than primary matter. But since 
secondary matter is derivative of and hence presupposes primary matter (of an 
infinite number of monads), it makes it plausible to assume that an angel’s 
substantial form would also possess primary matter. And since angels seem, to a 
certain extent, to be similar to human beings and therefore might naturally (as 
opposed to metaphysically necessarily) endowed with a body or secondary matter, 
being metaphysically necessarily without primary matter (and therefore also 
secondary matter) is a privilege restricted to God:  
 
Primary matter is essential to any entelechy and is never separated from it, 
since it completes it and is itself the passive power of the entire complete 
substance; for primary matter does not consist in bulk, that is, 
impenetrability, and extension. Secondary matter, however, such as 
constitutes an organic body, is a result of innumerable complete 
substances, each of which has its own entelechy and its own primary 
matter, but none of these substances is perpetually attached to us. Thus 
the primary matter of any substance involves the primary matter of 
another substance existing in its organic body, not as an essential part, but 
as an immediate requisite, and for a time only, since one takes the place of 
another. Therefore, although God through his absolute power could 
deprive a substance of secondary matter, he nevertheless cannot deprive it 
of primary matter, for from this he would produce pure act such as he 
himself alone is.284 
 
But Des Bosses quickly points out where he sees a problem with this account, 
namely that if any entelechy is inseparable from its primary matter, then all 
entelechies are created at the same time as matter was. But, according to religious 
teachings, human souls were created significantly later. Leibniz is not surprised by 
this objection and denies that this is indeed a problem, since he denies that the 
creation of new entelechies, in this case, human souls, requires that a new part of 
mass or additional secondary matter must be created alongside. This point might 
be, to some extent, surprising, since it suggests that there is no immediate and 
direct correspondence between the amount of primitive passive power and 
derivative passive power.  
While Leibniz does not explicitly state it here, he presents, as we have seen, 	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elsewhere the view that for the constitution of secondary matter, an infinite 
number of entelechies and their primitive passive powers must be present. But for 
the creation of complete simple substances, it is not mass or secondary matter that 
is required, with which entelechies are combined in order to produce complete 
substances.285 What is created is a complete substance that comes with its own 
primitive passive power, and which can then, once created, result in secondary 
matter when taken together with other monads.  
 
[T]he primary matter proper to an entelechy, that is, the primitive passive 
power that is inseparable from the active power, is created with the 
entelechy itself (which it completes, so that it constitutes a monad or 
complete substance). But this does not enlarge the mass, or the 
phenomenon resulting from the monads, any more than a point enlarges a 
line.286 
 
And monads are indeed all Leibniz needs from a philosophical point of view in 
order to explain the appearance of matter, including our own bodies. With the pre-
established harmony in place, he can claim that the union of soul and body 
amounts to the agreement of the expressions in the monads that are involved. But 
he seems reluctant to deny that there cannot be more to their relation, since by 
delivering an explanation in terms of pre-established harmony, “I do not thereby 
deny the metaphysical union of a complete substance, which belongs to a deeper 
inquiry and cannot be explained through the phenomena but also in turn does not 
offer a reason for the phenomena.”287 So two years into the correspondence, 
Leibniz does not yet see any need for a commitment to substantial bonds that 
render bodies genuine unified substances over and above to monads, not because 
he is certain that there is no such bond, but because he thinks such a bond and a 
further unification of mind and body into one corporeal substance would explain 
nothing that requires explanation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Des Bosses falls into the trap of not carefully distinguishing between primary and secondary 
matter. He assumes that there is a uniform or general notion of ‘matter’ or a qualitative similarity 
between both notions, while they are in fact different in fundamental respects. Des Bosses has a 
notion of ‘matter’ in mind that stands for the type of stuff we assume to be present in the objects of 
our experience. But this secondary matter is not, strictly speaking, created in the same sense primary 
matter is, but it is grounded in or follows from the creation of primary matter. 
286 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 March 1709, LDB 119. 
287 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 3 September 1708, LDB 101. 
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But four years later Leibniz entertains the thought that if there is any 
corporeal substance that is genuinely rather than merely phenomenally real and 
existing over and above monads, then a real unifier needs to be superadded to 
monads, such that  
 
from the union of the passive powers of monads there in fact arises 
primary matter, which is to say, that which is required for extension and 
antitypy, or for diffusion and resistance. From the union of monadic 
entelechies, on the other hand, there arises substantial form; but that 
which can be generated in this way, can also be destroyed and will be 
destroyed with the cessation of the union288 
 
But this substantial form, at least in this first and only preliminary introduction of a 
further unifying principle or substantial bond, is not a soul or simple substance; 
rather, this form and the matter it would unify would be in constant flux.289 The 
fact that Leibniz decides to choose the same terminology in order to describe the 
constitution of substantial bonds or corporeal substances that he has already 
employed in describing monads, shows how confident Leibniz was concerning the 
explanatory function of these terms. And even though we find an introduction of 
corporeal substances and the further explanation of how they might come about, 
we might nonetheless have doubts about any sincere ontological commitment to 
them. The substantial bond seems to be merely introduced for anyone who wants 
to hold that bodies are real: If bodies are real, then there must be such a 
metaphysical union or substantial bond; otherwise, they will only be phenomena.290 
One of the reasons that require somebody to ascribe to the assumption that bodies 
are real might be motivated by religious considerations or the wish to be in 
accordance with Aristotelian hylomorphism. But Leibniz does indicate that he 
cannot see how such a claim could be also be philosophically motivated:  
 
But a soul in its changes persists as the same thing, with the same subject 
remaining, which is not the case in a corporeal substance. Thus, one of 
two things must be said: either bodies are mere phenomena, and so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 February 1712, LDB 225. 
289 One might doubt that there is genuine substantiality supplied by the substantial bond, and it 
might be better to think of it in an explanatory analogous sense of ‘substantial form’. 
290 This is not unlike the train of thought already to be found in the Correspondence with Arnauld, 
see chapter 2. 
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extension also will be only a phenomenon, and monads alone will be real, 
but with a union supplied by the operation of the perceiving soul on the 
phenomenon; or, if faith drives us to corporeal substances, this substance 
consists in that unifying reality, which adds something absolute (and therefore 
substantial), albeit impermanent, to the things to be unified.291 
 
But if the ‘realization of phenomena’ is what is taken to be the important aspect, 
then Leibniz offers an alternative conception. The reality of bodies lies in their 
being phenomena in God, i.e. objects of his ‘knowledge of vision’: “God certainly 
sees things exactly such as they are according to geometrical truth, although 
likewise he also knows how each thing appears to every other, and thus he contains 
in himself eminently all the other appearances.”292 God considers monads, their 
modifications and relations; and it is through these relations that the things seem to 
us to form a unity. And this conception of a further unity that goes beyond the 
perception of finite monads can also serve to make more sense of the substantial 
bond, though the bond seemed to have been introduced independently of such 
considerations about it. One can, over and above these relations that finite 
substances perceive, conceive of a more perfect unity supplied by a more perfect 
perceiver, through whose perception a new substance arises from many substances, 
i.e. by which a certain substantiality is added. But one does not have to.  
Within the correspondence, substantial bonds seem to serve two purposes. 
On the one hand  they are a rather faltering attempt to account for 
transubstantiation – even though Leibniz does point out to Des Bosses that this is 
a pressing problem for the Jesuit rather than for himself. On the other hand, there 
is still the attempt to reconcile Leibnizian with Aristotelian principles. But, Leibniz 
makes clear, philosophically speaking, only monads are required and do have, if not 
under attack from attempts to establish an additional substantial bond, the merit of 
explaining not only the phenomena, but also of eliminating several major problems:  
 
I regard the explanation of all phenomena solely through the perceptions 
of monads agreeing among themselves, with corporeal substance excluded, 
to be useful for a fundamental investigation of things. In this way of 
explaining things, space becomes the order of coexisting phenomena, as 
time is the order of successive phenomena, and there is no absolute or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 February 1712, LDB 225-7. 
292 ibid., Supplementary Study, LDB 233. 
115	  	  
spatial nearness or distance between monads. To say that they are crowded 
together in a point or disseminated in space is to employ certain fictions of 
our mind when we willingly seek to imagine things that can only be 
understood. No extension or composition of the continuum is involved in 
this account either, and all the problems about points disappear. As I tried 
to say somewhere in my Theodicy, the difficulties concerning the 
composition of the continuum should warn us that we need to conceive of 
things very differently.293 
 
Or, to put it briefly, “[t]he hypothesis of mere monads has this distinction, that, 
with it assumed, nothing remains unexplained, nor is anything assumed except 
what is proven and what must be assumed necessarily.”294 
 
 
3.4. Simplicity from 1690 to Des Bosses 
 
 It is not immediately clear why Leibniz feels the need to introduce substances 
that are essentially simple into his system, especially since he continues to describe 
their constitution in form of two primitive forces, i.e., in terms of substantial form 
and primary matter as coming together in one substance. In addition, he seems to 
have a wide variety of other terms to choose from, such as ‘substantial atom’, 
‘metaphysical point’, or, of course, ‘monad’. But there is a clear thread running 
through his thinking about substance: the question of unity and the question of 
grounding. Already in his younger years, Leibniz seems to be worried about how 
something extended, and hence essentially constituted of parts, can have genuine 
unity and he introduces minds and God as the guarantors of any unity and 
cohesion of corporeal substances. In the correspondence with Arnauld, this worry 
runs like a thread through a major part of the letters, but it seems not yet clearly 
determined what Leibniz thinks about corporeal, extended substances such as 
individual human beings in opposition to merely mind-like substances. The idea of 
complete individual concepts and of substantial forms as the ultimate subject of 
predication is already strongly reductionist and emphasises the role of forms over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 June 1712, LDB 255.  
294 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 24 January 1713, LDB 307 
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that of matter. In the 1690s he seems to draw the consequences from the picture 
and to commit himself finally to the explanatory superiority of substantial forms, 
and this commitment runs alongside an increase in worries concerning the possible 
unity of extended or aggregated things as well as concerning the nature of 
extension as such. To De Volder, he is more reluctant to clearly state his views on 
extension, but merely tentatively argues for some relative character of extension or 
the fact that it not a primitive notion. But it is clear, that as a relative notion, it 
requires grounding in properties that are not extended and that can supply the basis 
for at least a derivative or borrowed kind of reality of extended objects. To Des 
Bosses, he presents his view more explicitly: Extension is relational and hence 
reducible to the properties of a simple, active substance. Hence one of the driving 
motivations for keeping extended substances in business, a commitment to our 
common sense or our gut feeling that there are such things, seems to have been 
finally completely dropped. It becomes an essential feature of the most 
fundamental substance that it is not extended, and that it is simple or partless. But 
it is not only the character of extension itself that seems to drive Leibniz to this 
conclusion. There seems to be, in addition, a further worry about anything that is 
composed of parts. The basis for this worry might already be visible in his very 
early writings on the art of combination, where he first sets out a very liberal view 
on the composition of wholes, making them essentially dependent on some mind 
conceiving of its parts as belonging to one thing. But the criterion for belonging to 
one thing is rather loose and it merely requires that something in common is 
present in all the individuals that are taken to form such a whole. Similarly, the two 
diamonds found in the correspondence with Arnauld can be taken together as one 
thing, but whether they are far apart, close together or even encapsulated in one 
ring does not change anything about the fact that there are distinct things. Though 
Leibniz sometimes allows for some aggregated things, i.e. things consisting of parts 
of some sort, to be more rightfully referred to as aggregates, because the reason for 
considering them together is stronger than in other cases, he seems committed to 
the view that everything composed of distinct parts will, metaphysically strictly 
speaking, always lack essential unity or unity in a strong sense. The unity of 
aggregates comes in degrees, the unity of individual substances does not. Such a 
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problem would also concern the constitution of a simple substance, unless there is 
an account of its components, its substantial form together with its primary matter, 
that does not regard them as distinct components. There might be other possible 
options to account for their unity, but the one we seem to see entailed in scattered 
remarks throughout the writings from the 1690s on, is established by denying a real 
distinction between substantial form and primary matter, or indeed denying that 
there are two components at all. This also accounts for what seems to be an 
ambiguity in the portrayal of substantial form as being sometimes regarded as a 
substance and sometimes denied substantiality unless it is united with or 
‘completed by’ primary matter. This primary matter does not add anything to the 
substantial form, but it rather is a limitation of it. We will see in the following that 
primary matter needs to be considered in order to make sense of the phenomena, 
the resistance and inertia they display, but that it is, in its explanatory function, 




4. The Dynamics of Substance 
 
 
 The relation between Leibniz’s metaphysical views and his ideas of what 
constitutes physical objects and grounds their behaviour is a difficult issue, 
especially since it sometimes seems as if Leibniz himself is not absolutely clear 
about how to think of this relation. We have already seen that Leibniz held the 
view that physics in some sense supplies a way into metaphysics,295 and, hence, that 
we should view the objects or laws of physics to tell us something about the nature 
of substance and the realm of what lies beyond the perceived world. But before we 
try to find this entrance, honesty demands to explicitly point out a decision that 
seems to be necessary for approaching this subject, because it fundamentally 
changes the treatment of the texts on physics that will be reviewed in the following. 
We have seen that there is good reason to regard a simple substance ontology as 
being in place by the mid-1690s, possibly even earlier, or at least a system in which 
the behaviour of corporeal substances can be explained under the assumption of 
principles that are compatible with, or even are highly suggestive of, such a simple 
substance ontology. Then some of the seminal texts concerning Leibniz’s 
dynamics, such as the ‘Specimen Dynamicum’, written and published in 1695, 
would be helpful indicators concerning the rather perplexing relationship between 
various kinds of forces in Leibniz’s philosophy of physics. But this is by no means 
the only view available. One might find good grounds to think that there is a 
difference between the extension of ‘substance’ during those years and the classical 
monadology. Such a reading could, for example, suggest that there are corporeal 
substances as the bearers of derivative force in the 1690s, and therefore to view the 
relationship between physics and metaphysics, and the different forces associated 
with both, to be rather straightforward:  
 
In this view, it is relatively easy to fit the ontology of the SD [Specimen 
Dynamicum] and other dynamical writings directly into Leibniz's other 
metaphysical writings. In this view, the active and passive primitive forces 	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of the dynamics correspond reasonably well to the form and matter of the 
metaphysical writings. The derivative forces, then, emerge as modes of 
corporeal substance, and their reality in inanimate bodies is grounded in 
the corporeal substances that make them up.296  
 
What grounds such a reading is not only the interpretation of several passages that 
suggest a commitment on Leibniz’s part to corporeal substances – though, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters, other readings of these passages are equally 
possible – but it also in a very clear way illuminates why Leibniz insisted in his 
correspondence to De Volder that physics is the way into metaphysics. The 
experienced derivative forces of physical bodies are simply the qualities of 
corporeal substances. But I have argued that there are good reasons to think that a 
simple substance ontology is in place by the mid-1690s, and that corporeal 
substances understood in a way that they could serve as the paradigmatic objects of 
physics, i.e. as extended unified beings, are highly suspicious due to their lack of 
unity. Therefore, such an account needs at least some modification or clarification. 
For a reading of Leibniz’s text such as the one I propose, the objects of physics 
and their derivative forces are primarily phenomena – despite their well-
foundedness – and as such might correspond to the primitive forces and 
substances in a loose sense, but in a less straightforward way than it would be the 
case under a firm commitment to the existence of corporeal substances. Already 
the question of how the two kind of forces, i.e., primitive and derivative forces, 
might be related to each other now faces obvious difficulties. For one, the relation 
between the phenomenal and the substantial needs clarification, but also how the 
phenomenal, i.e. physics, can give access to the substantial, i.e. metaphysics. An 
account that relates Leibnizian physics to a simple substance account always faces, 
in addition, the threat of rendering physics a science dealing with the purely 
phenomenal, while Leibniz at the same time clearly took physics more seriously 
than that. But this is not how it should be viewed. Despite the fact that Leibniz 
thinks that the properties of physical objects, such as extension, are to a certain 
extent phenomenal, he does not suggest that they are merely subjective. Rather, he 
seems to maintain that there is a link between what he calls well-founded 	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phenomena, e.g. the objects of physics, and the fundamental simple substances 
underlying them, such that it is possible to make claims about the latter based on 
the behaviour according to law-like patterns of the former and vice versa. But the 
fact that the relationship between simple substances and physical objects might be 
complicated by itself does not provide enough reason to attempt to reconstruct 
instead the seemingly simpler relationship between a corporeal substance and its 
derivative forces, especially once doubt has been cast on whether Leibniz is 
committed to corporeal substances at all. In addition, even if there are corporeal 
substances, their relationship to simple substances still requires explanation – 
unless one wants to deny that Leibniz is committed to simple substances in those 
years at all. The claim made previously that a simple substance ontology is already 
in place in the 1690s requires us to regard the physical writings of this period as an 
attempt to capture this more complicated relationship. But the aim of this 
reconstruction is, in any case, supported by textual evidence and therefore, 
hopefully, its plausibility is not entirely based on a strong commitment to the late 
monadological view. 
 One claim that seems to demand general assent is that, for Leibniz, the notion 
of force is a fundamental element in explaining any kind of activity in the world, on 
a metaphysical as well as on a physical level. The term itself enters into his writings 
by the late 1670s, but it gains a more precise and technical meaning only in the 
1680s or 1690s,297 when it becomes the most fundamental notion explaining the 
activity of substances as well as the motions of bodies.  
 We have seen already in the first letters his correspondence with De Volder 
that Leibniz regards the treatment of physics and its objects as in some sense prior 
to the treatment of substances, especially in the passages in which Leibniz insisted 
on treating the measure of force before going into the metaphysics of substance. 
Nonetheless, he claims in this very same correspondence that “the activity of 
substance is more of a metaphysical necessity, and unless I am mistaken, it would 
have had a place in every universe.”298 It seems as if there are two different 
priorities on the table in Leibniz’s reasoning. Throughout his philosophical career, 
activity (alongside unity) is the mark of substance, and it often seems to be less 	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supported by a conclusive argument, but rather appears to be either Scholastic 
heritage or assumed to be an a priori knowable attribute of substance. But there is 
another, a posteriori, argument for it, which is based on the order of discovery, so 
to speak, and sets out by analysing the objects we perceive, i.e. physical, extended, 
mobile things that behave in accordance with certain laws. This analysis might lead 
us to the more fundamental things, namely substances, and to the requirement of 
their necessary activity.299 In order to explain why physical objects show this or that 
kind of motion or extension, there must be something permanent that is active and 
resistant, respectively, and therefore, as a permanent subject, able to ground these 
momentary and fleeting physical manifestations or limitations. We have seen that 
this is the way the discussion with De Volder proceeds, namely from an 
investigation of extended things in motion to the necessary existence of more 
fundamental active principles. This is also the general way in which Leibniz 
proceeds when arguing for the explanatory insufficiency of merely extended and 
passive (especially Cartesian) matter. As a result of this analysis, Leibniz feels 
entitled to claim that  “in corporeal things there is something over and above 
[praeter] extension, in fact, prior to extension, namely, that force of nature 
implanted everywhere by the Creator.”300 But it is by no means obvious how these 
two levels and the various notions of force are connected, only that they stand in 
the some relation of mutual explanation and illumination, and that ‘force’ is a 
fundamental notion: 
 
[T]he concept of forces or powers, which the Germans call Kraft and the 
French la force, and for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of 
dynamics, brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the 
true concept of substance.301 
 
This distinct science of dynamics was supposed to be set out in a book-length 
treatment entitled Dynamica, which – as many of Leibniz’s ambitious undertakings – 	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300 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695), GM VI 235/AG 118. It is noteworthy that Leibniz here does not 
only claim that there is something over and above extension, as he has put it to De Volder and 
others, but in addition something indeed prior to extension, similar to the picture in the 
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was never finished. 302 But we get an introductory glance of his ideas in the 
published ‘Specimen Dynamicum’, in which Leibniz argues for the introduction of 
forces into natural philosophy. It is based on an assumption that he seemingly takes 
for granted – and quite rightly does so – , namely that we experience corporeal 
action of some sort, i.e. that we perceive moving bodies. It should be kept in mind 
that this experience does not entail the stronger claim that there actually exist such 
things as moving bodies. Even though they exist as objects of our experiences, the 
experience does not give us grounds for any assumptions concerning their 
ontological status beyond their being the content of a perception. But, so the 
argument goes, motion itself, once it is considered carefully and metaphysically 
accurately, turns out to be nothing really existing since it does not have coexistent 
parts and hence is never given as a whole: 
 
For, strictly speaking, motion (and likewise time) never really exists, since 
the whole never exists, inasmuch as it lacks coexistent parts. And 
furthermore, there is nothing real in motion but a momentary something 
which must consist in a force striving [nitente] toward change. Whatever 
there is in corporeal nature over and above the object of geometry reduces 
to this.303 
 
While Leibniz misses the opportunity here to give a reason, we have already seen 
why this might be the case. Leibniz seems to regard motion as an aggregate of 
smaller motions, similar to extended objects being composed of extended parts to 
infinity. And if motion is something that is composed of smaller parts (and these 
smaller parts of smaller parts again, and so on), all these parts must be given in 
order for the whole thing to be given. And, analogous to the argument against 
aggregates (and, in his correspondence with Des Bosses, also against extension) as 
genuinely real entities, motion is divisible in smaller portions of motion to infinity, 
from none of which motion could not borrow its reality, because there is no 
grounding level of smallest indivisible motions to be reached. But in the case of 
motion there is also the further complication that even if its parts would exist, they 
would be given only successively and hence could not cumulatively give rise to one 
whole thing, but only to a temporal series of an infinite number of infinitely small, 	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and hence fictional, things. Motion over time, it seems, has not only all the 
problems any infinitely divisible aggregate in general has, but due to its merely 
successive nature it can hardly be considered a thing at all.304 Therefore, Leibniz 
concludes, the only thing that can be real in motion is something momentary, a 
force or striving towards change.305 And, Leibniz claims, motion is the activity of 
corporeal objects. But by this time, Leibniz seems to have already abandoned the idea 
that such instantaneous forces, into which bodily motions must ultimately resolve, 
are something strictly speaking real.306 So even if this is what everything “in 
corporeal nature over and above the object of geometry or extension reduces 
to”307, the further question remains: What does it ultimately reduce to? Is it nothing 
but a fiction or does it have further grounding on a metaphysical level? We have 
seen that there has to be something beyond mere extension in physical objects, 
some kind of substantial form, possibly from the 1660s on, but now, thirty years 
later, Leibniz seems to have found the means to be more specific about its nature 
and what it can and does give rise to. By the mid-1690s, we find in Leibniz a more 
sophisticated view on the effects of forces and a more complex taxonomy of forces 
comprising two different types, namely primitive and derivative forces. Once these 
notions have become clearer, we might be able to assign them their place within 
Leibniz’s overall systematic picture.  
 There are two ways to proceed, the one demanded by Leibniz in his 
correspondence with De Volder, which starts with a basic conception of physical 
phenomena and enters from there into the metaphysics of substance, or to start 
with the metaphysics of substance and to work our way towards a description of 
physical phenomena as well as to try to establish the relation between the two in 
this way. Despite the fact that this decision might have an influence on the 
outcome, after having already tried to establish the problems of physics and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 This successive nature, though, must be different in kind from the successive nature we observe 
in simple substances. It is successive as a mere aggregation of momentous states, in difference to the 
essentially active simple substance that is not a sum of states, but essentially a force, analogous to 
the ‘law of a series’. 
305 On the relation between infinitesimals and derivative forces, see Rutherford, “Leibniz on 
Infinitesimals and the Reality of Force”. 
306 Richard T. W. Arthur, Leibniz (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 79-85. 
307 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695), GM VI 235/AG 118. 
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objects prior to considerations concerning the nature of substance in the previous 
chapters, the second approach seems, for the moment, the easier route to go. 
 
 
4.1. Primitive Active and Passive Force (the Metaphysics of Physics) 
 
A year before the publication of the ‘Specimen Dynamicum’, Leibniz rolled 
out some preliminary thoughts on the importance of the notion of force for 
metaphysics in an article entitled ‘On the Correction of Metaphysics and the 
Concept of Substance’. In this writing, he posits an active force which “contains a 
certain act or entelechy and is thus midway between the faculty of acting and the 
act itself and involves a conatus”308, and which leads to action if it is not impeded in 
some way. In this writing, Leibniz does not yet introduce a clear distinction 
between the essential activity of substances and the activity of bodies, but it is 
already entailed in it: While matter (here in the sense of what constitutes the bodies 
of physics) is in motion, there is also a force that is the ultimate grounding for the 
matter’s motion and that must, therefore, in some way be present in every body. 
While we can talk about bodies as limiting each other’s motions by collision, i.e., 
regard them as behaving according to the standard mechanical view of Leibniz’s 
time, which can be phrased in terms of causal interaction and the transmission of 
motion, “one created substance receives from another created substance, not the 
force of acting itself, but only the limits and the determination of its own 
preexistent striving or power of action”309. Here emerges a clear difference between 
possible descriptions of the objects of physics as well as their behaviour and the 
metaphysically fundamental substances. Metaphysical descriptions leave physical 
descriptions and phenomena untouched. There is a correct ascription of physical 
properties such as causal interaction and the transmission of force possible, despite 
the fact that it is, metaphysically strictly speaking, inaccurate. But we should keep in 
mind that this very short paper focuses on metaphysics rather than physical details, 
and hence some of the ideas are not spelt out in great detail. We see in it, 
nonetheless, a certain kind of relation indicated between bodies and substances: On 	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309 ‘On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance’ (1694), G IV 470/L 433. 
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the one hand, there is some force inherent in bodies that seems to be limited by the 
impact of other bodies, and these bodies display a behaviour that can be described 
in terms of causation and by the laws of motion and collision. On the other hand, 
there is a seemingly more fundamental kind of force which is found in substances. 
This force is never received from other substances, but only limited and 
determined from within itself. Hence, this should not be taken to be saying that 
there is a direct causal influence or passing on of a limit from one substance to 
another, especially since that the pre-established harmony is already in place in 
these years. It is rather the case that the passion of one substance requires the 
occurrence of an action in another suitably related substance (i.e. a substance 
standing in a particular relation of expression to the passive substance). Therefore, 
this limitation, though it is determined by the activity of another substance in form 
of an increase in the clarity or perfection of its expression, is not conferred onto 
the other substance. Both states must, rather, arise from within the involved 
substances themselves – and there must be, indeed, corresponding changes in all 
other substances, due to the universal expression of all the states of all monads by 
all other monads present in the same universe. Leibniz seems, even though he is 
not entirely explicit on it, to have a distinction between the forces displayed by 
bodies (what he will refer to as ‘derivative forces’) and the forces as they are 
constitutive of substances (later ‘primary forces’) in mind. An indication for the 
distinction being in place is the fact that we are given a criterion for differentiating 
between the two: One of them we can describe as if they were causally effective 
and therefore they behave according to laws we can know, while we perceive the 
other to act spontaneously, at least in the case we are best acquainted with: 
ourselves in introspection. 
But what is also of great interest here is that the account of this short paper 
does not make any explicit reference to passive forces (though, as I have done 
above, it can be reconstructed in such a way that it implicitly does), and the main 
constitution of substance is presented in terms of ‘active force’ and ‘the limits and 
determination of its [the created substance’s] own pre-existent striving or power of 
action’. This looks as if Leibniz thought that a created substance, at least in its 
function of grounding the physical behaviour of bodies, can be fully spelled out in 
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terms of limited activity, without ascribing a second component, in addition to 
determined force, to this substance. 
But a year later, he supplies his new science of dynamics with further, more 
elaborate definitions of the terms involved. In his ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695) 
he introduces several distinctions that can be made among forces. First and 
foremost, forces are either active or passive, but those forces can each be further 
distinguished into primitive and derivative. We will here focus on the former ones 
and look at the derivative forces in the next section. 
Leibniz introduces primitive active force or substantial form as something 
that is analogous to the soul. As we have seen, this is the familiar, but by no means 
the only, strategy Leibniz uses, namely to start by looking at things we have a closer 
or more intuitive access to and using them as paradigm cases. And due to a lack of 
reason to assume that we are significantly different in kind and constitution from 
the things around us, he finds himself licensed to generalize the ideas discovered in 
this familiar thing that is our soul. But this analogy has frequently been taken too 
literally by stressing the soul-likeness (and even more so the mind-likeness) of 
substantial forms and their having perceptions. It might be better, for the moment 
at least, to stick to the terms of activity and passivity, which can be discovered in 
our soul and hence ascribed to all other substances as well, without connecting 
these notions to perceptions and appetites. The primitive forces, Leibniz claims, 
must be “inherent in every corporeal substance per se”, but they are not to be used 
to explain particular phenomena, whose explanation should be advanced in 
mechanical terms only. Leibniz sees primitive forces as more fundamental or 
ontologically prior principles that ground the behaviour of bodies and hence gives 
rise to the laws they obey, but which do not enter immediately into their 
explanation. This reasoning should be familiar by now, since it is to be found in 
Leibniz’s writings from the 1660s onwards: Physics can be treated as a closed 
system and its explanations and laws, once established by experience and 
experiment, can explain the phenomena without recourse to metaphysics. But in 
order to understand the phenomena of physics, its own tools and terms are 
insufficient. While we can measure the forces of bodies, calculate their resistance 
and motion, we are not thereby given the means to explain them fully. In order to 
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do so, we must turn to metaphysics. This grounding metaphysical principle that  
‘gives rise to’ these phenomena does not amount to an equivocation between 
primitive active forces and what they result in. We will also see that there is more to 
the phenomena than merely one primitive force, namely the coming together of an 
infinite number of them, that is required for giving rise to, but not composing, 
well-founded bodily phenomena. It is also interesting that here again it is the 
primitive active force that is described as inherent in every corporeal substance, 
rather than primitive forces as such.  
Its passive counterpart is the “primitive force of being acted upon [vis 
primitive patiendi] or of resisting”310, which can be also referred to as ‘primary matter’. 
Due to its workings it is the case that bodies ultimately are impenetrable and 
oppose motion. In difference to primitive active force, which has the soul as an 
explanatory analogue, the notion of primitive passive force does not receive 
similarly extensive treatment. But so far, the difference between active and passive 
primitive forces is not only the different functions they fulfil or the phenomena 
they give rise to, but also the ways in which they can be characterized: Active forces 
are explicitly inherent in corporeal substances and understood to be like or similar 
to our soul, while primary matter so far amounts to ‘being acted upon’ and giving 
rise to resistance, impenetrability and inertia in bodies. In the case of primitive 
passive forces, we seem prima facie more familiar with their results rather than with 
them and their core metaphysical function or foundation. But the overall picture 
concerning the explanatory functions of primitive forces seem clear: “[I]t is on 
account of form that every body always acts, and […] it is on account of matter 
that every body is always acted upon and resists.”311 But why does Leibniz feel 
forced to introduce these notions at all? The primary incentive given for the 
introduction of these primitive forces is the fact that a purely geometrical treatment 
of bodies would lead, Leibniz claims, to predictions about the behaviour of bodies 
which do not correspond to their behaviour as we experience it.312 Therefore, 
Leibniz claims, 
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we must admit something metaphysical, something perceptible by the mind 
alone over and above that which is purely mathematical and subject to the 
imagination, and we must add to material mass [massa] a certain superior 
and, so to speak, formal principle. Whether we call this principle form or 
entelechy or force does not matter, as long as we remember that it can only 
be explained thought the notion of forces.313 
 
While we have seen in the correspondence with De Volder the attempt to enter the 
metaphysical realm via considerations of the notions of extension and activity of 
physical objects, Leibniz claims in the ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ explicitly that what 
is required in order to ground these objects and their properties is ‘something 
metaphysical, something perceptible by the mind alone’. It is not the motions of body 
that are constituted by the motions of its grounding substances, but there must 
nonetheless be something that grounds these notions. And it is reason, rather than 
observation, that allows for this step from sense perception to a metaphysically 
viable system.314 
When looking back on his development, Leibniz states that the prevalence 
of mechanism in his thinking was what brought him to occupy himself with 
mathematics. 315  And we have seen that the phenomena of physics have, for 
Leibniz, always been regarded as being explicable in geometrical or mathematical 
terms. But from his early writings on we see a gradual development from assuming 
substantial forms as the suppliers of motion and guarantors of unity of bodies to 
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314 It is interesting to note that Leibniz makes reference here to the imagination as playing a role in 
physical and mathematical explanation, and juxtaposes it with the mind or the intellect. 
Unfortunately, the studies on the role of imagination in Leibniz’s physics are very limited, one 
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seeing in these forms the only explanatory principle that is required in order to 
ground the phenomena. The fact that we can give a thorough mechanical 
explanation of the phenomena, Leibniz seems to suggest, is the reason why we 
need to assume the presence of something more fundamental. 
In these considerations of the reason as to why he introduced primitive 
forces, Leibniz returns again to the point of view we have already observed in ‘On 
the Correction of Substance’ (1694): The foundational role is played by the 
entelechy or primitive active force, and primitive passive force or primary matter 
does not seem to have any prominent place in this reasoning. The basis for this 
might be simple negligence on Leibniz’s part or the assumption that the reader will 
immediately conclude that the same reasoning applies to primary matter. But there 
might be another support for the claim that we have already seen indicated in the 
more metaphysical writings: It is possible that ‘entelechy’ can stand legitimately for 
‘substance’, the entity constituted by entelechy and primary matter or primitive 
active and passive force.  
But these primitive forces do not only ground the possibility of corporeal 
substances to act and be acted upon, they are also required by the notion of 
extension. Since, as we have already seen in the De Volder Correspondence and 
elsewhere, Leibniz regards extension as a relative notion and, as he states in the 
Specimen Dynamicum, as something that “presupposes the substance of body, which 
involves the power of acting and resisting, and exits everywhere as corporeal mass 
[massa], and that the diffusion of this substance is contained in extension.”316 The 
‘substance of body’ is not body considered as a corporeal substance, but it is the 
substance required for there to be bodies. This is illustrated in a text from the 
previous year. Here he writes that  
 
I prefer to say that the notion of force is prior to that of extension, because 
extension signifies a mass or aggregate of several substances, whereas force 
must exist even in a subject which is a single substance only; and unity is 
prior to multiplicity. It can even be said that force is constitutive of 
substance, just as action, which is the exercise of force, is its distinguishing 
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mark. For actions pertain only to substances, and pertain always to all 
substances.317 
 
We see now that primitive force is not only metaphysically prior to the actions and 
passions of bodies, but also that it is prior to their extension, i.e., that it is not only 
prior to the derivative forces of physical objects, but also to what has been 
regarded by some, most notably Descartes, as their other fundamental attribute, 
namely extension. All these notions constitutive of physics are, as it turns out in 
thorough metaphysical analysis, not ultimately real but the result of more basic, 
unextended, forces. 
But since the ‘Specimen’ itself leaves open how the two primitive forces are 
related to each other and only equates entelechy with primitive active force and 
primitive passive force with primary matter, it might look at first sight as if these 
are two distinct components (though, as I have argued, it does not need to be seen 
that way).  
There are good grounds why we might intuitively think of them as distinct 
principles and to regard passive force as something that cannot possibly be mere 
privation or limitation. First of all, it is the notion of a ‘force’ suggests itself for 
reification. If something is a force, it should be something that acts. Here Leibniz’s 
use of terminology might cloud the issue. Clearly, his passive force is defined as 
the ‘force of being acted upon or of resisting’ rather than in terms of any kind of 
action. It seems, that in his descriptions, he reduces the force of resisting to an 
action upon a subject rather than an action in its own right. But Leibniz might 
have had good reasons to call such a seemingly not itself active power ‘force’: It is, 
as the absence of primitive active force, only definable in terms of this active force. 
Taken by itself, without being taken as a limit of a fundamental active force, it 
cannot be described other than in terms of the phenomena it gives rise to. It is 
also, from a Leibnizian point of view, plausible to regard it and its derivative 
expressions as privations. The fundamental attribute of a substance is activity, but 
qua being a limited creature, this activity must necessarily be limited. This 
limitation is what gives rise to the resistance that bodies display, rather than 
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constituting an active force of resisting. If bodies were not limited, they would 
neither display impenetrability or inertia nor extension. God, as an absolutely 
active being, does not display these properties at all. Resistance is rather an 
approximation to the state of absolute passivity, which would be displayed in 
bodies at absolute rest. (But since no grounding principle and therefore no body 
can be absolutely passive, they also can never be at absolute rest.)318 
These two forces are unified again in the following years by the introduction 
of the term ‘dynamicon’ (or ‘dynamism’) that we have already encountered in the 
correspondence with De Volder. In a paper of 1702, entitled by the translators as 
‘On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians’, Leibniz supplies us with a somewhat 
clearer idea of what this unity or dynamicon might be. Here, again, the starting 
point is extension as a relative notion and hence as something that requires 
something else which is extended or diffused. And he admits that the nature of 
that which is extended requires further elaboration: “[M]atter consists in the 
diffusion of resistance. But since on our view there is something besides matter in 
body, one might ask what its nature is. Therefore, we say that it can consist in 
nothing but the dynamicon, or the innate principle of change and persistence.”319 
“Furthermore,” Leibniz continues, “the dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is 
twofold, passive and active. Properly speaking, passive force [vis] constitutes matter 
or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form. Passive force is 
resistance itself…”320 There is a tension in this passage in the juxtaposition of 
entelechy and matter here, since, in difference to what we have seen before, it 
seems to be constructed not between primitive active and primitive passive force, 
but rather between primitive active force (entelechy) and secondary matter (massa). 
Mass, as we have seen in the De Volder correspondence, is “the secondary matter, 
i.e., the organic machine, for which innumerable subordinate monads come 
together”321. But this equation of matter with massa or secondary matter in this 
passage might equally well echo the description of monads as seen in the 
correspondence with De Volder, since in the same text we also find that primitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 For some possible objections and replies to this view of passive forces, see Antognazza, 
“Primary Matter, Primitive Passive Power, and Creaturely Limitation”. 
319 ‘On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians’ (1702), G IV 394/AG 251. 
320 ibid., G IV 395/AG 252. 
321 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 265. 
132	  	  
active force is the “natural principle which, together with matter or passive force, 
completes a corporeal substance. This substance, of course, is one per se, and not 
a mere aggregate of many substances, for there is a great difference between an 
animal, for example, and a flock.”322 And Leibniz immediately goes on to explain 
that this primitive active force or entelechy furthermore activates some organic body, 
which is a machine of nature and hence an infinity of entangled organs, i.e. which 
is the mass or secondary matter. This mirrors the description to De Volder and the 
different aspects of substance as 
 
(1) the primitive entelechy, i.e., the soul; (2) matter, namely, primary matter, 
i.e., primitive passive power; (3) the monad completed by these two things; 
(4) the mass, i.e., the secondary matter, i.e., the organic machine, for which 
innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) the animal, i.e., the 
corporeal substance, which the monad dominating in the machine makes 
one.323 
 
In further support of this reading, the notion of a dynamicon in this Anti-
Cartesian work of 1702 can be related to its appearance in the correspondence 
with De Volder: “And so I believe that our thinking is completed and terminated 
more in the notion of dynamism than in that of extension, and no other notion of 
power or force should be sought than that it is an attribute from which change 
follows whose subject is substance itself.”324 This dynamicon is also in this letter 
the nature that is diffused in extension and it is nothing other than the “dynamism, 
from which there is action and passion”325. Another indication for the close 
connection between the two primitive forces is found in the explanation of them 
as being incomplete without the other: Incomplete “is the passive without the 
active, and the active without the passive”326. This indicates that while it is possible 
to view the primitive active and passive forces as fulfilling different functions, 
ontologically we deal with only one principle, the dynamicon, which incorporates 
the two. 
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It seems clear that a real unity, if it is a created substance, consists of a 
primitive active and a primitive passive force. But how are these two related? For 
once, we have seen that Leibniz does not always regard it as necessary to take 
primitive passive force into account, which suggests a similar treatment of primitive 
passive force that we have seen beforehand concerning the distinction between 
entelechy and primary matter, where it was suggested that what is essential and 
positive in a substance is indeed its entelechy. Its passive ingredient, on the other 
hand, fulfils an important explanatory function, but it is, metaphysically strictly 
speaking, not an individual component of a substance. One should read the 
suggestion concerning the limitation of primitive forces in a similar vein: 
 
It will be apparent from our meditations that one created substance receives 
from another created substance, not the force of acting itself, but only the 
limits and the determination of its own pre-existent striving or power of 
action.327 
 
Here Leibniz indicates that the only property required for adequately describing 
substances is their essential activity and the limitation thereof. And, so it seems, 
what is defined in the correspondence with De Volder as “(3) the monad 
completed by these two things [i.e. of the primitive entelechy and primary 
matter/primitive passive power]”328 is referred to in his more dynamical writings as 
the dynamicon, one principle that is the essential constitution of a substance and 
gives rise to the phenomena physics describes.  
 But despite the importance Leibniz gives to the notion of primitive force in 
explaining the notion of substance, he remains in his physical writings surprisingly 
vague concerning its nature: The nature of substance needs to be understood in 
analogy with our soul or the ‘I’ (an analogy that seems prima facie rather unhelpful in 
an account of the foundations of physics, unless one wants to establish a thorough 
phenomenalism) and it is required in order to explain the behaviour of bodies and 
the nature of physical explanation. But maybe we can get a clearer picture of what 
these primitive forces are by contrasting them with derivative forces, whose 
properties they give rise to despite the fact that they possess these properties, as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 ‘On the Correction of Metaphysics’ (1694), G IV 470/L 433. 
328 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 265. 
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will see, only in a very different way. This might only give us for the moment a 
predominantly negative definition, but will nonetheless prove useful. 
 
 
4.2. Derivative Active and Passive Force (Physics and its Objects) 
 
Derivative forces as such seem to tell us surprisingly little about the details 
of the fundamental substances or real unities, even though they form, as a part of 
what we perceive in the world, a partial basis for the investigation that ultimately 
leads to these unities. But there is, nonetheless, a connection between derivative 
and primitive forces, since derivative active forces result from a limitation of 
primitive active forces through the collision in bodies and are therefore found in 
different degrees, Leibniz claims:  
 
Active force (which might not inappropriately be called power [virtus], as 
some do) is twofold, that is, either primitive, which is inherent in every 
corporeal substance per se [...] or derivative, which, resulting from a 
limitation of primitive force through the collision of bodies with one 
another, for example, is found in different degrees.329 
 
This characterisation is slightly cryptic, but it might incorporate just a twofold 
claim. On the one hand, any derivative active force is a result of primitive actives 
forces, but it can also be regarded as being determined by the collision on the 
physical level. This double characterization is in line with Leibniz’s insistence that 
the behaviour of bodies can be explained in purely mechanical terms, but is 
ultimately or fully explicable only with recourse to metaphysics. There are two 
options how this double explanation is possible: Either there is a law-like derivative 
relation between the fundamental active but limited substances that give rise to the 
phenomena, or a more phenomenalistic explanation in terms of the pre-established 
harmony that obtains between the unities from which they are derived. But the 
former seems to be ruled out by Leibniz’s claim towards Des Bosses that an 
increase in monads or primitive powers in a mass does not correspond to an 
increase in the mass itself: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695), GM VI 236/AG 119. 
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[N]ew entelechies can be created even if no new part of mass will be 
created; for even if a mass already contains unities everywhere, nevertheless 
it always acquires new ones, which are dominant with respect to many 
others. […] Moreover, the primary matter proper to an entelechy, that is, 
the primitive passive power that is inseparable from the active power, is 
created with the entelechy itself (which it completes, so that it constitutes a 
monad or complete substance). But this does not enlarge the mass, or the 
phenomenon resulting from the monads, any more than a point enlarges a 
line.330 
 
Analogously, derivative passive force is a consequence of primary matter and 
shows itself in different degrees in secondary matter,331 i.e. it is a consequence of an 
infinite number of limited monads coming together without being merely an 
aggregate of those primitive passive powers. (Especially on an account that 
assumes that primitive passive powers are nothing but privations, it seems clear 
why derivative passive powers cannot be an aggregate: What amounts to nothing 
can not be aggregated.) But this seems even more puzzling, given that ‘secondary 
matter’ is by Leibniz understood to be “the organic machine, for which 
innumerable subordinate monads come together”332. But then again, this showing 
itself in secondary matter might amount to nothing more than claiming that it is the 
basis for the organic machine as a whole to show resistance and impenetrability.  
While Leibniz emphasizes that, strictly speaking, there is no interaction 
between individual things, neither substances nor bodies, he allows for derivative 
forces to be that by which bodies are said to actually act on other bodies and be 
acted upon by other bodies. These derivative forces are connected to local motion 
and they are, furthermore, the basis of explanation for all other material 
phenomena.333 But as that which is to a great extent dependent on being perceived 
by us to obtain in the physical interaction of extended things or as that which 
seems to constitute the nature of these extended things, derivative force is 
something changeable and hence something modal, i.e. a modification of 
something persisting, something more absolute. It is a modification “not of 
something merely passive (otherwise the modification or limit would involve more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 March 1709, LDB 119. 
331 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’ (1695), GM VI 237/AG 120. 
332 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703, LDV 265. 
333 ‘On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians’ (1702), G IV 400/AG 256. 
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reality than that which is limited), but of something active, that is, of a primitive 
entelechy.”334 Leibniz is not explicit here, but we can see several reasons why he 
might assume that something changeable must be based on something more 
permanent. Clearly, there cannot be modifications as such, but only modifications 
of something. And these things that derivative forces are modifications of are 
primitive forces. Furthermore, as momentary modifications of things, given 
Leibniz’s view of infinitesimals as fictions, they are not absolutely real, because as 
existing for only an instant, they would be required to be smaller than an assignable 
quantity, hence being useful fictions in calculation, but not real. Though this does 
not lead us directly to monads, it explains why bodies and their forces are 
phenomena – even though well founded ones – rather than fully real entities: 
 
I consider bodies to be the same kinds of things as corporeal forces, namely 
to be among the phenomena, if, indeed, they are understood to superadd 
anything to simple substances and their modifications, just as we say, not 
improperly, that a rainbow is a thing, even if it is not a substance, i.e., it is a 
[real, i.e., well founded,] phenomenon [that does not disappoint the 
expectations of one who proceeds rationally]. And in fact, not only sight but 
touch has its phenomena [, and corporeal masses are like this, as are beings 




4.3. Forces and their Relation to Simplicity 
 
There are connections between forces and simplicity on several levels. In 
treating derivative or phenomenal forces in purely mechanical terms, Leibniz holds 
that “when I assign certain motions to bodies, I do not and cannot have any reason 
other than the simplicity of the hypothesis, since I believe that one can hold the 
simplest hypothesis (everything considered) as the true one”336. On the face of it, 
this is just a simple statement of Leibniz’s version of Ockham’s razor, and it seems 
to consider only what means to regard a physical hypothesis to be true. The 
reasoning seems to be that, for phenomena, whatever is the simplest assumption, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 ‘On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians’ (1702), G IV 397/AG 254. 
335 Leibniz to De Volder, January 1705(?), LDV 319. 
336 Letter to Huygens, 4/14 September 1694, GM II 199/AG 308. 
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can be regarded as true. This is based on Leibniz’s view that God’s perfection in 
creating the world manifests itself in “the simplicity of the ways is in balance with 
the richness of effects”337. But it seems to be more important than just that: Even 
though these physical phenomenal effects result from the activity of substances, 
judging only by the appearance does not allow us to determine which of the objects 
we observe are in fact in motion. This should make us suspicious: If the activity of 
substances is concluded from the behaviour of the phenomena, but we cannot 
ascribe with certainty which objects are in motion, then we probably also cannot 
know the specific degree to which the underlying substances are active, and 
possibly not even which substance are overall more active than passive. While this 
would entail a certain degree of scepticism, it seems to be the view Leibniz would 
need to resort to: The fundamental substances, despite being to a certain degree 
active and to a certain degree passive, do not seem to have the kind of force or 
activity that is measurable and with certainty ascribable for us.  
But there is another, but related, fundamental difference that makes this 
ascription of amounts of active and passive force to the fundamental unities almost 
impossible, rather than merely epistemologically difficult to access: One of their 
main differences between primitive and derivative forces is the fact that only the 
latter are quantifiable and hence measurable. They appear to us as continuous, 
measurable quantities that we can calculate and describe by assuming that they are 
composed of infinitesimal instances: We can describe all kinds of motions as if they 
were composed from infinitely small, instantaneous amounts of motion.338 
The primitive forces, on the other hand, are the fundamental forces that are 
in a certain sense simple and not composed of any units. They are not composed of 
an infinite number of infinitesimal quantities, but they are themselves essentially 
qualitatively but not quantitatively determined, active and simple unities that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) §5, AG 38. 
338 Rutherford suggests that “in designating a substance’s derivative force, we are not referring to 
any entity over and above the substance itself; we are referring simply to some way or mode in 
which the substance exists – a mode in which it exhibits such-and-such tendency to change.” 
(Rutherford, “Leibniz on Infinitesimals and the Reality of Force,” 277.) He thinks, therefore, that 
the mathematical strategy of reconstructing them in terms of infinitesimals is merely a heuristic tool, 
since infinitesimals are fictitious and would render derivative forces fictitious or phenomenal. But 
since there is good reason to think that there is an explanatory gap between primitive and derivative 
force, it is possible that Leibniz indeed though of the latter as infinitely divisible and phenomenal 
(i.e. in the same way he thinks about extended matter). 
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ground everything else, including the appearance of measurable properties of 
physical objects. 
Nonetheless, even though we might not be able to pin down exactly which 
substance in an aggregate will contribute to what extent to the behaviour of the 
aggregate, it is nonetheless necessary that they form the basis and that the 
behaviour of physical objects is in a cerain sense reducible to them. Hence the 
pragmatic view of physics is at the same time bound to an overall metaphysical 
reduction of physical phenomenal effects or qualities to one fundamental 
explanatory principle, namely force in the sense of the dynamicon, which shows itself 
in the physical and quantitative science, but also in a variety of, or indeed in all, 
other experiential phenomena. That the objects of physics are fundamentally 
reducible to substances each constituted by one simple principle is also what 
Leibniz claims in opposition to the Cartesians: 
 
Moreover, alteration, though, like qualities, appears to be of many sorts, in 
the final analysis, reduces to the variation of forces alone. For all qualities of 
bodies, that is, except for shapes, all of their real and stable accidents (that 
is, those which do not exist merely in a transitory way, like motion, but 
which are understood to exist in the present, even if they make reference to 
the future) are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces, when analysis is 
undertaken. Furthermore, if we set forces aside, then nothing real remains 
in motion itself, since from change of place alone one cannot determine 
where the true motion or the cause of change really is.339 
 
This also leads to an order of sciences: Physics makes use of principles from two 
mathematical sciences, geometry and dynamics, and hence is subordinated to them. 
Geometry itself, as the science of extension, is subordinated to arithmetic due to 
the repetition found in extension, as well as to dynamics, which in turn is 
subordinated to metaphysics, which treats cause and effect.340 But this order of 
sciences does not amount to a full reduction of what we can know about physics to 
two fundamental sciences, i.e., to metaphysics and arithmetic. There is still a 
difference between the metaphysical primitive forces and derivative forces for us. 
And this difference is phrased by Leibniz in a terminology familiar from his 
accounts of the composition of aggregates from monads: “The primitive force of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 ‘On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians’ (1702), G IV 400/AG 256. 
340 ibid., G IV 394-95/AG 251-2. 
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bodies is indefinite in itself, but it results in secondary force, which is like a 
determination of primitive force, and arises from the combinations and collisions 
of bodies.”341 
  The indefinite character of primitive force that results in secondary force 
reminds strongly of the simple unextended substances that result in extended 
things, as, for example, body is, reducible or resolvable, since “a corporeal mass 
that is believed to have something besides simple substances is not a substance but 
a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, which alone have unity and 
absolute reality.”342 What seems to be an overall reduction to monads proves more 
difficult once a closer look is taken. It is real unextended unities that give rise to 
extension; and it is the explanatory principles that can be spelled out in terms of 
‘form’ and ‘primary matter’ or in terms of primitive powers that give rise to the 
derivative forces, but to some extent there still seems to be a distinction to be made 
between the phenomenal and the metaphysical.  
  It is clear that Leibniz tries to reduce the system of science he is building to 
as few hypotheses and principles as possible. It is the metaphysical that gives rise to 
the physical, and even though it is not clear how this happens, it is a necessary 
assumption in order to explain the observed behaviour of physical objects. But 
Leibniz is able to put these observations and the origin of their phenomenal 
character into the individual substances as well:  
 
Besides, you will easily see from this that material substances are not 
destroyed but conserved, provided that they are sought in dynamism, which 
reveals itself through the phenomena, i.e., in the active and passive force of 
perceivers, not outside of them. But extension, like time and bulk and the 
motion that consists of their variations, disappears into the phenomena no 
less than real qualities do, and exists, as Democritus said, more by 
convention than in reality.343 
 
But derivative forces have another feature in common with extended 
things: They are aggregates. As such, they face the same problems of constituting a 
whole, and hence the demand that, in order to be real, they be reducible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Leibniz to Bousset 1694, WF 34. 
342 Leibniz to De Volder, January 1705(?), LDV 319. 
343 Supplement 2, Leibniz to De Volder, 19 January 1706, LDV 339. 
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something basic and not aggregated. Primitive forces as the basis for derivative 
forces hence seem to be constituted by a conatus that is itself simple and not 
further resolvable as well. This underlying primitive force cannot be composed of 
any kind of parts, since a composition of infinitely small units of force would 
render them fictitious.344  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 That Leibniz might have realized at some point – though maybe not entirely clearly – that he 
introduced a gap between primitive and derivative forces can be argued also with recourse to a 
rather different problem: The increase of perfection in the world. Once perfection is connected with 
force, as we will see in the next chapter, is plausible, it becomes apparent how Leibniz, who was 
adamant to maintain that the quantity of force in the universe, at least on the derivative level, i.e. as 
physical force, remains the same, could have nonetheless incorporated the idea that the universe 
increases in perfection on a metaphysical level. This reasoning might lend itself to give a deeper 
explanation on why Leibniz did not seem to hold a consistent view on whether the world increases 
in perfection. (For an exposition of the problem, see Lloyd Strickland, “Leibniz on Whether the 
World Increases in Perfection,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14.1 (2006).) 
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5. Theological Considerations  
 
 
5.1. Is God a Monad? The Hierarchy of Substances and Degrees of 
Perfections. 
 
In the analysis of simple substances, emphasis is sometimes put on 
Leibniz’s metaphysical and physical writings, but there is good reason to take his 
intertwined theological considerations into account as well. Not only is there a long 
tradition Leibniz feels free to draw from and to modify according to his needs,345 
but the attempt to reconcile metaphysical and theological claims itself is also of 
utmost importance to him throughout his life and therefore his views on God’s 
nature, creation, and the origin of evil are strongly connected to his philosophical 
views.  
Simplicity itself as an attribute of God is an integral part of the traditional 
understanding of a Christian God,346, a tradition Leibniz himself is a part of 
(though it is also found in other monotheistic religions347). Leibniz is explicit in his 
commitment to this assumption as well: “[...] God alone is the primitive unity or 
the first [originaire] simple substance [...]”348. Though it seems to be obvious, in this 
case, that Leibniz receives this idea of divine simplicity from the preceding 
tradition, considering his conception of a simple God might give insight into his 
theory of substance for several reasons. Firstly, the case of divine simplicity 
involves a problem analogous to a general puzzle arising from Leibnizian simple 
substances: How to conceive of the relation of a multitude of properties with 
something absolutely simple. The analogous case concerning substances in his 
mature philosophy would be the question as to how an individual simple substance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 For a connection of Leibniz’s conception of evil with the Scholastic tradition, see especially 
Antognazza, “Primary Matter, Primitive Passive Power, and Creaturely Limitation” and Duarte, 
“Leibniz and Prime Matter”. 
346 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q.3.  
347 See David B. Burnell, Knowing the Unknowable God. Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1986, 35-50. 
348 Monadology §47, G VI 641/AG 219. 
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can have a multitude of properties in the form of an infinite number of perceptions 
and limited perfections. Thus, as one needs to account for the infinite multiplicity 
of perceptions in one created simple substance, one also needs to account for (an 
infinity or at least several) attributes in one simple divine substance. But there are 
also important considerations concerning the similarity between God’s simple 
nature and its imitation by monads and the questions in which sense various divine 
perfections can enter into the constitution of simple substances. 
But at this point it is unclear if Leibniz considers God to be a substance of 
the same or of a different kind than his creatures. Only if they are of the same kind 
we seem entitled to apply considerations concerning divine substance to the 
creatures that follow from him.349 One evident difference between the two is the 
fact that God, in difference to his creation, is absolutely independent: “It must be 
admitted, Sir, that we are not completely free; only God is completely free, since he 
alone is independent.” 350  Though one might attribute certain other kinds of 
independence, such as a predicative independence (as the ultimate subject of 
predication) to individual substances351, or causal independence of each created 
substance from all other created substances (as assumed in the Discourse as well as 
in the monadological writings), everything created is nonetheless in certain 
fundamental ways dependent on God.352 So there is a difference between created 
substances and creator as the latter is absolutely independent, while this can only be 
claimed in a restricted sense for the former. But is this sufficient to establish a 
difference in kind? There are also good grounds for assuming that God and created 
substances are of the same kind of substance. First and foremost, the core of 
Leibniz’s definition of substance is activity and unity, but not independence. The 
difference between creator and creatures manifests itself, furthermore, not in the 
possession of different qualities, but only in different degrees of those qualities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 “God alone (from whom all individuals emanate continually and who sees the universe not only 
as they see it but also entirely differently from all of them) is the cause of this correspondence of 
their phenomena […]” Discourse §14 AG 47. The terminology of emanation suggests a closer, 
Platonic relation between divine and creaturely perfections, but this of less relevant here. For a 
possibly reconstruction of a Platonic emanation theory in Leibniz, see Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: 
Its Origins and Development, especially 190-192. 
350 ‘Dialogue effectif sur la liberté de l’homme et sur l’origine du mal’ (25 January 1695): Gr 362/AG 
112.  
351 See chapter 2. 
352 This is not only true about their origin, i.e. creation, but also in their relation to continued 
existence. 
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This seems for Leibniz sufficient reason to establish a strong connection between 
the constitutions of them:  
 
[T]he soul is an imitation of God as far as is possible for a created thing, for 
like him it is simple and yet also infinite, in that it contains everything 
implicitly through confused perceptions – though with respect to clear 
perceptions it is limited, whereas everything is clear to the sovereign 
substance, from which everything emanates, which is the cause of existence 
and of order, and is in a word the ultimate reason for things. God contains 
the universe eminently, and the soul or unity contains it actually, being a 
central mirror, though active and vital, so to speak.353 
 
God might therefore serve as some kind of blueprint, having the qualities of 
created substances, but in their highest degree, while the qualities of substances 
could also serve in turn to illuminate the notion of God. Already in the ‘Dialogue 
effectif’ of 1695 Leibniz claims that all created things “are bounded or imperfect by 
virtue of the principle of negation or of nothingness they contain, by virtue of the 
lack of an infinity of perfections in them”354. We see here again Leibniz’s general 
strategy of explaining the nature of substance in a reductionist way, constructing it 
out of one essential positive principle and its limitation. 
There is, as Adams put it, “a general top-down theory of the constitution (and 
not just the causation) of the constitutive properties, or realities, of finite things as 
deriving their positive content from those of the infinite being”355. In this sense, 
God is not only the reason for the actuality of individual substances, but also of the 
degree of their reality or perfection. This sits well with the idea of a complete 
concept or the determination of substantial forms by their individual laws, and the 
extent of divine foreknowledge in general, but also with the therein implied 
reductionist program. At first sight, Leibniz’s definition of a ‘perfection’ seems to 
be clear: “(1) They must be qualities rather than, say, relations. (2) They must be 
simple. (3) They must be positive – metaphysically and not just verbally. And (4) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Letter to Bayle (1702?), G III 72/WF 132. 
354 Gr 364/AG 114; see also Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) §30: “And it is to this [i.e. an original 
imperfection or limitation connatural to all creatures], in my view, that we must reduce the opinion 
of Saint Augustine and other authors, the opinion that the root of evil is in nothingness, that is to 
say, in the privation or limitation of creatures” (G IV 455/AG 62). 
355 Robert Merrihew Adams, “The Priority of the Perfect in the Philosophical Theology of the 
Continental Rationalists,” in Rationalism, Platonism and God, ed. Michael Ayers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 91-116; 103; for a further development of this claim, see Maria Rosa 
Antognazza, “Comments on Adams’ ‘The Priority of the Perfect,” in Rationalism, Platonism and God, 
ed. Michael Ayers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 118-128. 
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they must be absolute; that is, they must express or possess their content, their 
reality ‘without any limits’.”356 Here, Adams seems to suggest that there is a 
univocal use of ‘perfectio’ in Leibniz’s writings, but this does not seem to be 
straightforwardly the case. Prima facie, there are at least three slightly different uses 
of the term in Leibniz writings, namely perfectio as (a) a property which allows for a 
maximum357, (b) the perfection-in-the-maximum, e.g. omnipotence, omniscience 
etc. (i.e. perfection as it is possessed by or attributed to God), and (c) a degree of 
perfection, i.e. as quantitas essentiae358. And in this last sense, they do not seem to be 
in accordance with Adams’s general definition of perfection, since perfections of 
creatures are necessarily limited but are nonetheless referred to ‘perfections’. This 
last definition has, in addition, the further implication that referring to it as 
‘quantity’ [quantitas], they seem to run the risk of being comparable and composed 
of parts.359 But since they allow for degrees or limitations, it seems required that 
they are composed in some way, for example, as Adams suggests, by certain logical 
operations, namely negations, and thus seem to be neither simple nor purely 
positive; they do not qualify as perfections according to the criteria proposed by 
Adams, even though he (and Leibniz) seems to acknowledge them as such. He 
attempts to reconstruct the properties of creatures through the limitation of God’s 
simple properties based on the introduction of a special operator that results in 
‘limited perfections’. Though it is a difficult task to give a plausible explanation of 
how God’s simple perfections may be limited (even more so if one wants to hold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Adams, “Priority of the Perfect,” 105. 
357 We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is that forms or 
natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as for example, the nature of 
number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even the number of all numbers), as well as 
the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction, but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do 
not involve any impossibility. Consequently, power and knowledge are perfections, and, insofar as 
they belong to God, they do not have limits. (Discourse §1, G IV 427/AG 35.) 
358 “Furthermore, in order to explain a bit more distinctly how temporal, contingent, or physical 
truths arise from eternal, essential or metaphysical truths, we must first acknowledge that since 
something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence or (so to speak) a straining 
toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of 
itself strives for existence. Furthermore, it follows from this that all possibles, that is, everything that 
expresses essence or possible reality, strive with equal right for existence in proportion to the 
amount of essence or reality or the degree of perfection they contain, for perfection is nothing but 
the amount of essence [essentiae quantitas].” (‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’ (1697), G VII 
303/AG 150.) 
359 Such a construction of perfections and their comparability would give rise to Broad’s concern 
that creatures, when compared with God, would turn out to be infinitely evil, since they would lack 
an infinite degree of perfection. (C. D. Broad, Leibniz. An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 159.) We will see below how this worry might be circumvented. 
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that they are simple), Leibniz’s approach to this issue shows that there is a 
qualitative similarity between the divine and all other individual substances. Taking 
this into account, there is a construction suggested by what has already been said, 
namely that the negation that leads to limited substances is not an operation in 
form of taking away some part, performed on the conception of the most perfect 
monad, but rather a function of privation or non-being.  Another reason for such a 
reconstruction can also be found in Leibniz’s general attitude towards the 
constitution of the infinite in general: 
 
Unlike the notion of a number, the notion of God (and, in fact, of any true 
being, of which God is the most perfect) is, according to Leibniz, a notion 
of something that is not produced by composition of parts, that is, it is not 
something that is made up (per impossible) by composing or conjoining an 
infinite number of units or perfections. God (and any created Leibnizian 
being) is not a sum of perfections. In fact, a being for Leibniz is not a sum 
at all; rather, it is an active agent and, in this sense, it is one and indivisible. 
[…] Such a unity cannot be fully defined in terms of its constituents and in 
this sense admits of no parts.360 
 
One worry concerning this reconstruction is how divine perfections can be 
limited in a way that they ultimately explain the constitution of substance. Even if 
one accepts that God is a simple substance with simple properties 361 , these 
properties seem to be fundamentally different in created substances, because they 
seem, qua capability of being limitable, to be complex rather than simple properties. 
In a straightforward way, to be limited or partially negated seems to require a 
composition of the quality in question of several parts, some of which are negated 
in the case of a limitation. But such a composition, as we have seen, seems to be 
ruled out by Leibniz due to his considerations of the infinite in actual beings. (It 
seems clear that a simple negation of a divine perfection as such would be too 
strong – since created substances are essentially limited and do not possess any 
divine perfections in an unlimited degree, it seems that simple negation would 
render created substances without any perfections whatsoever.) Leibniz himself is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Ohad Nachtomy, “Leibniz on Infinite Beings and Non-beings,” in The Rationalists. Between 
Tradition and Innovation, ed. Carlos Fraenkel et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 187-88. 
361 Despite the further worry that, as Adams also point out, it is far from clear why we should accept 
divine qualities as simple and not further analysable. (Adams, “Priority of the Perfect,”,111-116.) 
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not particularly helpful on the issue and one analogy he draws, between perfection 
and nothingness, seems to suggest the view of simple negation:  
 
And this is the origin of things from God and nothing, positive and 
privative, perfection and imperfection, value and limits, active and passive, 
form (i.e. entelechy, endeavour, energy) and matter or mass which is in itself 
inactive, except insofar as it has resistance. I have made those things clear to 
some extent by the origin of numbers from 0 and 1, which I have observed 
is the most beautiful symbol of the continuous creation of things from 
nothing, and of their dependence on God. For when the simplest 
progression is used, namely the dyadic instead of the decadic or quaternary, 
all numbers can be expressed by 0 and 1, as will be evident in the table I 
have added, and in this genesis of numbers, which is especially suitable for 
nature, many things lie hidden that are wonderful for contemplation, and 
indeed for practice, even though it is not for common use.362 
 
Leibniz was clearly convinced that his binary system could provide fundamental 
insights not only into the nature of various series of numbers but also be of use in 
more other areas. Unfortunately, he leaves it open how much and in which sense it 
might explain the nature of created substance: “[I]t is unclear how the simple 
negations of divine perfections could provide enough determinate content for all 
positive creaturely properties. The fact that I am not omnipotent cannot alone 
establish how much power I have.” 363  While it seems clear that creaturely 
perfections are not an all-or-nothing affair and hence, strictly speaking, are not 
composed of a string of absolute divine perfections as such and absolute absence 
thereof, i.e. absolute non-being, the analogy might indicate something else.  
 Despite the fact that it might be unclear how this analogy works in the 
details, Leibniz entertains this reasoning explicitly in some places and, in doing so, 
extends or specifies the notion of ‘perfection’. In a letter to Duke Rudolph August 
from 8 May 1699, Leibniz stresses that part of the explanatory value of the binary 
system is its ability to show not only how creatures are composed, but also that this 
creation is beautifully ordered: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Letter to Schulenburg, 29 March 1698, SL 39. See also Samuel Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, 
Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.2 (2014), 295 and 
Antognazza, “Metaphysical Evil Revisited,” 131. 
363 Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” 295. 
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First and foremost it should be remembered that this [i.e. the binary] way 
of calculating is not meant as if it should be introduced in general use, but 
it serves for the contemplation of the nature of numbers themselves as 
well as many splendid and also useful qualities as are concealed therein; 
also of the wonderful model of creation, as it comes about therein.364  
 
 
What the creation out of divine perfection and nothingness shows, Leibniz seems 
to suggest here, is their harmony and order. Once one produces a table of the 
natural numbers, one will see certain repetition and regularities in the columns.365 
But, on a prima facie reading, one might also be led think that there is only one 
perfection (corresponding to 1) and its negation (corresponding to 0), a thought 
that would dovetail with what seems an overall reductive program that seeks to 
view the constitution of substance fundamentally as an active principle limited by a 
passive principle, which can equally be viewed as a the limitation of perfection or 
confusion in perception.  
But Leibniz also connects his idea of the binary system with another aspect 
of what it means to be a perfection: “One can see also in this model that in all 
things of the whole world there is a beautiful order, if only one arrives at the right 
origin, namely 0 and 1. One and nothing else.”366 That Leibniz connects the idea of 
perfection, here mirrored by a creation out of God and nothing, with the idea of 
order is not unheard of. It features more prominently in his correspondence with 
Christian Wolff during Leibniz’s final years.  
 
Perfection is the harmony of things, or the state where everything is worthy 
of being observed, that is, the state of agreement [consensus] or identity in 
variety; you can even say that it is the degree of contemplatibility 
[considerabilitas]. Indeed, order, regularity, and harmony come to the same 
thing. You can even say that it is the degree of essence, if essence is 
calculated from harmonizing properties, which give essence weight and 
momentum, so to speak. Hence, it also follows quite nicely that God, that 
is, the supreme mind, is endowed with perception, indeed to the greatest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 “Zu förderst wird erinnert, daß diese art zu rechnen, gar nicht dahin gemeinet, als ob man sie im 
gemeinen Gebrauch einführen solte, sondern sie dienet zur betrachtung, so wohl der Natur der 
Zahlen selbst und vieler treflichen auch nüzlichen Eigenschafften so darinn verborgen; als auch des 
wunderbaren Vorbilds der Schöpfung, so sich darinn ergiebet.“ (Leibniz für Herzog Rudolf August, 
Beilage zu Brief vom 8. (18.) Mai 1969, AI.xii.67.) 
365 ibid. A I.xii.69. 
366  “Man siehet auch bey diesem Vorbild, daß in allen Dingen der ganzen Welt eine schöhne 
ordnung sey, wenn man nur auf deren rechten Ursprung komt, nehmlich 0 und 1. Eins und sonst 
Nichts.“ (AI.xii.70) 
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degree; otherwise he would not care about the harmonies.367 
 
Leibniz seems to run together a wide variety of notions in this late letter, but it 
might help us understand how he views the constitution of imperfect creatures. 
What makes it so difficult to understand the analogy between binary numbers and 
the constitution of creatures is that creatures seem precisely not to carry divine 
perfections (and their absolute negations), but perfections to a limited degree.368 
Here the degree of essence is defined in terms of harmony, and the analogy with 
the binary system might need to be understood in this harmonic sense rather than 
giving illuminating insight into the constitution of created substances. 
 But, as is frequently the case with Leibniz, we might have a different 
understanding of ‘limitation’ than the one Leibniz has in mind. In other texts we 
find a different explanation of perfections, which does not construct them in terms 
of opposition or negation. For him, these limitations are not in fact something that 
has been taken away, but they are boundaries or the denial of further progress: 
 
Without doubt boundaries or limits are of the essence of creatures, but 
limits are something privative and consist in the denial of further progress. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that a creature, after a value is 
received from God and such as it affects the senses, also contains 
something positive or something beyond boundaries, and cannot in fact 
be resolved into mere limits or indivisibles. And hence I also think that 
what is postulated by the sense of the author's theses, from which he 
infers the resolution into mere limits or mere indivisibles, cannot be 
applied to a creature taken with its value. And this value, since it must 
consist of a positive, is a certain degree of created perfection, to which the 
power of action also belongs, which in my view constitutes the nature of 
substance. So much so that this value bestowed by God is in fact the 
energy or power imparted to things, which some people deny in vain, not 
noticing that they themselves, contrary to their expectation, fall into the 
doctrine of Spinoza, who makes God the only substance and everything 
else modes of it.369 
 
What Leibniz seems to deny is that the perfections of creatures are quantities such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Leibniz to Wolff, 18 May 1715, AG 233-34. 
368 Not everyone is convinced that Leibniz is serious his commitment to an analogy between 
creation and the binary system. See, e.g., Hans J. Zacher, Die Hauptschriften zur Dyadik von G. W. 
Leibniz. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des binären Zahlensystems (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1973), 34-55. 
369 Letter to Johann Christian Schulenburg (29 March 1698), Strickland 38. 
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that they can be easily measured and dissolved into discrete unities or indivisibles 
whose accumulation would render a measure which can be used to rank individual 
perfections on a numerical scale. As the point – the limit or boundary of a line – 
does not mark the cut-off of a finite line from an infinite line such that the infinite 
remainder beyond the point is negated of it, so is a limited perfection not merely a 
cut-out of an infinite perfection or the simple negation of an infinite degree of 
perfection.370 The picture suggested by this is similar to a view we encounter also in 
the case of primitive active and passive force when compared to their derivative 
counterparts. While the latter are quantifiable and measurable, there seems to be a 
gap between them and their primitive grounds, which prevents the former from 
being quantifiable. But it is also the fact that they are not quantifiable that preserves 
the possibility of their simplicity. The fact that they are not composed of parts, 
guarantees their unity and simplicity, a view that is also supported by Leibniz’s view 
on how to construct the properties of finite things without recourse to 
infinitesimals. 
This similarity is also supported by the idea of a hierarchy of monads that 
Leibniz presents in the Monadology: Based on the above account of imperfections 
and in accordance with the principle of continuity, i.e. one of Leibniz’s “great and 
best confirmed maxims that nature never makes leaps”371, we seem to arrive at a 
picture of an ordering of an infinite number of substances with God at the top, 
followed by “minds or rational souls”372, “souls where perception is more distinct 
and accompanied by memory”373, and entelechies (in the sense of Monadology §19 
as “simple substances which only have perceptions”374). But what, one might ask, 
does the analysis of the limitation of creatures add to the overall analysis attempted 
here? What is clothed here in theological considerations about imperfections of the 
created substances, is intimately connected with the considerations about 
activity/passivity and form/matter, a connection that is already in place at least by 
1686, and, of course, with the overall constitution of substance: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 A possibly similar view is proposed by Antognazza, but in terms of various aspects that can be 
negated. (See Antognazza, “Comments on Adams ‘The Priority of the Perfect’,” 129-30.) 
371 A VI vi 56/NE 56. 
372 Monadology §82: G VI 621/AG 223. 




When a change takes place by which several substances are affected (in fact 
every change affects all of them), then I believe one may say that the 
substance which immediately passes to a greater degree of perfection or to a 
more perfect expression exercises its power and acts, and the substance 
which passes to a lesser degree shows its weakness and is acted upon [pâtit].375 
 
If action is a perfection and passivity an imperfection, and “the primitive force of being 
acted upon [vis pimitiva patiendi] or of resisting constitutes that which is called primary 
matter”376, and if imperfection is a privation or limitation, i.e. nothing rather than 
something, then primary matter (and therefore to some extent possibly also the 
derivative secondary matter) seems to be nothing positive or ontologically given, 
but a consequence of the limitation which constitutes the difference between God, 
who is pure activity, and the limited substances subject to passions.377  
This account, the idea of a continuum of creatures that is bound by two 
extremes, namely God as the absolute perfect and purely active being on the one 
hand and nothingness or absolute nonbeing on the other, with only a difference in 
degree rather than kind, is also supported by Leibniz’s accounts of the nature of 
angels. They must move within these given boundaries as well, since “[n]o creature 
can be without nonbeing; otherwise it would be God. Angels and saints must have 
it.”378 In this writing of the 1690s, as we have already seen, Leibniz ascribes the 
essential limitation of all created substances to a certain participation in nonbeing. 
Such a notion of limitation might also serve to solve Adams’s puzzle about how 
limitation would not threaten simplicity: Since non-being does not add anything 
positive, or, rather is original and essential to the substance, limitation or 
imperfection does not consist in something being taken away as if the perfection-
in-the-maximum had parts that could be removed, it does not threaten the 
simplicity neither of the substance itself nor of its perfections.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) §15: G IV 441/AG 48. 
376 ‘Specimen Dynamicum’, GM VI 236-7/AG 119-20. 
377 In a Letter to Remond (11 February 1715), Leibniz writes: “Au reste, comme les Monades sont 
sujettes aux passions (excepté la primitive), elles ne sont pas des forces pures.” (G III 636.) 
378 DS I 411/L 386. 
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5.2. Metaphysical Evil  
 
From this essential or original limitation, a further constraint seems to be 
imposed on created substances. It is not only some basic fact about simple 
substances, but it extends further to the derivative physical constitution of 
substances, which is equally similar across all creatures: “I am inclined to believe 
that all finite immaterial substances – in the opinion of the ancient Church Fathers, 
even the genii or angels – are joined to organs and accompany matter and even that 
souls or active forms are found everywhere.”379 Even though, when one considers 
sicknesses and the overall rather rickety construction of what is our body, it might 
be suggested that this body is an unnecessary further constraint imposed on 
creatures, Leibniz regards it as well supported and a contribution to the overall 
perfection.  
 
[T]his very fragility is a consequence of the nature of things, unless we are 
to will that this kind of creature, reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, 
be not in the world. But that, to all appearance, would be a defect which 
some philosophers of old would have called vacuum formarum, a gap in the 
order of species.380 
 
There is a twofold notion of creaturely limitation of perfections in play, which 
clearly mirrors the twofold notion of passivity or matter that restricts the action on 
a metaphysical and on a physical level, respectively. In simple substances we find 
primitive passive power or essential creaturely limitation that consists in nonbeing 
or privation only. As such, it does not threaten their simplicity and hence their true 
unity, since it does not add anything positive such that the simple substance 
resulting from primitive powers would be composed of two different, separable 
principles.381 But this fundamental and purely privative matter or original limitation 
is to be distinguished from its derivative effects, to which it gives rise to some 
extent, when collaborating with infinitely many other simple substances. Because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 ‘On What is Independent of Sense and of Matter’ (Letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia, 
1702), G VI 507/L 552. 
380 T §14. 
381 Similarly, given the connection between perfection, activity and perception, confused perceptions 
(as the epistemological equivalent to primary matter) are more strongly limited perceptions when 
compared to clear perceptions, but not different in kind. 
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secondary matter is a collection of substances, it is not purely negative or passive, 
even if some of its properties derive from the privative nature of primitive passive 
power. But due to the positive nature of the substances involved, it is, in some 
sense, also created by God. And in this way Leibniz can claim that God is a 
substance without matter in the twofold sense, as a simple, absolutely independent, 
and exclusively active substance he is neither limited by any passivity nor can he, 
therefore, enter into secondary matter or a body that is the coming together with 
other simple substances: “God alone is a substance without matter, for it is he who 
created matter itself”382, he alone has neither primary matter – which is nothing but 
negation or privation, nor enters into an organic body as a constituent of some 
secondary matter. 
This reductive account that views perfections and imperfections in the light 
of activity and passivity might also illuminate further the relation of what Leibniz 
calls ‘physical’ (suffering), ‘moral’ (sin), and ‘metaphysical’ evil of which the former 
two are derivations.383 What grants the derivative forms of evil their status as an evil 
is based on their lack of perfection or goodness, i.e. it is the fact that they have a 
privative origin. As phenomena they appear in intimate connection with their active 
counterpart and hence as partially positive, i.e. as actions of some kind. But this is 
not to say that the evil aspect of their character is based on the primitive active 
force or original perfection that grounds their positive aspect, which is created by 
God. 
It is essential in this context that God is not the cause of primary matter if 
it can indeed be identified with creaturely limitation, since this limitation is the 
source of evil in the world. Otherwise it would seem as if God participates in the 
existence of evil by the very act of creating substances – a consequence Leibniz 
surely did not want to draw. And in his Theodicy, he offers several historical 
accounts that attempted to exonerate God from the charge of causing evil. 
Ancients, Leibniz claims, thought that there is uncreated matter that forms the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 LDB 61. 
383 Straightforwardly, the texts on evil, especially the Theodicy, allow also for a different reading that 
subsumes moral and physical evil under metaphysical evil; see Michael Latzer, “Leibniz's 
Conception of Metaphysical Evil,” Journal of the History of Ideas 55.1 (1994): 9. For a more complex 
construction of the possibility of moral and physical evil, see Newlands, “Leibniz on Privations, 
Limitations, and the Metaphysics of Evil,” 298-99. 
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basis for evil and which is, as uncreated, independent of God. But an answer like 
this is not available to Leibniz and most his contemporaries. 
 
But we, who derive all being from God, where shall we find the source of 
evil? The answer is, that it must be sought in the ideal nature of the 
creature, in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal verities which 
are in the understanding of God, independently of his will. For we must 
consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because 
the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues that it cannot know 
all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors.384 
 
Given divine foreknowledge, God will know before creating the best of all possible 
worlds which sins individual creatures will commit and which other evils will arise. 
But, at the same time, he cannot be held responsible for those evils and sins. He 
puts imperfect, sinful substances into being, but he does not put the imperfections 
themselves into being, for a simple reason: Those imperfections are nothing that 
could be put into being, since they do not constitute anything positive:  
 
God will be the Understanding; and the Necessity, that is, the essential 
nature of things, will be the object of the understanding, in so far as this 
object consists in the eternal verities. But this object is inward and abides 
in the divine understanding. And therein is found not only the primitive 
form of good, but also the origin of evil: the Region of the Eternal 
Verities must be substituted for matter when we are concerned with 
seeking out the source of things. 
This region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of good: but, 
properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no efficient cause, for it 
consists in privation, as we shall see, namely, in that which the efficient 
cause does not bring about.385 
 
There is an essential imperfection inbuilt into created substances, which is 
unavoidable, but which, furthermore gives rise to or forms the basis of further evil. 
Again the system build to accommodate sins, but resolving God from complicity in 
it, mirrors the structure of primitive and derivative forces. There is metaphysical 
evil on the most fundamental level, which is mere imperfection or non-being, 
giving rise to the possibility and actuality of physical evil, which consists in 
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suffering and moral evil or sin, and the effect of primitive privations is seen 
predominantly in experienceable actions of created beings.  
The lack of God’s cooperation in the genesis of evil is illustrated by 
suggesting it being analogous, if not the same as, inertia. The starting point is 
establishing a connection with the tradition: “[O]ne must consider the truth [...] 
that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends to the positive”386, 
and, Leibniz goes on, this can be set in analogy with physical phenomena we 
observe, namely “the ‘natural inertia of bodies’; and it is something which may be 
regarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitation of 
creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal character of the 
imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in its actions.”387 If 
one considers boats going down a stream, those that are heavily laden will go down 
the very same stream slower than lighter boats will. But since going downstream 
does not require an active effort on behalf of the boat, it shows that it is the matter 
that deprives the boat of speed or that reduces the boat’s receptivity towards the 
impression of action from the river. And this is analogous to God’s relation to 
creatures. God is the cause of perfection in action, as the current supplies the boat 
with the action of going downstream, but the limitation of receptivity is to be 
found in the creatures (or boats) themselves. And it is this limitation that causes 
any defects in actions.  
 
Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine and the Schoolmen were right to say 
that God is the cause of the material element of evil which lies in the 
positive, and not of the formal element, which lies in privation. Even so 
one may say that the current is the cause of the material element of the 
retardation, but not of the formal: that is, it is the cause of the boat’s 
speed without being the cause of the limits to this speed. And God is no 
more the cause of sin than the river’s current is the cause of the 
retardation of the boat. Force also in relation to matter is as the spirit in 
relation to the flesh; the spirit is willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits 
act . . .quantum non noxia corpora tardant.388 
 
The equation of limitation or original evil with non-being allows Leibniz to 
regard God as the origin of all action, perfection, positive, or good, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




imperfections and defects in operations are derivable from the original limitation of 
creature. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce a positive principle in order to 
account for the existence of evil.  
 
Evil itself comes only from privation; the positive enters therein only by 
concomitance, as the active enters by concomitance into cold. [... C]old is 
a certain privation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a 
movement which separates the particles of fluids.389 
 
It is, furthermore, the case that imperfection as a privation in creatures is 
the principle of passivity or of negation, and as such stands in a relationship of 
mutual dependence to the principle of activity or perfection, i.e., to the substantial 
form. As such, imperfection is absolutely inseparable from perfection, because it 
has to be viewed as being within the substance itself and because it is nothing but 
the limitation of perfection. Abstracted from the substance, it seems to be even 
less, namely not even conceivable at all. 
Such a reconstruction would maintain Leibniz’s thought that all substances 
are fundamentally constituted in the same way, such that there is one explanation 
of all created as well as (the one) uncreated substance. It also circumvents the 
worry that created substances qua being limited would be rendered infinitely evil 
due to infinite shortcomings in perfection in comparison with the one infinite 
substance. 
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6. Simple Substances as Points and not as Parts 
 
 
6.1. The Analogy with Mathematics and its Boundaries 
 
Leibniz, as we have seen, argues repeatedly that one of the shortcomings of 
matter is the fact that no principle of real or genuine unity can be found within it, 
because it is a mere collection or aggregation of parts ad infinitum. But, as one of 
Leibniz’s claims goes, the reality of a multitude is derived only from true unities; 
hence such true unities must be found somewhere as grounding principles. In his 
‘New System’ Leibniz offers several possible candidates that might fulfil this role 
and he is quite clear that it must be some kind of points that do so, either physical 
or mathematical or metaphysical points. Physical points, some kind of atoms in the 
traditional understanding of the term, can be excluded on the basis that their 
notion is incoherent or at least implausible. No thing can be material, if matter is 
understood to be something extended, and hence to be something that has parts of 
some kind, and perfectly indivisible at the same time, and therefore, Leibniz claims, 
it cannot possess genuine unity.390 We see here that Leibniz’s notion of indivisibility 
goes beyond physical inseparability. He denies, and given the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason it seems to be a denial on solid Leibnizian grounds, that something can 
have physical parts that are strictly speaking inseparable, unless some reasoning can 
be given that justifies this claim. As long as there is no such principle, the 
assumption of atoms as physical points that are extended but indivisible is nothing 
but question begging.  
But neither can this grounding principles be mathematical points, since they 
are nothing real, but merely ideal modalities or extremities, that is, abstractions. 
And even though physical points are considered to be unacceptable and 
mathematical points might possess the required unity, but lack reality, Leibniz sees 
good reason in referring to his genuine unities nonetheless by using the term 
‘point’:  	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It is only atoms of substance, that is to say real unities absolutely devoid of 
parts, that can be the sources of actions, and the absolute first principles 
of the composition of things, and as it were the ultimate elements in the 
analysis of substances. They might be called metaphysical points; they 
have something of the nature of life and a kind of perception, and mathematical 
points are their point of view for expressing the universe. But when a 
corporeal substance is contracted, all its organs together make what to us 
is only a physical point. Thus the indivisibility of physical points is only 
apparent. Mathematical points really are indivisible, but they are only 
modalities. It is only metaphysical or substantial points (constituted by 
forms or souls) which are both indivisible and real, and without them 
there would be nothing real, since without true unities there would be no 
multiplicity.391 
 
These ‘atoms of substance’ Leibniz is looking for are simple, i.e. ‘absolutely devoid 
of parts’, and, as we have already seen, not only active themselves, but also the 
ultimate foundation for the activity we find derivatively among the physical objects 
we encounter in our sense perception of the world. Similar to the simple concepts 
of his combinatorics392, they are the most fundamental level in the analysis of more 
complex things, in this case of (corporeal) substances. It seems also 
straightforwardly clear why Leibniz thinks that physical points do not suffice as the 
basic unities he is looking for: The objects we derive at by contracting “the animal, 
that is, the corporeal substance, which the dominating monad” together with “the 
organic machine, for which innumerable subordinate monads come together”393, 
will only constitute a minute physical object. But this object will not be a point in 
the strict sense, since its indivisibility is only an apparent one. Such a point amounts 
to nothing more than the atoms of the mechanistic philosophy endowed with some 
activity, and therefore to nothing more than objects that are nonetheless extended, 
but that will not qualify as unities in the strict sense. This claim does not only serve 
to illustrate the difference between the metaphysical and physical points, but it also 
entails the further assumption that the animal itself, even when contracted or 
enfolded to the maximum degree, and therefore also when it is unfolded in the 
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highest degree obtainable to it due to its nature, does not have genuine indivisibility 
and is, hence, not a substance in the strictest sense.  
 But the discussion of physical points shows in addition that Leibniz has 
definitively arrived at a solution for the problem of unity of substances. The charge 
is still that atomists as well as the Cartesians struggle with giving a sufficient 
explanation for the cohesion of the parts of an atom and a body, respectively, and 
cannot provide reasons as to why some parts should form an atom rather than 
other parts or indeed all parts, i.e. why the whole plenum should not rather be one 
unified substance.394 It is this charge and his solution that supply another reason 
that serves Leibniz in justifying his metaphysical points: these points possess the 
absolute unity of a partless and indivisible thing that, as a simple point, does not 
require any further explanation of its unity at all.  
 The main motivation Leibniz indicates in the passage cited above for 
referring to substances as ‘points’ seems to be their indivisibility, but he also 
introduces the notions of ‘ideal’ and ‘real’ as one of the criteria for distinguishing 
mathematics and metaphysics. Spelling out this difference between points in this 
way is also the solution Leibniz sees for the ‘labyrinth of the continuum’. 
 Mathematical objects, such as (mathematical) extension or space, as well as 
the surfaces, lines, and points that can be conceived in it, are, for Leibniz, merely 
relational systems comprising the relations of all possible existents (of which all 
actual existents are hence a subset).395 While the ideal or abstract allows for a ‘top 
down’ view, where the whole is prior to the parts, such as in numbers or lines, 
which come before their fractions, and which are therefore indefinite concerning 
their division, concrete physical objects. These physical objects are on the one hand 
actually infinitely divided, i.e., their parts are prior and their division is definite. But 
they are, on the other hand, also the result of a multiplicity of real simple 
substances, that is, of discrete unities from which they derive their reality. 
Concerning the continuum, the difference between the actual and the ideal is that 
ideal objects are not made of basic elements and that the relations they comprise 
(i.e. all possible relations) involve eternal truths. The phenomena of nature, given 	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that the ideal comprises all possible relations, are therefore accordingly structured, 
i.e. they have one determinate structure or division that is contained (among an 
infinity of others) in the ideal. When we consider real things, we are therefore 
concerned with the divisions that are actually made and which have the whole as a 
result.  
 
In fact, the number of simple substances which make up a mass, however 
small that mass may be, is infinite, since in addition to the soul which 
constitutes the real unity of an animal, the body of a sheep (for example) 
is actually subdivided: that is to say, it too is an assemblage of invisible 
animals or plants, which themselves are also compounded, in addition to 
also having that which makes up their own real unity. And even though 
this goes on to infinity, it is obvious that, all in all, everything comes down 
to these unities, all the rest, or the resultants, being only well-founded 
phenomena.396 
 
The argument Leibniz seems to have in mind is that mathematics deals with objects 
that comprise all possibilities and is independent of the reality of its objects, while 
actual existing things are, for obvious reasons, quite dependent on being real or 
having existence. This idea serves Leibniz occasionally to defend his infinitesimals 
against criticisms since it allows him to claim that mathematics is free to use 
notions that have no correspondence to things in nature, i.e. that mathematical 
analysis is not dependent on metaphysics and therefore the existence of infinitely 
small or great lines or other infinitesimal quantities is not necessary for them to be 
used as ideal concepts.397 The same reasoning gives rise to the claim that continuity 
is ideal, and that nothing in nature has perfectly uniform parts, even though the real 
“never ceases to be governed perfectly by the ideal and the abstract”398.  
This is of interest for Leibniz’s metaphysics, because it is connected with 
the analogy he draws between points and monads, and because it provides some 
further reasoning for why he regards monads as ‘metaphysical points’. Points 
neither compose the continuum that is a line nor do monads compose a 
continuous extended substance. 
 
A continuum is infinitely divisible. And this holds for a straight line or 	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what is formed from it, since a part of a line is similar to the whole. And 
so, since the whole can be divided, the part can be also, and similarly any 
part of the part. Points are not parts of a continuum but extremities, and 
there is no more a least part of a line than a least fraction of unity.399 
 
What is continuous and therefore also divisible can always be split in further 
smaller parts of the same kind as itself is, such as any line, no matter how short, will 
always be divisible into two even shorter lines. In the same way every extended 
body will always be divisible into smaller, but likewise extended bodies, without 
ever reaching an either unextended or indivisible smallest body (or a physical point 
in the strict sense of point). Even though not even an infinite number of points can 
compose a line, they are nonetheless fundamental for the existence of the line. And 
the relation of a point to a line is analogous to the relation of a monad to extension:  
 
That is, a simple substance, even though it does not have extension in 
itself, nonetheless has position, which is the foundation of extension, 
since extension is the simultaneous continuous repetition of position, just 
as we say that a line comes to be from the flux of a point, since in the 
trace left by a point its different positions are connected. Yet an active 
thing cannot arise from the repetition or continuation of an inactive 
thing.400 
 
And hence the function of monads is similar to that of points. Due to their lack of 
extension, points or monads can only contribute something to the extended 
objects, i.e. lines and extended bodies, respectively, by means of some kind of 
action or motion, such as a line is the path of a moving point. But they cannot, as 
essentially unextended things, immediately compose them or enlarge their 
quantitative extension. “[T]he primary matter proper to an entelechy, that is, the 
primitive passive power that is inseparable from the active power, is created with 
the entelechy itself (which it completes, so that it constitutes a monad or complete 
substance) [… and] does not enlarge the mass, or the phenomenon resulting from 
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the monads, any more than a point enlarges a line.”401 As it is fundamentally the 
activity of simple substances that gives rise to the phenomenon of extension or to 
extended phenomena, so is the line as the path, i.e. “the continuous and successive 
locus of a movable thing”402, arising from the motion of a point. This analogy, in 
turn, provides evidence for a fundamental difference between the metaphysical 
basis, the primitive active and passive force of a simple substance, and their 
derivative expressions in physical phenomena: An increase in the basis does not 
result in a measurable increase in the derivative forces, in the way that adding 
points to a line does not lead to a longer line. This lack of quantity and thus the 
lack of measurability seem essential to simple substances, in order to guarantee and 
uphold their simplicity. They are characterized by qualitative and not quantitative 
qualities. But this, by itself, poses a problem for the relation between monads and 
well-founded phenomena: while these phenomena are well-grounded due to the 
existence of the monads that give rise to them, there does not seem a necessary 
correspondence between the active forces and their derivations, since one can 
increase and decrease, while the other stays constant. It is, therefore, unavoidable 
to assign an essential role to perception and pre-established harmony in order to 
account for the behaviour of physical phenomena.  
But there is another aspect that metaphysical and mathematical points share 
and which further adds to the notion of simplicity. What it means essentially to be 
a point is to lack quantity, and hence to be considerable only under the aspect of 
quality. Here we find another reason for the fundamental difference between 
extension, as a spatial quantity, and simple substances, and the warning that one 
should not be considered under the aspect of the other. “Those things that pertain 
to extension should not be attributed to souls, and their unity and multitude should 
not be taken from the category of quantity, but rather from the category of 
substance, that is, not from [physical] points, but from a primitive force of 	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operating.” 403  Even though points cannot be considered as quantities, they 
nonetheless form the foundation of the quantities – in the way that primitive active 
and passive forces as the qualitative determination of individual simple substances 
or monads give rise to derivative active and passive forces. These derivative forces, 
since they are quantitative and hence measureable and mathematizable properties, 
ensure the possibility of physics as a proper science. 
The determination of these points is based on their internal properties and 
does not require the compresence of other objects that can serve as a yardstick or 
as an essential addition to the definition of the thing. Rather, it is the qualities of 
the simple thing itself that allow for its determination, individuation, and 
explanation: 
 
To make this more understandable, we shall now leave out of consideration 
all that we see in the particular things in which distance is involved and 
consider them as if they contained no plurality of properties; that is, we 
shall consider them as points. For that is a point in which nothing else can 
be assumed to coexist, so that whatever is in it is it.404 
 
It is worth noticing in this passage that Leibniz indicates a radical reduction, that 
we have so far more or less only deduced from his writings: It is not a plurality of 
properties that is in a point. Such an explanation sits well with a proposed 
reduction to one essential principle – active force – in the case of a metaphysical 
point, i.e. in a simple substance. Viewed in this way, it also becomes clear why 
Leibniz is not worried that essential simplicity endangers a multiplicity in the world, 
but is a prerequisite for it. For simple substances, “mathematical points are their point 
of view for expressing the universe”405, and even though it is not entirely clear what 
Leibniz means by this,406 we find further indications of this view: 
 
[...] the simplicity of a substance does not prevent the plurality of 
modifications which must necessarily be found together in the same simple 
substance; and these modifications must consist in the variety of relations 
[rapport] which the substance has with things outside. In the same way there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 PS on draft of letter to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709. 
404 ‘The Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics’ (after 1714), GM VII 25-26/L 671. 
405 WF 16. 
406 Margarita R. Levin, “Leibniz’ Concept of Point of View,” Studia Leibnitiana 12.2 (1980). 
163	  	  
may be found, in one centre or point, though it is perfectly simple, an 
infinity of angles formed by lines which meet in it.407 
 
It seems that its simplicity is what grants the possibility of an infinite variety of 
perceptions coming together in a substance. It is not only the unification in a point 
that is relevant, that its character as partless grounds also the possibility for it to be 
the centralized relatum of an infinite number of relations to other substances in the 
world, similar to a point in which not only lines, i.e. shortest connections with 
other points, come together, but which at the same time give rise to an infinite 
number of angles.408 And such a role of being a centre for an infinite number of 
properties, it seems, can only be fulfilled by something that is essentially simple and 
therefore does not require a further principle of unification for all these different 
relations and properties. The simple substance unites an infinite number of angles 




6.2. Mereology: The Constitution of Wholes and their Parts 
 
Given the important role that composite objects, their ontological status 
and relation to simple substances play in the argumentation for monads, and given 
that the essential definition of ‘simple’ is ‘not having parts’, taking a final, but 
tentative look at Leibniz’s mereology might provide useful clues for any further 
discussion. We have already seen that from a metaphysical point of view there is 
something fundamentally wrong with genuine parts as far as substantiality is 
concerned. But a clearer notion of parthood will also illuminate the relation 
between ‘being a part’ and ‘being a constituent’ or ‘being an immediate requisite’, a 
difference crucial in Leibniz’s explanation of the relation between substances and 
bodies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Principles of Nature and Grace §2: G VI 598/AG 207. 
408 A similar view is indicated in Helmut Pape, “Über einen semantischen Zusammenhang von 
projektiver Geometrie und Ontologie in Leibniz’ Begriff der Perspektive,” in Leibniz und Europa: VI. 
Internationaler Leibniz-Kongreß. Vorträge 1. Teil, ed. Albert Heinekamp and Isolde Hein (Hannover: 
Gottfried-Willhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 1994). 
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The clearest exposition of ‘part’ can be found in the ‘Metaphysical 
Foundations of Mathematics’409 (1715), which includes the following definitions: 
1. A quantity or magnitude is what can only be known through compresence, 
because it requires the presence or prior presence of a further thing, with 
which the thing in question is to be compared. 
Magnitudes such as extension seem to be what is given in the imagination or 
perception, a property of either abstract or concrete mathematical objects or the 
phenomenal extended bodies of our perception, but its exact determination is 
dependent on comparison with another thing that is used as some means of 
measure.  
2. A quality is what can be conceived in a way sufficient for their definition 
without requiring the compresence – in difference to a quantity or 
magnitude – of another thing. 
Qualities are non-relational and contain their full explanation in themselves, i.e. they 
do not need to be compared to other qualities of the same kind in order to be 
defined. Here we see the essential difference between the extension and activity of 
bodies in contradistinction to the activity of substances that gives rise to them. The 
former require other bodies in order to be compared with them and for their size 
and motion to be determined. The activity of substance as a quality is not 
quantifiable or a geometrically determinable and measurable, but fundamental and 
self-contained. 
3. Equal is what has the same quantity. 
4. What is similar has the same qualities and can thus be distinguished only 
when compresent. 
5. Two things are homogeneous when they have equals which are similar to 
each other: “Given A and B, and given that L equals A and M equals B, 
and that L and M are similar, then A and B are homogeneous.”410 
6. One thing is in another or is an ingredient of another thing, if with the 
positing of the latter the positing of the former is immediately understood. 
7. A part is a homogeneous ingredient of a whole. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 GM VII 17-29. 
410 GM VII 19. 
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These definitions themselves confront the interpreter with several problems and 
questions, especially if they shall be considered in connection with Leibniz’s 
substance theory. But they are, after called, metaphysical foundations of mathematics. 
First of all, it is worth noting that the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative properties is not entirely clear. Concerning quantities, it is uncertain to 
what extent they are relational, as the requirement of the presence of another object 
seems to suggest that they are based on some kind of comparison. But this is by no 
means clear. One way of viewing quantities is by considering the difference between 
having a particular property and having some property: “Having a particular length, 
say being twelve inches long, is a quantitative property. The property having length or 
being the sort of object that has length, as opposed to being a lengthless point, does 
not require compresence and so is not quantitative.”411 But this seems to be 
insufficient, as we would be inclined to think that the having of a particular length is 
a quantitative property as well, just the determination of that length requires an 
external object which provides us with (arbitrarily chosen) measurement units. That 
is to say that an object in question, e.g. a finite line, does have a certain length and 
that we know it must have a certain length (otherwise we would not conceive of it 
as being finite and also not as having parts), but in order to name this specific 
length, we need to compare it with some external scale. This view is also in 
accordance with Leibniz’s example given for the determination of quantitative 
properties through compresence. But it is impossible to give an exhaustive 
definition of ‘foot’ as we could only give definitions which include other 
measurement units, such as ‘30.48 centimetres’ or ‘12 inches’, since those defining 
units would themselves require further definitions and this process of defining 
would go on to infinity or in a circle.412 This suggests that quantitative properties, in 
order to have reality – albeit only borrowed one – are based on qualitative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Cook, Roy T. “Monads and Mathematics: The Logic of Leibniz’s Mereology.” Studia Leibnitiana 
32:1, 2000, 1-20; 4. 
412 GM VII 18-19: “Sic non potest cognosci, quid sit pes, quid ulna, nisi actu habeamus aliquid 
tamquam mensura, quod deinde aliis applicari posit. Neque adeo pes ulla definition satis explicari 
potest, nempe quae rursus aliquid tale involvat. Nam etai pedem dicamus esse duodecim pollicum, 
eadem est de police quaestio, nec majorem inde lucem acquirimus, nec dici potest, pollicis an pedis 
notio sit natura prior, cum in arbitrio existat utrum pro basi sumere velimus.” See also NE II.xii.4: 
“[I]t is impossible to have the idea of an exact determinate length: no one can say or grasp in his 
mind what an inch or a foot is. And the signification of these terms can be retained only by means 
of real standards of measure which are assumed to be unchanging, through which they can always 
be re-established.” 
166	  	  
properties and are still, at least in the given case of an external scale for determining 
lengths, in some sense ‘relational’. Let us assume a concrete example to illustrate 
this point: Given there are two finite lines A and B, and, as being finite, both must 
have the quantitative property of having a specific length. In order to know the 
relation of the lengths of A and B, we might either compare the two lines directly to 
see that ‘A is longer than B’ or we might apply a yardstick to determine that ‘A is 10 
inches long’ and ‘B is 9 inches long’ and thus conclude that ‘A is longer than B’. In 
both cases, some comparison between the lengths of the two lines or between the 
lines and some external object (a yardstick) is required. Nonetheless, the possibility 
of establishing any quantitative property is still based on the fact that the object that 
possesses such a quantity also possesses the more fundamental qualitative property. 
Thus, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative properties is in some 
sense a mirroring of the metaphysical distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
qualities, and it is in accordance with Leibniz’s dictum “that there are no purely extrinsic 
denominations, denominations which have absolutely no foundation in the very thing 
denominated.”413  
But, furthermore, it indicates that quantitative, measurable properties are 
relational and grounded in qualitative properties which are themselves not 
composed of units that can be measured – a thought we have already encountered. 
We might, thus, in a simplifying manner conclude that, in the application of the 
‘part’ in metaphysics, quantitative properties will play only a secondary role and 
qualitative properties are our main interest. But it is worth asking, why Leibniz 
introduces properties in mathematics which, in the form introduced there at least, 
do not enter into his metaphysics. One answer is that within the realm of ideal 
objects, to which those of mathematics belong, it is not problematic to include ideal 
relations or quantitative properties, and there, in mathematics, they are usefully 
employed. It seems prima facie unproblematic to say that certain features and 
properties can be found in one field, but not in another (as seems to be indeed the 
case with the ideal and actual continuum, i.e. infinite divisibility in abstract things 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Primae Veritates (1686?): C 520/AG 32. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see for 
example: Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz, 209-226; Massimo Mugnai, “Bemerkungen zu Leibniz’ 
Theorie der Relationen,” Studia Leibnitiana 10 (1978): 2-21; Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance 
and Individuation in Leibniz, 58-86.  
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and the infinite division in actual things)414. But while they are unproblematic in the 
ideal realm of mathematics, they are also to be found in physics and our ordinary 
everyday perceptions – and as quantities in the sense we understand them now, they 
must be reducible to qualitative properties of underlying non-quantifiable 
substances. 
But metaphysically even more challenging is the definition of ‘similarity’ as 
presented in the ‘Metaphysical Foundations’: The definition of two similar things as 
sharing all qualities and thus being only distinguishable by being present to the 
mind at the same time violates the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. And 
on this subject, Leibniz is, as we have seen earlier, astonishingly clear. There are no 
two things in nature which differ only in number. Again, concerning abstract or 
ideal objects, which are characterized by having notions which are “incomplete or 
abstract ... without regard to particular circumstances”415, the violation of this 
principle seems to be less distressing. It would then force one to say that the 
Identity of Indiscernibles is only applicable to things having a full determination, 
i.e. is only applicable to things which have a complete concept.416  
There is a slight tension with other utterances within the Arnauld-
Correspondence, such as the following:  
 
Can one deny that every thing (whether genus, species or individual) has a 
complete concept [notion accomplie] according to which God, who 
conceives of everything perfectly, conceives of it, that is to say a concept 
which contains or includes everything that can be said of the thing417. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 G IV 491/AG 146. 
415 G II 39/LA 41. 
416 Cook is aware of this problem, even though, allowing quantities and spatial location to make a 
difference in determination, the violation of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles appears later 
in the definition of congruent objects, i.e. objects which share all qualitative and quantitative 
properties. He offers as a solution that the Principle might be given up in mereology, because “[i]t is 
quite possible that Leibniz viewed the identity of indiscernibles as a contingent fact about the ‘best 
of all possible worlds’, and as a result it might not hold of his more general metaphysics of 
mathematical space which should apply to all possible worlds.” (Cook, “Monads and Mathematics”, 
8.) But this proposal rests partly on the assumption that the principle in question does not hold for 
all possible worlds, which would require further argument. For it being true in all possible worlds, 
see, e.g., Hacking, Ian. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” The Journal of Philosophy 72:9, 1975, 249-256; 
255.  
417 G II 131/ LA 73. 
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The most common approach to address this tension is to take a note into account, 
which Leibniz made in his own copy of his Correspondence with Arnauld and 
which introduces a distinction between full and complete concepts: “A full concept 
contains all the predicates of the thing, e.g., heat; a complete concept all the 
predicates of the subject, e.g. a hot fire. They coincide in individual substances.”418 
This distinction opens up several possibilities for a distinction between complete 
concepts as being reserved for proper or true substances and the full concepts for 
abstract, so that when we speak of complete concepts, we refer to the concept of 
an individual substance only.419  
We have seen so far that for Leibniz, at least by 1715, similarity (defined in a 
rather strong sense here as sharing all qualities) cannot be entertained in 
metaphysics. But with it, also homogeneity according to the definition above has to 
be discarded as it is based on the notion of similarity and cannot be a genuine 
attribute of existing things. And corresponding thoughts can be found in earlier 
writings, where Leibniz claims that  
 
it is justifiable to consider two similar triangles in geometry, even though 
two perfectly similar material triangles are nowhere found. And although 
gold and other metals, also salts and many liquids might be taken to be 
homogeneous, this can only be admitted with regard to the senses, and is 
not true that they are, in all rigor.420 
 
What became visible so far is the following: Strictly speaking, i.e. according to the 
definition of ‘parts’, what appears to us to be a homogeneous, extended thing 
cannot in fact be such a thing, because its parts would violate the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Leibniz never doubts that we do perceive things as extended and 
as having parts, but now we see that is an additional reason Leibniz might have had 
to regard them as metaphysically suspicious.421  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 G II 49/LA 54:  “Notio plena comprehendit omnia praedicata rei v.g. caloris; completa, omnia 
praedicata subjecti, v.g. hujus calidi. In substantiis individualibus coincidunt.” Please note that G II 
49 and A II.ii.71 read ‘hujus calidi’, Mason is following Lewis’s Lettres de Leibniz à Arnauld suggestion 
of ‘ignis calidi’. 
419 For such possible accounts, see e.g. Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 119-124, or Stefano Di Bella, The Science of the 
Individual. Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual Substance. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 379-80. 
420 Primae Veritates (1689?): C 520/AG 32. 
421 See, e.g., Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) §21; ‘Primary Truths’ C 523/AG 34; ‘Specimen 
Dynamicum’. 
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But there is a different relation defined in the ‘Metaphysical Foundation of 
Mathematics’, which has already been fruitfully employed by commentators: the 
relation of ‘being in’ (inesse). 
 
In general, we may say that an entity A "is in" an entity B if, when we posit 
the existence of a B, we must thereby be understood, without need of 
inference, to have posited the existence of an A. Put in slightly different 
terms, if A "is in" B, then the existence of an A (or the existence of As) is a 
special sort of necessary condition for the existence of a B, one which can 
be ascertained immediately upon examination of the nature of B.422  
 
Applied to metaphysics, we arrive at the following familiar picture: If bodies are in 
some sense real or well-founded, then they presuppose true unities.423 As such 
‘requisite’ or ‘constituents’, the true unities are thus metaphysically prior or simpler 
than the bodies they constitute, and the reality of those constituted bodies is only 
derived from the reality of its constituents. But, in addition, it is also the case that 
all quantitative properties are grounded in, and are in a certain sense reducible to, 
qualities that are predicates of non-qualitatively determined, hence partless subject. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422  Donald Rutherford, “Leibniz's "Analysis of Multitude and Phenomena into Unities and 
Reality",” Journal of the History of Philosophy 28:4 (1990): 539. 
423 See Rutherford “Leibniz's "Analysis of Multitude and Phenomena into Unities and Reality",” and 
Richard T. W. Arthur, “Presupposition, Aggregation, and Leibniz’s Argument for a Plurality of 






 There might be something that rings true about Kant’s claim that in a 
certain way “the Critique of Pure Reason might well be the true apology for 
Leibniz”424 and that there is more similarity between the two thinkers. Leibniz, as 
we have seen, also thinks that there are strong reasons to ascribe a phenomenal 
character to the objects we perceive, while the underlying or appearing substances 
are, to a certain extent, unknown to us. But he seems to be more confident that his 
Königsberger successor that there are at least some qualities of those appearing 
substances that we can know with certainty, albeit not in all detail. Among them, 
and capturing the most fundamental aspects, is the notion of ‘simplicity’.  
 Leibniz’s first philosophical endeavours occupy themselves with finding a 
principle of individuation for substances, under the explicit restriction that such a 
principle should apply independently of any determined ontologies. Whatever the 
principle that makes an individual thing the thing is, it is must be applicable to all 
kinds of substances that there might possible be. In the following years we can see 
that Leibniz tries to come to grips with what kinds of things might be regarded as 
genuine unities, but predominantly under the aspect of trying to explain how their 
constitution can explain the phenomena we perceive. In his first attempts to 
account for these phenomena, especially this attempts to make room for the 
possibility of corporeal substances, their material aspect and their cohesion, he 
introduces the notion of substantial forms as a fundamental concept of activity and 
main means to establish these properties. By the time of the ‘Discourse on 
Metaphysics’ in 1686 and the following correspondence with Arnauld, he has cast 
serious doubt about the possibility of aggregated unities such as extension or even 
bodies. They are, as infinitely divisible, too close to infinitesimals, which Leibniz by 
then regarded as fictitious entities. With the introduction of complete individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 Immanuel Kant, Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere 
entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (1790), in Akademie-Ausgabe, Band VIII (Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1968), 251. Translated in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter 
Heath, transl. by Gary Hatfield et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 336. 
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concepts that correspond to substantial forms, we see that the explanatory weight 
by now has shifted almost exclusively to those active principles that were 
previously treated by him as the preferred means to account for the reality of 
corporeal substances. But it is by no means clear that these so-called ‘middle years’ 
already entail a monadological point of view. But it seems clear that with their 
explanatory emphasis on substantial forms, these writings constitute a tremendous 
step towards such a view.  
 In the 1690s, these worries concerning composition and aggregation as well 
as the explanatory superiority seem to culminate in the introduction of ‘simple 
substances’ as the only required explanatory principle. The relativity that Leibniz 
ascribes to extension requires him to introduce a fundamental substance that can 
ground the relation of extension and must therefore itself be unextended. This idea 
is aided by the fact that Leibniz thinks that the aggregation of extended objects that 
are composed of extended parts, which themselves are composed of extended part, 
and so on to infinity, requires an explanation or grounding for its existence. The 
parts themselves cannot ground the reality, since the reality of their parts, and 
therefore their own reality is doubtful. If there is no fundamental level of atoms or 
other extended unities possible, Leibniz reasons, then there must be an unextended 
principle that grounds these seemingly extended objects.  
 Another reason for simple substances can be drawn from a wide variety of 
different areas Leibniz occupied himself with: As simple, these substances are not 
quantifiable or measurable. The problem is not only that all quantitative properties 
seem to fall prey to the problem of composition, but that they would also allow for 
a comparison with other similar quantitative properties. If they had quantitative 
properties, substances would not only be composed of unities that give rise to 
quantity, but they would also be infinitely imperfect, infinitely evil, and infinitely 
passive when compared to the divine substance. But, as simple and partless 
substances, their properties are not composed units that could give rise to a 
measurable quantity, and they are, therefore, not comparable – but also not fully 
knowable and calculable – for us.  
 There is, furthermore, an increasing conviction in the explanatory power of 
one simple, positive and active principle, that goes in its illuminating capacities 
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beyond what we encounter in physics and its objects. This principle also allows for 
an account of the essential limitation of creatures, while at the same time 
maintaining their analogy with a simple God as the paradigm substance. It is, 
furthermore, illuminated by Leibniz’s frequent allusions to the analogy between 
mathematical points and simple substances: It is due to their simplicity that simple 
substances are capable of uniting an infinite number of views or perspectives in 
individual being.  
 While such a reductionist view might not be appealing to everyone, it is 
clearly of Leibnizian spirit. The introduction of simple substances as the 
fundamental building block of the universe, that are nothing more than simple, 
limited, active unities, allow him to ground an infinite variety of phenomena. There 
might be an element of doubt as to what we can know about these simple 
substances. But since we are limited substances, we should expect that there are 
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